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and Origin of the Adverse Impact
Definition of Employment
Discrimination and a Recommendation
for Reform
Michael Evan Goldt
This Article examines the adverse impact theory of employment dis-
crimination under Title VII The author begins by discussing the develop-
ment of adverse impact in the case law, and by scrutinizing its theoretical
underpinnings. He demonstrates that Congress did not intend to mandate
adoption of adverse impact theory when it established Title VII The au-
thor then argues that the Courts have exceeded their authority under Title
VII by embracing the theory of adverse impact. He concludes that the
courts should therefore return to a narrower theory of employment dis-
crimination, namely, a theory based on the legal concept of "intent. "
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INTRODUCTION
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.
T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, pt. I
Two principal definitions of employment discrimination have
evolved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII, the
Act, or the statute).l One definition, generally called "disparate treat-
ment," is readily understood: motivated by a worker's race,2 an em-
ployer3 treats the worker less favorably than a worker of another race
would have been treated. For example, an employer commits disparate
treatment by hiring a white applicant instead of an equally qualified
black applicant because of the employer's preference for white employ-
ees. The specific intent to disadvantage for racial reasons is critical in
disparate treatment cases,4 though racial animus is not. Disparate treat-
ment occurs in our example whether the employer actively dislikes
blacks or merely believes that whites make better employees.
In contrast, intent is irrelevant to the other important definition of
employment discrimination, "adverse impact."5 Only effect counts. A
criterion an employer uses to make decisions concerning workers may be
racially neutral on its face, but, if the criterion disfavors proportionately
more qualified and interested blacks than whites and is not truly neces-
sary to the business, the criterion has an illegal adverse impact.6 For ex-
1. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)).
2. Title VII outlaws discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
Accordingly, not only blacks, but also whites and other racial groups, Jews, Catholics, women, His-
panics, etc. are protected in several ways. The remarks in this article apply with equal force to all
classes protected by the Act. Nevertheless, racial discrimination was the primary focus of the Con-
gress which enacted the Civil Rights Act; also, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
which this article examines closely, dealt with racial discrimination. Consequently, for convenience,
terms like "blacks" and "racial discrimination" are used to include all persons protected by Title VII
and all forms of discrimination outlawed by the Act.
3. Title VII outlaws discrimination by employment agencies and labor organizations as well
as by employers. The doctrine of Griggs applies to all of them equally. For convenience, unless
otherwise indicated, the word "employer" includes all possible violators of the Act.
4. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
5. Following the first edition of Barbara Sch1ei and Paul Grossman's influential book EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1976), the Supreme Court has labeled the second definition of
discrimination as "disparate impact." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 421 U.S. at
335 n.15 (1977). But the terms "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" are so similar as to be
confused easily. For this and the following reasons, "adverse impact" is used in this article instead
of "disparate impact."
The Supreme Court has suggested that disparate treatment is outlawed by §703(a)(l) of the Act,
and adverse impact is outlawed by §703(a)(2). See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 124, 137
(1976). Also, §703(a)(2) is the statutory basis of decision in Griggs, the case in which the Court
adopted adverse impact. The words "adversely affect" appear in §703(a)(2), and we use the root of
the first of these words. In deference to the Supreme Court, we use the word "impact" instead of
"effect," though the latter would serve as well. The result is a term, born of honorable parents, that
is not likely to be confused with its sister definition of discrimination.
6. ~ntcrnational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977).
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ample, an employer may allow persons of all races to take a pre-
employment examination, may score the examination fairly, and may
hire the applicants with the highest scores. Nevertheless, if the examina-
tion disqualifies proportionately more blacks than whites and does not
accurately predict who will succeed on the job and who will not, the
employer violates the Act by using the test.
Adverse impact is not well understood. For example, it is widely
held that proof that an examination is valid (that is, distinguishes quali-
fied from unqualified persons) is a defense. In truth, such proof is not a
defense,7 but destroys the plaintiffs' prima facie case. Adverse impact
has also spawned a number of difficult issues. For example, proportion-
ately how many more blacks than whites must be excluded by a selection
criterion to create a legally significant adverse impact?
These and other problems might be less important if Congress had
intended to outlaw adverse impact. In fact, however, Congress did not
intend to outlaw adverse impact; disparate treatment was the Eighty-
eighth Congress' only definition of discrimination. If the intent of Con-
gress were honored, many of the problems attending adverse impact
would disappear; further, the legitimate values underlying the creation of
adverse impact would still be served, and additional values would be
promoted.
In the following pages, Part I explains the theory and problems of
adverse impact. Part II demonstrates that disparate treatment was the
only definition of discrimination intended by Congress. Part III dis-
cusses the results that would obtain if the courts returned to the intent of
Congress.
A. The Theory
I
THE THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF ADVERSE IMPACT
The commonly accepted theory of adverse impact is well stated by
Schlei and Grossman:
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
substantial adverse impact, that is, of showing that the test at issue selects
those from the protected class [blacks] at a "significantly" lesser rate than
their [white] counterparts. If the plaintiff does not meet this burden, the
test's validity is irrelevant. If sufficient impact is demonstrated, the bur-
den shifts to the defendant to validate the selection device, that is, to
show that it is "job-related." If the employer fails in its burden, use of
7. In a true defense, the defendant concedes that the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case,
but offers a legally acceptable excuse. For example, a battery is an intentional harmful or offensive
contact. A defendant may admit such a contact ("Yes, I did punch the plaintiff in the nose") yet
successfully defend herself with a legitimate excuse ("1 thereby prevented him from striking me with
the ax he had raised over my head").
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the test will be deemed in violation of Title VII. If [the employer] suc-
ceeds, the plaintiff then attempts to rebut the defendant's evidence by
showing that although the test is job-related, it does not constitute a busi-
ness necessity in that an alternative selection device exists which would
have comparable business utility but could have a lesser adverse impact. 8
This formula, drawn from the Supreme Court's decisions in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.9 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 10 envisions a three-
step procedure. The plaintiffs put on their prima facie case. The em-
ployer puts on her defense. The plaintiffs may attack the defense. An
accurate understanding of adverse impact, however, reveals that there is
only one step. The employer's "defense" is actually a rebuttal of the
plaintiffs' prima facie case, and the plaintiffs' attack on the "defense" is
merely a further refinement of the prima facie case. In the end, the only
question in adverse impact cases is whether an employment practice
selects blacks and whites in numbers reasonably proportionate to the rep-
resentations of the races in the available work force. This view of the
theory of adverse impact is unorthodox and will now be explicated.
Consider the following hypothetical case. With the help of a well-
funded civil rights organization, a class of black plaintiffs sued an em-
ployer located in a large city, the population of which was half-black and
. half-white. The plaintiffs proved that the employer, who was seeking
drivers to handle dangerous cargo, required that applicants have a high
school diploma. Eighty percent of the whites but only 55 percent of the
blacks in the city had diplomas. During the time within Title VII's limi-
tations period, many persons of both races applied; the employer hired
sixty whites and forty blacks. When the plaintiffs rested their case, the
employer moved to dismiss; the motion was denied. Then the employer
proved that several different kinds of dangerous items had to be trans-
ported and each item had long and complex handling instructions. Fur-
ther, experts testified that a statistically significant, positive correlation
existed between having a high school diploma and performing success-
fully on the job at the end of one year, as measured by an objective per-
formance evaluation. Then the plaintiffs offered expert testimony that a
reading comprehension test, developed by an industrial psychologist and
administered to drivers with one year of experience, yielded a statistically
significant, positive correlation between scores of sixty-five points or
more on the test and satisfactory scores on the drivers' first-year per-
formance evaluations. The plaintiffs also proved that 90 percent of both
whites and 85 percent blacks in a random sample of adults in the city
8. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 91-92 (2d ed. 1983)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN 2d ed.].
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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scored sixty-five or more points on the test. Administering and scoring
the test cost one dollar per person. The judge held for the plaintiffs.
Let us analyze what happened in thi~ case. The plaintiffs began by
nominating a proxy for the available work force. The available work
force is the class of workers who are willing and able to perform the job
in question. In an adverse impact case, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
an employer's selection criterion has an adverse impact on their class in
the available work force because the effect of the criterion on other per-
sons-who do not want the job or are not qualified for it-would be
irrelevant. 11 But rarely if ever can a plaintiff produce direct evidence on
the available work force. As a rule, the many persons who might be
willing and able to perform a specific job are dispersed throughout a large
area. Even if tools were readily available to measure which of these per-
sons were genuinely interested in and qualified for the job, collecting the
relevant information would be prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the
necessary tools are not readily available. Other than counting applicants,
measures of real interest in a specific job are highly problematic; and, as
will be noted again below, valid ability tests for specific jobs are difficult
and expensive to develop. Indeed, the basis of adverse impact cases
against employers is their failure to use valid indicators of ability. In our
hypothetical case, for example, many persons might have been willing
and able to drive for the employer, and they were scattered about a large
city. To produce direct evidence on the available work force, the plain-
tiffs would have had to devise valid tests both of ability to perform and of
interest in holding the job of driving dangerous cargo for the defendant
employer. Then the plaintiffs would have had to administer these tests to
a significant number of persons in different parts of the city.
Accordingly, instead of trying to delineate the available work force,
adverse impact plaintiffs must rely on the concept of proxies. A proxy is
a class of persons with two important characteristics: first, the proxy is
reasonably representative of the real class in which we are interested;
second, the information we need about the real class can be obtained
about the proxy. Thus, what can be proven to be true of the proxy is
inferred to be true of the real class.
In our hypothetical case, the plaintiffs used the population of the
11. An employer can commit disparate treatment against an unqualified applicant for a job.
For example, an advertisement stating, "Blacks need not apply," is discriminatory against even un-
qualified black workers, who deserve the same opportunity to apply that the employer affords un-
qualified whites. An injunction against the advertisement would therefore benefit unqualified blacks,
who thus have a genuine legal interest. (Of course, an unqualified black would not be entitled to
back pay because he would not have been hired.) But an employer cannot commit adverse impact
against an unwilling or unable worker because such a worker has no legally relevant interest. An
unqualified black who is excluded by a selection criterion that is neutral on its face. has an adverse
impact on blacks, and is not job-related, occupies the same position as an unqualified white. An
injunction against the selection criterion would not benefit the unqualified black in any way.
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city as a proxy for the available work force. The proxy was half black
and half white. What did the plaintiffs prove? Section 703(a)(2) pro-
hibits conduct composed of four elements: (1) classification of workers
or applicants (2) by an employer, which classification (3) disadvantages
blacks (4) because of their race. The plaintiffs' evidence proved in a
straightforward way the existence of the first two elements: the employer
adopted a high school diploma as a selection criterion, thus dividing ap-
plicants into two classes: those with and those without diplomas.
The third element was more difficult to prove because whites as well
as blacks failed to get the job. The plaintiffs argued that a large group of
new hires should reflect the racial composition of the available work
force. One hundred is a large group, and the city (which was their proxy
for the available work force) was half-black and white; therefore, fifty of
the newly hired employees should have been black. Because only forty of
the new hires were black, the class of blacks in the available work force
was disadvantaged vis-a-vis the class of whites.
Proof of the fourth element was even more difficult. The words "be-
cause of such individual's race" suggest the necessity of a causal connec-
tion between what happens to an individual and her race. The plaintiffs
did not prove the employer adopted the diploma requirement purpose-
fully to exclude blacks, so race as a cause in the sense of motivated be-
havior was not established. Nor did the plaintiffs prove that the diploma
requirement excluded only blacks, so race as a cause in the sense of "but
for" or necessary antecedent was not established. And the plaintiffs did
not prove that all blacks were excluded, so race as a cause in the sense of
sufficient antecedent was not established. What the plaintiffs did prove
was a greater association between being white and being eligible for the
job (80 percent of whites held diplomas) than between being black and
being eligible for the job (55 percent of blacks held diplomas). This proof
may be characterized as "associative causation."
In support of the motion to dismiss, the employer offered two argu-
ments. First, he challenged the plaintiffs' proxy directly, arguing that the
entire population of the city was an unacceptable representative of the
class of willing and able drivers. He pointed out that the population in-
cluded persons too young to work, persons too old to work, persons dis-
abled from working, persons unqualified to be drivers, persons holding
satisfactory jobs and therefore not interested in this job, etc. The plain-
tiffs responded that proportionately as many blacks as whites probably
fell into most of these' categories. There were perhaps proportionately
more black than white children too young to work, but this fact was
balanced by the likelihood that there were proportionately more blacks
than w~ites in low-paying jobs who would be willing to change jobs and
become drivers. The judge accepted the plaintiffs' argument. Her com-
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mon sense told her that blacks as well as whites can drive trucks, and at
least as many blacks as whites were probably interested in this job. Also,
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 12 the
Supreme Court had accepted the population as a proxy for the available
work force in upholding a finding of discrimination against a trucking
company.
The employer's second argument was that the plaintiffs had failed to
show the diploma requirement had a sufficient adverse impact on blacks;
he contended the difference between 55 percent and 80 percent was too
small to constitute discrimination. The plaintiffs replied that the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. had found that a high school
diploma requirement had an adverse impact when 34 percent of whites
but only 12 percent of blacks could satisfy the requirement; 13 also, the
Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
state that adverse impact occurs if the selection rate of blacks is less than
eighty percent of the selection rate of whites. 14 Seeing that the differen-
tial in rates of success on the diploma requirement was greater in the case
at bar (80 percent - 55 percent) = 25 percent than in Griggs (34 percent
- 12 percent = 22 percent), and that the black success rate was only (55
percent -:- 80 percent = 60 percent) of the white success rate, the judge
rejected the employer's second argument as well and denied the motion
to dismiss.
At this point, three seemingly different tactics were open to the em-
ployer. First, he could have tried to prove that a better proxy for the
available work force existed and that his selection criterion had no ad-
verse impact on blacks in this proxy. Second, he could have accepted the
plaintiffs' proxy and tried to prove through more refined statistical analy-
sis that the criterion had no adverse impact. Third, he could have tried
to validate his selection criterion, that is, prove the diploma requirement
was job related because it distinguished qualified from unqualified candi-
dates for the job. The first two tactics would have been obvious straight-
forward attacks on the plaintiffs' prima facie case. Though not so
obvious, it is nonetheless true that the third tactic would also have been
an attack on the prima facie case. Indeed, the third tactic is no different
from the first, for although proof that a test is valid is generally consid-
ered a defense, in fact such proof destroys the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
Speaking precisely, the employer persuades the judge to reject the plain-
tiff's proxy because a better one exists. Consider:
An employer is allowed to use a valid selection criterion, despite its
adverse impact, because the criterion distinguishes qualified from unqual-
12. 431 u.s. at 337 n.17 (1977).
13. 401 U.S. 424 at n.6.
14. 29 CFR § 1607.4D (1981).
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ified persons.15 Therefore, proof that a selection criterion is valid is proof
that persons who do not satisfy the criterion are not members of the
available work force. It follows that, when an employer validates a selec-
tion criterion, he proves that the persons whom the criterion excludes are
unqualified and, consequently, any adverse impact on them is legally ir-
relevant. Because these persons were included in the plaintiffs' proxy,
the employer has proved that his proxy (generated by a valid selection
criterion) more accurately represents the available work force. Thus, val-
idation of a selection criterion is not a defense to discrimination, but an
attack on a key element of the prima facie case.
Applying this analysis to our hypothetical case, we see that the
plaintiffs had originally convinced the judge that interest in and ability to
perform the job of driver were both probably distributed evenly among
blacks and whites in the city. By proving that graduation from high
school correlated positively with scores on performance evaluations, the
employer established that possession of a high school diploma was a reli-
able index of ability to perform on the job. Thus, the judge was per-
suaded that application of the diploma requirement created a class that
represented the available work force better than the plaintiffs' proxy did.
The assumption of equal distribution of ability was replaced with evi-
dence that the available work force was composed of 59 percent whites
and 41 percent blacks.16 The employer proved nothing about interest,
but impliedly assumed that black and white high school graduates were
equally interested in the job. Because (60 -:- 100 =) 60 percent of the
newly hired employees were white and (40 -:- 100 =) 40 percent were
black, the representation of blacks among newly hired employees was
almost exactly what would have been expected, rebutting the plaintiffs'
prima facie case of adverse impact.
There remained the possibility that the plaintiffs could improve on
the employer's proxy. As noted above, this possibility almost never oc-
curs; but because the plaintiffs were supported by a wealthy civil rights
organization (and because a good hypothetical case should include major
theoretical possibilities), the plaintiffs were able to offer proof of an alter-
native selection criterion that was valid, -inexpensive, and had a lesser
15.
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously
they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms
controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job perform-
ance. . . . Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such quali-
fications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become
irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person
for the job and not the person in the abstract.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 436.
16. In a population that was half white and half black, if 80% of whites and 55% of blacks
held diplomas, (80 -7- 135 =) 59% of high school graduates were white and (55 -7- 135 =) 41% of
graduates were black.
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adverse impact. They proved that a professionally developed test of
reading comprehension used as a selection criterion yielded a statistically
significant, positive correlation between success on the criterion and suc-
cess on the job. The plaintiffs also proved that the reading test had a
lesser adverse impact on blacks, for the test could be passed by 90 per-
cent of whites and 85 percent of blacks, whereas the diploma requirement
was satisfied by only 80 percent of whites and 55 percent of blacks.I7
And, at a cost of only one dollar per person, the test was not costly to
use. Like the employer, the plaintiffs proved nothing about interest; they
too relied on an implied assumption, namely, that black and white scor-
ers of sixty-five and better were equally interested in the job.
In the end, the judge decided the plaintiffs' reading test created a
better proxy for the available work force than the diploma requirement.
This proxy was composed half of whites and half of blacks. 18 The em-
ployer's diploma requirement had resulted in the hiring of sixty whites
and forty blacks; based on the proxy generated by the reading test, we
would have expected the hiring of fifty whites and fifty blacks. The judge
concluded that the employer's diploma requirement had an adverse im-
pact on the plaintiffs' class.
A correct understanding of adverse impact reveals not only that
there is no true defense under this definition of discrimination, but also
that the only issue is whether an employment practice selects proportion-
ate numbers of blacks and whites. The plaintiffs must convince the court
that the employer's selection criterion has an adverse impact on a proxy
17. There was a difference between the plaintiffs' and the employer's validation strategies, but
the difference was not important. The employer hired high school graduates and validated the di-
ploma requirement against performance evaluations of the new hires after one year. The plaintiffs
could not follow this strategy because they could not place those who scored above 65 on the reading
test in drivers' jobs. Instead, the plaintiffs administered the test to drivers with one year's experience
and validated the test against their performance evaluations.
The plaintiffs' strategy is widely accepted. Perhaps in an ideal validation study, an employer
would rate each applicant according to a proposed selection criterion, hire applicants at random,
later rate the applicants' performances on the job, and compare ratings on the selection criterion
with ratings of job performance. But this strategy would be costly because of the inefficiency of
random. hiring. Therefore, it is acceptable to rate present employees against a proposed selection
criterion and compare these ratings with ratings of the employees' job performance.
The latter strategy is possibly biased for two reasons. First, present employees were selected in
the past according to a standard of some type and, if it was worth anything, the standard selected
qualified persons. Results on a test administered to persons with talent for a job may not indicate
results that will be obtained when the test is administered to all comers, many of whom are probably
unqualified. Second, present employees have learned something from their experience on the job.
Their scores on the test may not indicate the results that will be obtained when the test is adminis-
tered to persons who have not learned from performing the job. This possible bias notwithstanding,
the cost of an ideal validation strategy is considered so unreasonable that the less ideal strategy used
by the plaintiffs is permitted. Moreover, the employer's strategy could also have been biased by the
first of the reasons mentioned.
18. If90% of whites and 8~% of blacks passed a test, (90 -7- 175 =) 51% of those who passed
the test are white and (85
-'- 175 =) 49% who passed are black.
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f for the available work force. If the plaintiffs succeed, the employer must
defeat the proxy by validating his selection criterion, that is, by convinc-
ing the judge that the plaintiffs' proxy was false, that a better proxy exists
(it is composed of persons who succeed on the valid selection criterion),
and that there is no adverse impact on the proxy. If the employer suc-
ceeds, the plaintiffs must produce as good or better a selection criterion
that has a lesser adverse impact. Plainly, the war is fought over whose
proxy is better. Once the judge chooses the appropriate proxy, the only
remaining question is whether blacks and whites are selected according
to their representation in the proxy.
The practical significance of a correct understanding of the theory of
adverse impact is demonstrated in the following discussion of the
problems that have arisen under adverse impact.
B. The Problems
1. Proxies
The role of proxies in adverse impact theory was discussed above.
Because of the practical impossibility of identifying each member of the
available work force, plaintiffs resort to a proxy and examine the effect of
employer's selection criterion on blacks and whites in the proxy. A com-
monly acceptable proxy in the social sciences is a random sample of the
population under study, but random sampling is impractical in employ-
ment discrimination cases. Theoretically, plaintiffs could take a sample
of the available work force, note the sample's racial composition, apply
the employer's selection criterion to the sample, and compare the per-
centages of blacks and whites in the sample who passed the criterion with
the percentages of blacks and whites in the sample. But this is easier said
than done. Each person in the sample would have to be a member of the
available work force; thus, plaintiffs would have to develop means of
measuring interest in and ability to perform the job in question-in other
words, develop a job-related test. Employees cannot afford to do what
their employers find is all but impossible, regardless of cost. The prob-
lem, therefore, becomes how to choose another appropriate proxy.
When is a proxy close enough to the class the proxy represents to
justify using it in a court of law? How should a judge choose between
competing proxies? Consider this hypothetical case. An employer was
located in a community that was half black and half white. She had job
vacancies in the entry-level position of helper, which was paid the mini-
mum wage. A thousand blacks and 500 whites applied for jobs. Each
applicant was given a paper-and-pencil test; 100 passed and were hired
over the course of a few weeks. Fifty of the new helpers were white, and
fifty were black.
Two proxies for the available work force in this example spring to
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mind. It can be argued that no reason exists to believe that blacks were
less interested than whites in this sort of work and that, because the job
of helper required no prior training, proportionately as many blacks as
whites were qualified to do the work. This argument would support
choosing the community as the proxy for the available work force. The
community was half black and half white, and half of the new hires were
black, half white. Thus, using the community as the proxy for the avail-
able work force might lead to an inference that the selection process had
no adverse impact. On the other hand, it can also be argued that,
although ability to do the job may not have varied across classes, interest
in the job probably did vary. A good measure of interest is applying for
the job. Accordingly, runs the argument, the right proxy was the pool of
applicants. Two blacks for each white applied, yet only one black for
each white was actually hired. Whereas we expected that sixty-seven
blacks and thirty-three whites would be hired, in fact fifty members of
each race were employed. Thus, using the applicant pool as the proxy
for the available work force might lead to an inference that the selection
process had an adverse impact.
The difficulty of choosing proxies is not hypothetical. Consider
Griggs. The plaintiffs established that the high school dipioma require-
ment had an adverse impact on blacks by proving that, in 1960, 34 per-
cent of the white males in North Carolina had completed high school, as
compared to only 12 percent of the black males in the state.19 Was the
male population of the state an appropriate proxy for the available work
force for the jobs at the Duke Power Company? Reasons exist to doubt
the validity of assumptions on which use of this proxy was based. First,
it assumed that there were no women in the available work force, yet
women were probably interested in and able to perform a number of the
jobs at the station. Second, the proxy assumed that state-wide averages
applied to the small, rural town of Draper, where the Dan River station
was located.2O But high school graduation rates tend to be lower in rural
areas than in urban areas. Because the workers at the Dan River station
certainly lived nearby, the state-wide figures, which included the 40 per-
cent of the state's population that lived in cities,21 were probably different
from the graduation rates in the available work force. Whether the
black-to-white graduation ratio was the same in a rural area as in the
state as a whole is not clear a priori. Third, the proxy assumed that
blacks and whites of all ages were equally interested in these jobs. In
fact, however, jobs that require heavy physical labor are generally more
attractive to younger workers. Because of changing attitudes and judicial
19. 401 U.S. at 430.
20. Id. at 426.
21. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 322 (1966).
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decisions like Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,22 more young
blacks held high school diplomas in 1970 than did their elders.23 As a
result, the graduation rate for blacks of all ages in the state probably
differed from the graduation rate of blacks in the available work force.
Finally, the proxy assumed that all workers at the Dan River station
lived in North Carolina. A map reveals, however, that Draper lay hard
by the southern border of Virginia.24 Some of the workers at the station
probably lived in Virginia, where black and white graduation rates may
have been different from those in North Carolina.
In spite of these objections, the male population of the state may
have been a rough proxy for the available work force. After all, most of
the jobs at the Dan River station were probably unattractive to women in
1966, so excluding them from the proxy may have had little effect. Both
whites and blacks probably completed high school in lower numbers in
rural areas of the state, so that the difference between the percentages of
whites and blacks excluded by the diploma requirement was still large.
Younger blacks may have held diplomas in higher proportions than older
blacks, but the same was true of whites (albeit in less dramatic figures);
thus, the spread between white and black graduation rates in the avail-
able work fOrce was probably less than 34 percent to 12 percent but
nonetheless substantial. And what was true of northern North Carolina
was in all likelihood true of southern Virginia. The point, therefore, is
not that the Supreme Court relied on an inappropriate proxy in Griggs,
but that use of proxies is complex-much more complex than the Court
seems to have realized in 1971.
Perhaps Griggs is the wrong case to examine so closely. It was the
first case of its kind; the parties may not have appreciated the importance
of identifying an accurate proxy for the available work force, and the
Supreme Court may not have fully realized the assumptions on which its
proxy rested. Unfortunately, the Court's understanding of proxies was
little better in Dothard v. Rawlinson,25 which was decided six years after
Griggs. The plaintiff in Dothard applied to become a prison guard, but
she was rejected because she failed to meet a requirement that guards
weigh at least 120 pounds.26 Representing the class of all women who
might be employed as prison guards, she challenged this requirement, as
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). ,
23. In 1970, only 10.7% of blacks aged 55 to 64 and 19.8% of those aged 45 to 54 had com-
pleted four years of high school, whereas 39.7% of blacks aged 18 to 24 and 38.4% of those aged 25
to 34 had done so. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 205 (1983). Younger whites also
graduated from high school in greater numbers during comparable periods, id., but the increases
were smaller.
24. Draper is no longer on the map, but has been consolidated with two other towns to form
Eden.
25. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
26. Id. at 323-24.
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Reliance on demographic data was not misplaced when there was no rea-
son to suppose that the physical characteristics of men and women who
were willing and able to be prison guards in Alabama differed from the
physical characteristics of the national population. One mayor may not
accept this conclusion, but one must agree that the Court did not charac-
terize the issue correctly.
The second error is equally serious. The Court wrote that a plaintiff
need only introduce evidence that "conspicuously demonstrates a grossly
discriminatory impact. If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies
in the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing
evidence of his own.,,33 This language strongly suggests that the burden
falls on the defendant to convince the court that the plaintiffs' proxy is
not accurate, provided only that the plaintiffs' evidence reveals a suffi-
ciently gross adverse impact. But surely when plaintiffs use a proxy, the
burden is theirs to convince the court that the proxy is a reasonably accu-
rate substitute for the available work force. This error is substantive as
well as procedural. If a proxy is not acceptably accurate, even the gross-
est adverse impact on the blacks in proxy would be meaningless as an
indication of the effect on the available work force. That a selection cri-
terion excludes disproportionate numbers of blacks living in California is
irrelevant if the available work force for the job in question is located in
New York.
The Supreme Court's difficulty is dealing with proxies had not
abated when New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer34 was decided.
The Transit Authority refused to hire anyone being treated for heroin
addiction wit~ the drug methadone. 35 The plaintiffs proved that blacks
and Hispanics comprised 20 percent of the labor force for New York
City and 36 percent of the metropolitan population,36 but that at least 40
percent, and perhaps as many as 63 percent, of the persons in public and
private methadone programs were minorities.37 The district court held
that the methadone rule had an adverse impact on minorities38 and en-
joined the Transit Authority from denying employment (except in safety-
sensitive jobs) to persons who had used methadone successfully for one
year.39 Although the district court did not explain its reasoning, we can
construct a likely analysis: Minorities constituted about one-third of the
available work force, thus the class excluded by a non-discriminatory se-
33. Id. at 331.
34. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
35. Id. at 576.
36. !d. at 586 n.30.
37. Id. at 579, 585. The Court quibbled with this percentage, arguing it could have been as low
as 40%. Id. at 586 n.30. The actual percentage is irrelevant for the purpose of the argument in the
following text.
38. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
39. 440 U.S. at 578.
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lection criterion would be about one-third minority as well. In fact, the
class excluded by the Transit Authority's criterion was almost two-thirds
minority. Although many participants in methadone programs were
surely unwilling or unable to work for the Transit Authority, probably as
many Anglo as minority participants were willing and able (and thus
members of the available work force). For this reason, the class of par-
ticipants in methadone programs was a fair proxy for the class of partici-
pants in the available work force. Because two-thirds of the persons
excluded by the methadone rule were minorities, whereas a non-discrimi-
natory criterion would have yielded a figure of one-third, the district
court held the criterion had an adverse impact.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that these statistics did not
prove a violation of Title VII.4O Justice Stevens wrote:
[T]he District Court noted that about 63% of the persons in New York
City receiving methadone maintenance. . . are black or Hispanic. We
do not know, however, how many of these persons ever 'Y°rked or sought
to work for TA [Transit Authority]. This statistic therefore reveals little
if anything about the racial composition of the class of TA job applicants
and employees receiving methadone treatment. More particularly, it tells
us nothing about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and employ-
ees who have participated in methadone maintenance programs for over
a year-the only class properly excluded by TA's policy under the Dis-
trict Court's analysis. The record demonstrates, in fact, that the figure is
virtually irrelevant because a substantial portion of the persons included
in it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the illicit use of
drugs and alcohol--or have received successful assistance in findingjobs
with employers other than TA. Finally, we have absolutely no data on
the 14,000 methadone users in private programs, leaving open the possi-
bility that the percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the class of metha-
done users is not significantly greater than the percentage of those
minorities in the general population of New York City.41
Thus, the majority refused to accept participants in methadone programs
as a proxy for methadone users who were willing and able to work for
the Transit Authority (that is, who were in the available work force) for
four reasons: there was no evidence on the ethnic composition of partici-
pants who had used methadone for one year; some participants had
found other work (and therefore were unwilling to work for the Transit
Authority); some participants had reverted to use of illicit drugs (and
therefore were unqualified to work for the Transit Authority); and the
racial composition of methadone users in public programs might have
differed from that of methadone users in private programs.
Justice White dissented, offering persuasive reasons for accepting
40. Id. at 584.
41. Id. at 585-86 (footnotes omitted).
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the proxy. Responding to the argument that some participants in metha-
done programs were not interested in working for the Transit Authority
(for example, because they had found other jobs) and, thus, were not in
the available work force, he pointed out that many participants certainly
were interested in jobs with the Transit Authority; 5 percent of all
Transit Authority applicants were rejected because of use of drugs, and
this figure undoubtedly included many minorities using methadone.
There being no reason to believe that proportionately fewer minority
than Anglo users of methadone were unwilling to work for the Transit
Authority, it followed that most methadone-using applicants were proba-
bly minorities.42
Justice White offered a similar response to the argument that many
participants in methadone programs were disqualified from working for
the Transit Authority because they had reverted to use of illicit drugs.
Since there was no reason to believe that proportionately more minority
than Anglo participants had lapsed into use of other drugs, it followed
that most persons who had successfully been maintained on methadone
for one year and who were qualified to hold jobs at the Transit Authority
were minorities.43
We cannot dig too deeply into the disagreement over the racial com-
position of methadone participants in private as opposed to public pro-
grams; the dispute is factual, turning on interpretation of evidence in the
record. Nevertheless, we may note the unlikelihood of the majority's
suggestion that all participants in private programs might be white (in
which case, the percentage of minorities in methadone programs would
have been the same as the percentage of minorities in the metropolitan
population). There was apparently no evidence to indicate that Anglos
enrolled in pnvate programs at a greater rate than minorities. Whatever
reasons might a priori suggest this possibility would be dispelled by the
fact that 80 percent of all heroin addicts in the metropolitan areas were
minorities.44 Justice White's inference was the more reasonable: minori-
ties probably participated in private programs in about the same percent-
ages as in public programs,45 so that 60-65 percent of methadone users
were black or Hispanic.
Whether one accepts the reasoning of the majority or the dissent,
one point is established: the choice of proxies is a difficult issue under
adverse impact.
42. ld. at 599-600.
43. ld.
44. ld. at 601 n.7.
45. ld. at 601.
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2. Methods of Comparison
Another issue concerning the prima facie case of adverse impact is
the appropriate method of comparing the effects of an employment prac-
tice on racial classes. Two methods are possible: comparison of success
rates and comparison of failure rates. The Supreme Court has used both,
yet the two methods produce different results in similar cases.
In Griggs the Court compared success rates. In analyzing the di-
ploma requirement, the Court used the adult male population of the state
as a proxy for the available work force and compared the success rate on
the requirement of blacks within the proxy to the success rate on the
requirement of whites within the proxy. The diploma requirement had
an adverse impact because 34 percent of white males, but only 12 percent
of black males, had completed high school. In analyzing the testing re-
quirement, the Court used the class of persons who took the tests as a
proxy for the available work force and compared the success rate on the
tests of blacks within the proxy to the success rate on the tests of whites
within the proxy. The testing requirement had an adverse impact be-
cause 58 percent of whites, but only 6 percent of blacks, passed the test.
Thus, in Griggs the Court determined the existence of adverse impact by
comparing rates of success within proxies for the available work force.
In Dothard the Court compared, not success rates, but failure rates
within the proxy. The national population was accepted as a proxy for
the available work force, and adverse impact was found because the
height and weight requirements excluded 41 percent of women, but less
than 1 percent of men.
In Beazer the Court again compared failure rates. The court major-
ity and minority battled over whether participants in public methadone
programs constituted a fair proxy for methadone users in the available
work force, but both sides determined the existence or absence of adverse
impact by comparing the percentages of Anglos and minorities in the
class of persons excluded by the methadone rule. Examining relative
representations in the class of excluded persons is another way of com-
paring failure rates.46
In Connecticut v. Teal,47 the Supreme Court reverted to comparing
success rates. The plaintiffs proved that 48 blacks and 259 whites took
an examination for a promotion, and 26 blacks (54 percent) and 206
whites (80 percent) passed. The Court implicitly accepted the class of
test-takers as a fair proxy for the available work force. The black success
rate was (54 percent -:- 80 percent =) 68 percent of the white success
rate. Although the employer did not contest the finding of the district
46. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
47. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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court that this ratio constituted adverse impact, the Supreme Court spe-
cifically noted that the examination
resulted in disparate impact under the "eighty percent rule" of the Uni-
form Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures adopted by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Those Guidelines provide that a
selection rate that "is less than [80 percent] of the rate for the group with
the highest rate will generally be regarded. . . as evidence of adverse
im pact. ,,48
Comparing failure rates with representation in the class of excluded
persons yields similar results; the methods used in Dothard and Beazer
are interchangeable. But comparing success rates to either of these meth-
ods yields different results in similar cases. Indeed, results are the same
only in the extraordinary case in which the success and failure rates are
equal. The following examples demonstrate the truth of these assertions.
Let us begin with the extraordinary case. Suppose 1,000 blacks and
500 whites applied for work and were given a test; 100 blacks and 50
whites passed and were hired, and 900 blacks and 450 whites were re-
jected. Let us accept the pool of applicants as a proxy for the available
work force. The black success rate was (100 -:- 1,000 =) 10 percent; the
white success rate was the same (50 -:- 500 = 10 percent). Therefore,
comparing success rates (as in Griggs and Teal) shows no adverse impact.
Comparing failure rates (as in Dothard) produces the same result. The
black failure rate was (900 -:- 1,000 =) 90 percent, which is exactly the
same as the white failure rate (450 -:- 500 = 90 percent). Comparing
representations in the class of excluded persons to representations in the
available~work force (as in Beazer) also shows no adverse impact. The
test disqualified two blacks for each white (900:450), and this ratio
matches the black:white ratio (1,000:500) in the pool of applicants.
Thus, all three methods yield the same result when success and failure
rates are exactly equal.
Now let us turn to the more usual case in which success and failure
rates differ. Suppose 900 of 1,000 black and 495 of 500 white applicants
passed a test and were hired. Comparing success rates shows no adverse
impact. The black success rate was (900 -:- 1,000 =) 90 percent; the
white success rate was (495 -:- 500 =) 99 percent; the eighty percent rule
is satisfied because the black success rate was (90 percent -:- 99 percent
=) 91 percent of the white success rate. Comparing failure rates, how-
ever, tells a different story. The black failure rate was (100 -:- 1,000 =)
10 percent; the white failure rate was (5 -:- 500 =) 1 percent; thus, the
black failure rate was ten times higher than the white failure rate, and
that result seems disproportionate. Similarly, comparing representations
in the excluded class to representations in the available work force seems
48. Id. at 443 n.4 (citations omitted).
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to reveal a disproportionality. The black:white ratio in the available
work force (1,000:500) leads us to expect to find two blacks for each
white in the excluded class; instead, we find twenty blacks for each white,
and this difference from our expectation suggests adverse impact.49
The adverse impacts in Griggs, Dothard, and Teal were so great that
any of the methods discussed above would produce the same result.
Lacking statistics on the number of persons in the available work force
(or a proxy for it, for example, the number of applicants), we cannot
calculate pass and fail rates for Beazer. Nevertheless, one day the
Supreme Court will be presented with a case in which a choice must be
made as to the method for measuring adverse impact, and the choice will
be difficult.
3. Legal Significance of Disparities
An equally difficult issue under the prima facie case of adverse im-
pact discrimination is whether a given disproportionality is legally signifi-
cant. Suppose 1,000 blacks and 500 whites applied for jobs, and 50
whites and 50 blacks were hired. Assume the court de"tides the pool of
49. An objection might be raised that the example in the text does not reveal adverse impact,
but, rather, that expectations must be adjusted for each method. The following example rebuts this
objection.
Suppose 700 of 1,000 whites (70 %) in a proxy for the available work force and 560 of 1,000
blacks (56 %) succeed on a selection criterion. The black success rate is (56% -:- 70% =) 80 % of
the white success rate. The black failure rate is (440 -:- 1,000 =) 44 percent; the white failure rate is
(300 -:- 1,000 =) 30%; so the black failure rate is (44% -:- 30% =) 147% of the white failure rate.
Focusing on representations in the excluded class, we find it is composed of (300 whites + 440
blacks =) 740 persons. Because the available work force is half black, we would expect to find (740
-:- 2 =) 370 blacks in the excluded class; instead, we find the actual number of blacks in this class is
(440 -:- 370 =) 119% more than expected. If comparing success rates yields the same results as
comparing failure rates of representation in the excluded class, and all we need to do is adjust our
expectations according to the method in use, adverse impact occurs if the black success rate is less
than 80% of the white success rate; if the black failure rate is more than 147% of the white failure
rate; or if blacks are represented in the excluded class at more than 119% of expectations.
Now let us modify the example somewhat. Beginning again with 1,000 blacks and 1,000 whites
in the available work force, suppose 900 whites (90%) and 770 blacks (77%) succeed on the selection
criterion. The black success rate is (77% -:- 90% =) 86% of the white success rate; thus, the eighty
percent rule is easily satisfied. Indeed, as measured by comparing success rates, there is less adverse
impact in this example than in the example in the preceding paragraph. Failure rates paint a differ-
ent picture. The black failure rate is (230 -:- 1,000 =) 23%; the white failure rate is (100 -:- 1,000
=) 10%. In the preceding example, we concluded that adverse impact occurs if the black failure
rate exceeds 147% of the white failure rate; here, the black failure rate is (23 -:- 10 =) 230% of the
white failure rate. Thus, as measured by failure rates, there is an adverse impact in this example,
even though, as measured by success rates, there is not. The same is true for comparing representa-
tions in the excluded class. It is composed of (100 whites + 230 blacks =) 330 persons. Because
the available work force is half black, we would expect to find (330 -:- 2 =) liS blacks in the
excluded class. In the preceding example, we concluded that adverse impact occurs if blacks are
represented in the excluded class in excess of 119% of expectations; here, blacks are represented in
the excluded class at (230 ..;- 115 =) 200% of expectations. Thus, as measured by representations in
the excluded class, there is adverse impact in this example, even though, a5 measured by success
rates, there is not.
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applicants is a fair proxy for the available work force and that comparing
success rates is the appropriate method for measuring adverse impact.
Do the foregoing numbers reveal an adverse impact?
The answer begins with statistical analysis of the data. To illustrate
this type of analysis, suppose a woman reported that she flipped a coin
100 times and observed 50 heads and 50 tails. We would trend to believe
that the coin was fair, that this outcome truly occurred, and that she
reported it correctly, because it reflects what we would expect in a ran-
dom process. We would hold the same belief if the woman reported that
she observed 45 heads and 55 tails because we expect some variation in a
random process. On the other hand, if she reported that she observed 5
heads and 95 tails, we know this outcome is unlikely to occur by chance,
and we would probably doubt the fairness of the coin, the accuracy of the
woman's observation, or the accuracy of her report.
Suppose she reported observing 35 heads and 65 tails. Our common
sense may not yield a ready impression. Statistics, however, provide a
method for determining the probability that this outcome would occur
by chance. The method reveals that 35 heads and 65 tails happen by
chance about one time in a hundred. 50 In the argot of the statistician,
this outcome is statistically significant at the .01 level of confidence.
That is, if a fair coin is flipped 100 times and the numbers of heads and
tails are recorded; and if the process (100 flips and recording the results)
is repeated 100 times, it is likely that 35 heads and 65 tails will be ob-
served and recorded no more than once. Accordingly, we would have
reason to goubt some aspect of the woman's report. If we were certain
that she observed and reported correctly--or, of course, if we made the
observation ourselves-we would doubt the fairness of the coin. In other
words, we would suspect that 35 heads and 65 tails were the outcome of
a process that was not random.
Let us apply this form of analysis to our hypothetical case. If 1,000
blacks and 500 whites took a test for a job, and 50 blacks and 50 whites
passed, is it likely that the selection criterion chose at random among the
applicants? The answer is no; this outcome would occur by chance fewer
than one time in a hundred.51 We know, therefore, that the outcome of
50 blacks and 50 whites is probably not a chance variation in a process
.
"
50. The standard deviation is the square root of the product of the probability heads will occur
(.5), the probability tails will occur (.5), and the number of coin flips (100) or 5. Ninety-nine percent
of observations occur within three standard deviations of the mean, which here is 50 heads and 50
tails. Thirty-five heads and 65 tails is three standard deviations from the mean. See G. GLASS & J.
STANLEY, STATISTICAL METHODS IN EDUCATION AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (1970).
5 I. The standard deviation is the square root of the product of the probability of selecting a
black (.67), the probability of selecting a white (.33), and the number of selections (100) or 4.7.
Ninety-nine percent of random observations will occur within three standard deviations of the mean
(67 blacks, 33 whites). Fifty blacks and 50 whites is more than three standard deviations from the
mean. .
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that affects blacks and whites in the same way in the long run. This
outcome is not like 45 heads and 55 tails, but is more like 35 heads and
65 tails.
We have determined that the test in our hypothetical case consist-
ently disqualified a disproportionate number of blacks. Yet one more
step is necessary before we may conclude that the test was discrimina-
tory. We know the disparity between black and white success rates on
the test is statistically significant. We must now decide whether the dis-
parity is legally significant. The black success rate was (50 -7- 1,000 =) 5
percent; the white success rate was (50 -7- 500 =) 10 percent. Thus,
blacks succeeded at (5 percent -7- 10 percent =) 50 percent the rate of
whites. This disparity appears to be legally significant.
The difference between statistical and legal significance is important,
but commonly neglected. Suppose blacks passed our hypothetical test at
the rate of 33 percent and whites passed at 34 percent. Suppose also that
the group taking the test was large enough that we are satisfied that, if
the test were administered many times, black and 'Yhite success rates
would not change; that is, the results were statistically significant.
Should a court strike down a selection criterion on which blacks succeed
at (33 percent -7- 34 percent =) 97 percent the rate of whites? Suppose
instead that 33 percent of blacks and 44 percent of whites passed the test,
so that the black success rate was (33 percent -7-44 percent =) 75 per-
cent of the white rate. Should a court intervene? We are not playing the
law professor's game of showing that a cutoff is hard to justify. Rather,
we are observing that the legal significance of a disparity between black
and white success rates is a genuine and difficult issue.
Although it has decided a number of adverse impact cases, the
Supreme Court has not adopted a rule for deciding when a disparity is
legally significant. 52 In Griggs, the Court pointed out the disparities be-
tween black and white performances on the diploma and testing require-
ments and impliedly held the disparities were legally significant, but did
not articulate a standard for judging legal significance. In Dothard, the
Court characterized the difference between male and female failure rates
on the height and weight requirements (1 percent versus 41 percent) as
"gross. . . greatly exceed[ing] the 34 percent to 12 percent disparity that
served to invalidate the high school diploma requirement in the Griggs
52. The Court has indicated when a disparity is statistically significant. In Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the Court wrote:
A precise method for measuring the significance of such statistical disparities was ex-
plained in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17. It involves calculation of the
"standard deviation" as a measure of predicted fluctuations from the expected value of
sample. . . . The Court in Castaneda noted that "[a]s a general rule for such large sam-
ples, if the difference between the value and the observed number is greater than two or
three standard deviations," then the hypothesis. . . would be suspect.
[d. at 308-09 n.14.
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case."53 The Court was apparently aware of the need to have a standard,
but left the task of defining it to another day. In Teal, as noted above,
the district court's finding that the examination had an adverse impact
was not contested before the Supreme Court; the majority opinion stated
the eighty percent rule, but did not hold it was the legal standard of
judgment.54 Thus, except for disparities that exceed those in Griggs,
whether a disparity is legally significant remains an open question in the
courts.
The legal significance of a disparity is a troubling issue. Why should
any statistically significant disparity-that is, any real disparity-be ig-
nored? If blacks pass a test at only 85 percent the rate of whites, should
not the employer be required to prove the test is job related? If the test
does not predict success on the job, are not the excluded blacks victims of
an irrational selection criterion that acts as an "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barrier. . . to employment?,,55 Do not such tests "operate
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups?,,56 On the other hand, how
much precision can be expected? Is not any selection criterion likely to
have some adverse impact on one of the many protected classes-blacks,
whites, men, women, Hispanics, Asians, Catholics, Jews, etc.? If validat-
ing a test is expensive (it is), and if few tests can be validated at any cost
(few can be), a finding of adverse impact is tantamount to a judgment
against the employer. Should judgments be entered on relatively small
disparities? That these are hard questions proves our point: whether a
given disproportionality should be legally significant is a difficult and un-
settled issue in the law of adverse impact.
~
4. Burden of Persuasion
We have discussed three problems with the prima facie case of ad-
verse impact discrimination, namely, choice of proxies, methods of com-
paring effects on racial classes, and legal significance of disparities. Now
let us turn to three problems with the "defense": the burden of persua-
sion regarding the validity or job relatedness of a selection criterion,
proof of job relatedness, and quotas.
The word "defense" was enclosed in quotation marks in the preced-
ing paragraph because, as has been demonstrated above, there is no true
defense in adverse impact litigation. Rather, after the plaintiffs make out
their prima facie case, the employer may attack that case in one of three
ways: first, the employer may argue that the plaintiffs' proxy is so im-
probable that the effect of his selection criterion on the proxy reveals
53. 433 U.s. at 330 n.12.
54. 457 U.S. at 443 n.4.
55. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432.
56. !d.
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nothing about the effect of the criterion on the available work force.
Such an argument might succeed, for example, if the plaintiffs used the
national population as a proxy for persons willing and able to become
astronauts. 57 Second, the employer may argue that the plaintiffs' statisti-
cal analysis is faulty and proper analysis shows an absence of adverse
impact. For example, an employer might show through multiple regres-
sion analysis that a disparity indicated by a simple association is spuri-
ous. Third, the employer may argue that the disproportionate impact on
the plaintiffs' class is legally insignificant. Such an argument might suc-
ceed if the success rate of the plaintiffs' class were 90 percent of the suc-
cess rate of the best scoring class.
Each of these methods of attack, if successful, would destroy an ele-
ment of the plaintiffs' prima facie case: the plaintiffs must nominate an
acceptable proxy, demonstrate by reliable statistical analysis a dispropor-
tionate adverse impact on their class, and persuade the court that the
disparity is legally significant. Therefore, the burden of persuasion on
each of these elements belongs on the plaintiffs. Because validation of a
selection criterion is a variant of the first method of attack-a valid test
identifies and selects qualified candidates for the job, thus proving the
plaintiffs' proxy to be false because it includes unqualified persons-the
burden of persuasion should remain on the plaintiffs to convince the
court that the employer's test is invalid, that is, that their proxy is the
better one.
This analysis shows the Supreme Court has incorrectly allocated to
the employer the burden of persuasion on the issue of job relatedness.
The Supreme Court wrote in Griggs, "Congress has placed on the em-
ployer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question";58 and the Court
has used words to the same effect in subsequent cases. 59 A correct under-
standing of the theory of adverse impact proves the Court was in error.
This is not to say, however, that the initial burden of production ought
not to fall on the employer. To the contrary, it clearly should be the
employer's responsibility to offer evidence that a selection criterion is job
related. As a theoretical matter, such an offering is an attempt to rebut
the plaintiffs' prima facie case, which was persuasive enough to with-
stand a motion to dismiss. As a practical matter, the employer has better
57. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (the population
may serve as a proxy for the available work force if the job requires a skill that many persons have or
can easily acquire, but "[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons
to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the qualifica-
tions) may have little value").
58. 401 U.S. at 432.
59. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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access than have the plaintiffs to the relevant evidence. Nevertheless, the
ultimate burden of persuasion should remain with the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court's formula for adverse impact cases-plaintiffs
prove prima facie discrimination; employer proves validity of criterion;
plaintiffs prove equally useful criterion with less adverse impact-leads
to correct results in some cases but not in others. Suppose the plaintiffs
successfully prove a prima facie case, and the employer offers no evidence
at all. Under the Court's formula, the plaintiffs win because the em-
ployer has failed to carry his burden of proving the selection criterion
was job related. This result is correct because the employer has not re-
butted the judge's initial conclusions that the plaintiffs' proxy is fair and
the criterion has an adverse impact on blacks in the proxy. The same can
be said if the employer attempts, but fails, to prove the criterion is valid.
Now suppose the employer satisfies the judge that the criterion is valid.
Under the Court's formula, the employer has carried his burden and
wins. This result is also correct because the employer has destroyed the
plaintiffs' proxy and shown the absence of adverse impact on blacks in a
better proxy. These are easy cases.
The difficult case is the one in which the judge is at sixes and sevens
over whose evidence is the more persuasive. This is the case in which
allocation of the burden of persuasion is critical-and the case in which
the Supreme Court's formula leads to error. Suppose the plaintiffs' evi-
dence has some, but not overwhelming, persuasive force. The employer's
evidence falls in the range of indecision: the judge cannot decide whether
the test is valid or not. Applying the Court's formula, the judge would
think ab<;mtthe prima facie case and the defense as separate matters. She
would reason that the plaintiffs had proved a prima facie case-marginal,
perhaps, but strong enough to withstand a motion to dismiss. Then, she
would continue, the burden shifted to the employer to prove the selection
criterion was job related. The employer failed'to carry that burden and,
therefore, loses. But a correct understanding of the theory of adverse
impact reveals the employer should win this case. The issues are three:
whether the plaintiffs have identified a fair proxy for the available work
force, whether the criterion has a statistically significant adverse impact
on blacks in the proxy, and whether the adverse impact is great enough
to be legally significant. The employer's evidence on the validity of his
selection criterion applied to the first of these issues and created a genu-
ine doubt whether the plaintiffs' proxy was appropriate. If the judge is
unsure whether the plaintiffs have established an element of their prima
facie case, they must lose.6o
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60. If the burden of persuasion were relevant only in cases in which the evidence is evenly
balanced, this issue would be minor. But the author believes that, as a practical matter, the alloca-
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5. Proof of Job Relatedness
A second problem with the "defense" is a set of issues concerning
proof that a test is job related. If a test has an adverse impact, the em-
ployer must establish a relationship between success on the test and suc-
cess on the job.61 One issue is how to measure success on the job.
Productivity may be determined easily for some jobs; for example, if the
job is sewing buttons on shirts, productivity may be measured in terms of
buttons sewed per hour. But for many jobs, determining productivity is
difficult. Many employees perform tasks that do not lend themselves to
quantitative assessment. A secretary may not only type, which can be
evaluated in pages per day, but also take telephone messages, schedule
appointments, and arrange travel, none of which is easily rated quantita-
tion of the burden of persuasion decides cases in which the evidence is somewhat more probative on
one side than on the other.
Let us say the burden of persuasion decides issues that fall within a judge's "range of indeci-
sion." Traditional doctrine holds that the range is very narrow, indeed-to attempt a crude quantifi-
cation-applies only when the needle of belief stands at 50 on a scale of 100 when the standard of
proof is preponderance of the evidence. The author believes the range is almost always wider, and it
varies with the nature of the case, the issue, the parties, the judge, and perhaps the strength of the
evidence on other issues in the case. Further, the author believes that the further outside the range
of indecision the judge's belief stands, the more likely are other issues to be affected.
The range of indecision may be quite narrow in some cases. For example, on the issue of timely
performance in a breach of contract case between two large businesses before a judge with a back-
ground in commercial law, the range of indecision might be 48-52. The range is narrow because all
that is at stake is a small fraction of the profits of a large business; the issue can be resolved by more
or less objective evidence; and the judge is familiar with this sort of case and has confidence in his or
her ability to evaluate the evidence. If the judge evaluates the evidence on timely performance at 53
or higher, the plaintiff will prevail on this issue and, the higher the rating, the greater the probability
that other issues will be affected favorably for the plaintiff; similarly for the defendant if the judge's
evaluation is 47 or lower. If the evidence falls within the range of 48-52, the defendant wins on this
issue because the plaintiff has not carried the burden of persuasion, but other issues will not be
affected.
The range could be wide in other cases. For example, suppose a criminal rape case in which a
major issue is the consent of the woman. The defendant is a clergyman; the accusing witness is one
of his congregants. Intercourse occurred in a hotel room, and the state's evidence did not show any
physical injury to the woman. The range of indecision of the same judge who decided the contract
case (assuming that beyond reasonable doubt can be quantified as 85) might be 80 to 95. The conse-
quence to the defendant is much more severe in this case than in the contract case; the issue requires
a difficult inquiry into two parties' states of mind; the judge is less familiar with this sort of evidence;
and the likelihood of consent has been enhanced by other facts in the case.
The author believes that the range of indecision in Title VII cases tends to be wide and shifted
in favor of employers. Although discrimination is not criminal, it is shameful; such cases are usually
defended vigorously, sometimes out of proportion to the money at stake. Also, judges are often
uncomfortable with statistical evidence, and plaintiffs are rarely drawn from society's favored
classes. The range of indecision on the appropriate proxy, for example, might average 45 to 60.
61. The relationship may be positive or negative. For example, high scores on a general intelli-
gence test might correlate negatively with success as a pot washer. So long as the employer uses the
test results properly, it does not matter whether the correlation is positive or negative. Thus, the
employer of pot washers might hire applicants who make low scores on the test. Normally, how-
ever, tests are designed and used so that higher scores on the test predict higher scores on measures
of job performance, in other words, so that the test, if valid, correlates positively with success on the
job. For this reason, the text is cast in terms of positive correlations.
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tively. Other employees hold jobs in which success is partly a function of
the efforts of the employee and partly a function of the difficulty of the
task. One sales representative may write fewer orders than another, yet
have a more difficult territory. Supervisory ratings are often used to
measure success on the job, but, because human judgment is involved,
objectivity becomes problematic. For example, different supervisors may
apply varying standards, or apply the same standards in varying ways.62
Evaluation of success on the job may be more art than science.
Another issue concerning proof of job relatedness is choosing which
aspects of the job against which to validate the test. This may not be a
problem for a job that requires performing only one task; a spot welder
who will be welding the same kind of materials all day long can be tested
for ability to weld. Because jobs often require several tasks, however,
and because tests typically measure skills that are specific to tasks, an
employer must decide which skills to test for. An applicant for the job of
science teacher may be tested for knowledge of the subject matter, but
the job also requires teaching, counseling, and administrative skills. As-
suming that success on the job is measured by a composite of success on
each required task, success on a test of subject matter will probably pre-
dict only a fraction of a science teacher's total job performance. Should a
test that has an adverse impact on blacks be lawful if the test measures
only one of several required skills?63 Also, some skills are more impor-
tant to a job than others. What standard should govern the choice of
skills to be measured?
A third issue is the degree of correlation needed to establish that a
selection criterion is job related. The correlation between performance
on a perfect test and success on the job is + 1.0; the correlation between
random selection and success on the job is O. Suppose an employer
proves a +.2 correlation between success on a test and success on the
job. Such a result would be likely for a test that accurately measures one
of several required skills. The test is somewhat better than random selec-
tion and may be the best test available; yet it captures only a small frac-
tion of success on the job. Is this test valid enough?64
These issues are interrelated. For example, the reliability of the em-
ployer's ratings of job performance may affect the degree of correlation
required between success on the test and success on the job: the less
reliable the ratings, the higher the needed correlation. The breadth of
skills evaluated by a test may also affect the required correlation: the
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62. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 429-33.
63. The answer may be yes. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C.
1977), affirmed without opinion sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026
( 1978).
64. At least one court has suggested that nothing less than a +.3 is acceptable. NAACP v.
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1024 n.13 (1st Cir. 1974).
456 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:429
fewer and less important the skills measured, the higher the needed
correlation.
Related to the foregoing issues are the Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures.65 Section 1 states the Guidelines "are
designed to assist employers. . . to comply with requirements of Federal
law. . . They are designed to provide a framework for determining the
proper use of tests and other selection procedures."66 In fact, however,
the Guidelines hamper more than assist. The General Accounting Office
reported in 1982 that the level of reading difficulty of the Guidelines, as
measured by the amount of education required to understand them, was
beyond the doctor of philosophy level.67
Moreover, according to the Committee on Psychological Tests and
Assessment of the American Psychological Association, "the Guidelines
reflect a reliance on and use of measurement theory that does not repre-
sent the current state of research and theory in psychological testing."68
For these and other reasons, the General Accounting Office, together
with the Department of Justice, the Office of Personnel Management,
and the Department of the Treasury,69 recommended that the Guidelines
be reviewed and revised.
A glance at the Guidelines reveals why so many agencies agree on
the need for revision. Section 5 recognizes three varieties of validation
strategies: criterion-related, content, and construct studies. A selection
criterion (commonly called a test) has criterion-related validity if there is
a statistical relationship between success on the test and success on the
job or in a training program for the job. Accordingly, an employer at-
tempting to establish criterion-related validity must, first, use a test that
can be scored and, second, develop a means of evaluating in quantitative
terms the quality of performance of workers on the job. Then the em-
ployer must determine whether there is a relationship between success on
the test and success on the job. The degree of the relationship is ex-
pressed in a correlation coefficient.
A selection criterion has content validity if the test requires an appli-
cant to perform a task or display mastery of a body of knowledge neces-
sary on the job. For example, a would-be carpenter may be given a
blueprint and asked to build what it indicates. But even this simple strat-
egy is complicated. The task must be representative of the duties of the
job. Also, statistical estimates of the reliability of the selection procedure
65. 29 C.P.R. §§ 1507.1-1607.18 (1984).
66. Id. § 1607.18.
67. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNIFORM GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE
SELECTION PROCEDURES SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND REVISED 10 (1982).
68. [d. at 6.
69. !d. at 28-29, 32-33. The Department of Labor concurred in part. Id. at 24-27. The EEOC
did not comment. [d. at 12.
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are required if feasible. Finally, if applicants do not merely pass or fail
the test, but are ranked, the ranking must be validated, too: that is, the
employer must demonstrate that a higher ranking on the test leads to a
higher ranking on the job.
A selection criterion has construct validity if the test measures a
personality trait considered vital to success on the job. For example, an
insurance company may be interested in recruiting aggressive, goal-ori-
ented, resourceful sales agents and may attempt to test for the presence
of these traits in an applicant. This sort of validation strategy is even
more complex and arduous than the first two.
Finally, even if a selection criterion is valid for the class of all per-
sons who take the test, the criterion may be unfair to (particularly small)
subclasses of persons who take the test. For example, a test may be valid
for whites but not for blacks. If 90 percent of the test-takers are white,
the test may satisfy a validation strategy because the effect on blacks is
obscured by the weight of the whites' scores. Accordingly, where feasible
a test must be validated for fairness (sometimes called differential valid-
ity) across classes.70
Our purpose at this point is not to criticize the Guidelines. Rather,
we seek to point out that the criticisms of the Guidelines, along with the
other issues discussed concerning proof of job relatedness, are part of a
more general question. That question is, how do we identify the point at
which an employer's interest in efficient selection outweighs blacks' inter-
est in equal employment opportunity? Because this question has no
ready answer, proof that a test is job-related is another difficult problem
growing out of the adverse impact definition of discrimination.
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6. Quotas
Quotas and adverse impact are practically synonymous. In theory,
an employer can win an adverse impact case by proving that the chal-
lenged selection criterion is valid. In practice, this burden can almost
never be carried, and the result is that employers are forced to hire and
promote by quotas.
In Albemarle v. Moody, the Supreme Court wrote:
The EEOC has issued "Guidelines" for employers seeking to deter-
mine, through professional validation studies, whether their employment
tests are job related. 29 CFR Part 1607. These Guidelines draw upon
and make reference to professional standards of test validation estab-
lished by the American Psychological Association. The EEOC Guide-
lines. . . constitute "[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the
70. The descriptions and characterizations of validation strategies are drawn from § 14 of the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14; see B. SCHLEI& P.
GROSSMAN,,supra note 5. at 66.67; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976).
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enforcing agency, and consequently they are entitled to great deference."
Griggsv. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 433-434.71
This language seems innocuous. Does not every rational employer want
job-related selection criteria? Without them, hiring and promotion are
surely inefficient. Also, would not any employer covered by Title VII
seek professional help in determining whether existing selection criteria
are valid and, if not, in developing valid criteria? In fact, however, a
valid test-one that satisfies the EEOC Guidelines-is today's rara avis.
This fact has been known for a long time. Consider the 1971 decision in
United States v. Georgia Power CO.72 The employer required that em-
ployees seeking promotion achieve satisfactory scores on three profes-
sionally developed aptitude tests, and blacks scored lower on the tests
than whites. Using a technique known as discriminant analysis, the em-
ployer conducted a study to determine whether the tests predicted job
performance. The study concluded that the tests were valid in many of
their applications, and the district court held that "the testing program
used by the Georgia Power Company is of significant help to the Com-
pany in predicting the job performance of applicants for employment and
promotion. "73 The district court refused to follow the EEOC Guidelines,
which did not recognize discriminant analysis but only the different tech-
nique known as correlation analysis, because "[u]nder this rigid stan-
dard, there is no test known or available today which meets the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission requirements for any industry."74
The court knew that no test could satisfy the EEOC standards because
the government conceded the fact: "[T]he rather startling evidence of-
fered by the government was to the effect that there was no test known to
exist or yet devised which meets such standards."75
On appeal, the district court was reversed for failing to enforce the
EEOC Guidelines.76 The court of appeals said that the Guidelines "un-
deniably provide a valid framework for determining whether a validation
study manifests that a particular test predicts reasonable job suitabil-
ity. . . . [W]e hold they should be followed absent a showing that some
cogent reason exists for noncompliance.,,77 The appellate court did not
comment on the government's "startling evidence" that no known test
met the standards in the Guidelines; apparently, the absence of any such
test did not amount to a "cogent reason."
71. 422 U.S. at 430-31 (footnote omitted).
72. 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 767 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd in part and vacated in part, 474
F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 781.
74. /d. at 780.
75. [d. at 787 n.8.
76. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
77. Id. at 913.
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Lawyers78 and social scientists79 know that the Guidelines impose
unrealistic standards. Three Justices of the Supreme Court have also rec-
ognized that valid tests are almost non-existent. Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, dissented in Connecticut v.
Teal.8O Referring to "tests that accurately reflect the skills of every indi-
vidual candidate," the Justices noted that "there are few if any tests that
do SO.,,81
If a test has an adverse impact, and if the test cannot be validated,
the employer must choose from among three alternatives: abandon the
test and substitute another valid test; abandon all tests and hire at ran-
dom; or preserve the test and eliminate its adverse impact. The first al-
ternative is impractical. Another valid test cannot be substituted for the
same reason the first test could not be validated: few existing tests can be
validated against the standards in the EEOC Guidelines. Moreover, con-
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If read literally, the 1970 Guidelines set forth requirements for validation so stringent as to
effectively preclude almost all use of employment testing. In this regard, Dr. William En-
neis, the senior industrial psychologist employed by the EEOC since 1966 and the principal
draftsman of the 1970 Guidelines, testified in 1974 that he was aware of only three or four
criterion-related validation studies which met all of the requirements of the 1970 Guide-
lines. Professional criticism of the 1970 Guidelines has been severe. The Psychological
Corporation, a respected and long established developer of psychological tests, has taken
the position that the 1970 Guidelines are "unreasonable, unrealistic, and unworkable."
The Division of Industrial-Organizational Psychology of the American Psychological As-
sociation. . . has criticized the rigid application of the 1970 Guidelines as leading to "pro-
fessionally unrealistic and effectively unattainable requirements."
Booth & Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29
EMORY L.J. 121, 125 (1980).
79. The Committee on Ability Testing of the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, a
division of the prestigious National Research Council, published a report on ability testing. ABILITY
TESTS: USES, CONSEQUENCES,AND CONTROVERSIES(A. Wigdor & W. Garner eds. 1982) [herein-
after cited as ABILITY TESTS]. The report stated:
The policy of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is clearly to make the
justification of test use as demanding as possible whenever tests result in differential selec-
tion.8 And, as we shall discuss below, the agency has received a good deal of backing for
this policy from the courts. . . .
i
8. See, e.g., memorandum of David Rose (1976), chief, Employment Section, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice [reprinted in Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Labor
Reporter (June 22,1976)]. Rose remarked that the thrust of the EEOC Guidelines was to
"place almost all test users in a posture of noncompliance; to give great discretion to en-
forcement personnel to determine who should be prosecuted; and to set aside objective
procedures in favor of numerical hiring."
Id. at 101.
The striking fact is that most of the decisions [since Griggs] have ruled against the chal-
lenged tests; no selection program seems to have survived when the Guidelines were ap-
plied in any detail. . . . Carefully constructed and researched tests. . . seldom withstand
legal challenge. Judges are requiring, in the face of evidence of differential impact, a degree
of technical adequacy that tests and test users apparently cannot provide. . . . It is dis-
ingenious to impose test validation requirements that employers, even with the best will
and a sizable monetary investment, cannot meet.
Id. at 105-07.
80. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
81. Id. at 463.
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structing and attempting to validate a test is a very expensive proposi-
tion, running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.82 The second
alternative is improbable. Few employers would believe that their selec-
tion criteria yield no better results than chance. The third alternative
remains. A test that cannot be validated may nevertheless be used under
Griggs so long as there is no adverse impact; accordingly, an employer
need only manipulate the results of the test to ensure that sufficient num-
bers of blacks pass. As Justice Blackmun foresaw in Albemarle v. Moody:
I fear that a too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines wi11leavethe
employer with little choice, save an impossibly complex and expensive
validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system of employ-
ment selection. This, of course, is far from the intent of Title VII.83
Such manipulation is the obvious explanation of what happened in
the Teal case. Forty-eight blacks and 259 whites sat for a written exami-
nation that was the first of two steps in the promotion process. Twenty-
six blacks (54 percent) and 206 whites (80 percent) passed. Thus, the
black pass rate was only (54 percent -7- 80 percent =) 68 percent of the
white pass rate. Apparently because more persons passed the test than
there were job openings, the process moved into a second step. Those
who passed the tests were evaluated primarily on past work performance
and recommendations. In this step, the employer applied an affirmative
action program, and eleven blacks and thirty-five whites were promoted.
Thus, the affirmative action plan yielded dramatic results: (11 -7- 26 =)
42 percent of the blacks and (35 -7-206 =) 17 percent of the whites who
passed the test were promoted; so that, in the second step, the black suc-
cess rate was (42 percent -7- 17 percent =) almost 250 percent of the
white success rate. Overall, 11 of 48 blacks (23 percent) and 35 of 259
whites (14 percent) who sought promotion were successful; therefore, at
the bottom line, the promotion rate of blacks was (23 percent -7- 14 per-
cent =) nearly 170 percent that of whites. 84
What happened in Teal is evident. The employer perceived that the
written examination had an adverse impact on blacks. Then, most likely
in hopes of averting litigation, the employer applied the malleable criteria
of work performance and recommendations so as to counterbalance the
adverse impact of the examination. In short, the employer decided how
many blacks had to be promoted and made sure that they were. The
report of the Committee on Ability Testing indicates that this phenome-
82. According to Daniel E. Leach, who was vice-chair of the EEOC at the time he spoke in
1978, the cost of a criterion-related validity study ranged from $100,000 to $400,000. DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at D-4 (Dec. 5, 1978). Content-related studies were considerably less expensive, but
hardly cheap.
83. 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. 457 U.S. at 443 & n.4.
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non may be widespread. 85
Theory points to the same results.86 Let us suppose an employer is
able to validate a selection criterion. Unless every person who satisfies it
is awarded the opportunity in question, another criterion must operate to
determine which of the persons who satisfied the first criterion will be
successful. Thus, even if the diploma requirement had been valid in
Griggs, doubtlessly an additional criterion came into play, for the Duke
Power Company certainly did not have a job for every high school gra-
duate who cared to apply. If the first criterion adequately distinguishes
qualified from unqualified persons, in other words, if everyone who satis-
fies the first criterion is able to do the job, the employer may simply hire
the first applicant who satisfies the criterion. In this case, the additional
criterion is order of application.
Truly random selection from a group of qualified and interested per-
sons is unobjectionable, but two reasons indicate that an informed em-
ployer will avoid random selection. First, what appears to be random
may not in fact be so. Order of application, for instance, may seem to be
racially neutral, but it could have an adverse impact if whites' access to
information about job openings is better than blacks'. Second, even ran-
dom procedures produce unusual results from time to time. Suppose
1,000 blacks and 1,000 whites, all equally qualified, applied for 100 job
vacancies. The employer decided to select according to distance of resi-
dence from the plant, a factor that turned out to be random in this case.
The employer hired 44 blacks and 56 whites-a result that would happen
by chance about 15 percent of the time.87 The black success rate was less
than 80 percent of the white success rate, and the appearance of adverse
impact arose. An employer who realizes he cannot anticipate the various
ways in which apparently neutral criteria can have an adverse impact, or
who does not wish to be whipped by the tail of a binomial distribution,
will not hire at random. Rather, such an employer will hire by the num-
bers. No one is likely to complain. If someone does, the employer can
claim to have selected randomly, and the statistics will support the claim.
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Given the repeated failure of tests and other modes of selection to withstand challenge, as
well as the pressure from the compliance authorities to achieve a representative work force,
it seems probable that many employers will quietly begin to select on the very bases that
Title VII disallows. . . but now for the purpose of eliminating the work force imbalances
that make them vulnerable to litigation.
ABILITY TESTS, supra note 79, at 106.
86. Conceivably, a selection criterion could not only identify qualified applicants, but also rank
them in order of their aptitudes. With such a test in hand, an employer could avoid quotas by hiring
the top scorer for the first job vacancy, the next best scorer for the second vacancy, etc. But valid
rank-order criteria exist more in imagination than in reality.
87. The standard deviation is the square root of (.5) (.5) (100)
= 5. Forty-four blacks and 56
whites is slightly more than one standard deviation from the mean. This and more unlikely results
occur by. chance about 15% of the time.
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We have been assuming that all persons who satisfy the first selec-
tion criterion are qualified. Although there may be some such cases, in
which final selection can be left to chance, there are probably many cases
in which the first criterion achieves only a rough cut. In other words,
unqualified persons often survive the first step in a selection process. In
Griggs, for example, a significant number of high school graduates would
have been unacceptable workers because they were not physically strong
enough to shovel coal all day. In such a case, an employer is unlikely to
hire randomly or proportionately. Rather, she will use a second criterion
that, like the first, is intended to distinguish qualified from unqualified
persons.88 And, like the first, the second criterion must be valid if it has
an adverse impact.89 The same would be true of a third and additional
criteria.9o
No reason appears to believe that there are any more valid second-
or third-step selection criteria than there are valid first-step criteria (of
which there are apparently very few), and good reason exists to believe
that employers are unwilling or unable to validate advanced-level crite-
ria. The reason is efficiency. Each step in a selection process typically
88. Many criteria are needed for some jobs. For example, a law school searching for a senior
professor to fill a vacancy created by the loss of a prestigious member of the faculty might establish
the following set of criteria: (1) a law degree (2) from a good school along with (3) some years of
private practice in a reputable firm and (4) some years of teaching experience at good schools plus
(5) specialization in the appropriate area, as well as (6) many publications (7) that are excellent in
quality, in addition to (8) satisfactory teaching ability, (9) solid recommendations from peers, and
(10) a widely recognized name.
89. Nothing in the theory of adverse impact or in the decided cases suggests that only the first
selection criterion must be valid, and in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the Supreme
Court sustained an attack on a second criterion. The plaintiffs were black employees who sought
promotion to supervisor. They were not promoted because they failed a written examination, which
they challenged because blacks passed it at only 68% of the rate at which whites passed. The exami-
nation was not the first criterion in the selection process. Rather, the first criterion was that one had
to be an employee in the department in order to sit for the examination.
Perhaps it cannot be said that the Court held in Teal that a second criterion must be valid, as
the focus of the opinions was on the employer's argument that there was no discrimination because
there was yet another step in the selection process and, at the end or bottom line, proportionately
more blacks than whites who entered the process were successful. Nevertheless, the rationale of the
majority opinion covers second selection criteria. Throughout the opinion, the majority stressed that
Title VII protects each individual's right to be considered for an employment opportunity without
regard to race. For example, "It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to
provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race. . .," 457 U.S. at 454, quoting
Fumco Constr. Corp., v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978). If the first criterion in a selection pro-
cess can be illegal because it denies individuals an employment opportunity, a second criterion would
be illegal for the same reason: individuals are screened out by invalid standards.
90. Technical reasons also indicate that test validation becomes more difficult after the first
step. The sample size is reduced; as a result, there is less statistical power, less chance of finding a
significant positive relationship. Also, the range has been restricted; a sample that has been screened
(by the first selection criterion) has a diminished chance of revealing a relationship that exists in the
total population. Statistical corrections for these problems are possible but mysterious to the
unini tiated.
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narrows the field by fewer persons than the preceding step.91 Assuming
the cost of validating a criterion is not affected by when it is used in a
multi-step selection process, the cost of validating each succeeding crite-
rion returns less benefit per dollar than the cost of validating the preced-
ing criterion. The employer will reach a point at which it is too
expensive to validate an additional criterion: the cost of validation will
exceed the marginal benefit of identifying the most productive workers
from among applicants who have survived the earlier steps in the selec-
tion process. The employer could at this point select randomly from the
survivors, but, as we have seen above, truly random selection is risky. A
prudent employer will hire by the numbers at this point.
Thus, adverse impact leads to quotas. There are few if any first-step
selection criteria that are valid under the EEOC Guidelines, yet employ-
ers are unprepared to hire and promote at random. The simple solution
is to adjust the results on the best criterion available so that enough
blacks succeed to avert a showing of adverse impact. Even if a first-step
criterion can be validated, the benefit of validating second- and subse-
quent-step criteria diminishes rapidly. Again, the solution is proportion-
ate selection. As the Committee on Ability Testing wrote: "The policies
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are those
that would be adopted if the desired effect were to force employers to a
quota system to achieve a representative work force."92
7. Costs and Benefits
Let us now examine the problems that develop if the plaintiffs offer
proof of an alternative selection device. Suppose an employer's test has
an adverse impact, but success on the test correlates with success on the
job. Suppose further that the plaintiffs demonstrate another test has a
lesser adverse impact, correlates with success on the job-but costs more
to administer than the employer's test. The extreme cases are easy. If
the plaintiffs' test costs only a little more than the employer's and the
business is large and profitable, surely she should switch to it. If the
plaintiffs' test costs so much that using it would put the employer out of
91. A leading law firm that needs an additional associate attorney would begin with the crite-
rion that applicants hold a law degree: this requirement excludes miIIions of persons. A second
criterion may be that holders of law degrees must be graduates of a short list of acceptable schools;
this requirement excludes hundreds of thousands of persons. The next criterion may be that gradu-
ates of acceptable schools must have served on the law review; this requirement excludes thousands
of persons. Another criterion may be that law review editors who have graduated from acceptable
schools must be personally compatible with members of the firm; this requirement excludes perhaps
hundreds of persons. And a final criterion may be that sociable law review editors who have gradu-
ated from acceptable schools must be willing to work for the pittance offered by the firm; this re-
quirement might exclude no one.
92. ,ABILITY TESTS, supra note 79, at 143.
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business, surely she should not be required to use the test. But all the
cases between the extremes are difficult.
The cases are also more complex. Suppose again that the plaintiffs'
test has a lesser adverse impact than the employer's. In addition, there is
a +.2 correlation between success on the employer's test and success on
the job, whereas the plaintiffs' test correlates at only + .175. The plain-
tiffs' test, which is somewhat less efficient than the employer's test, would
impose on the employer the costs of hiring, training, and discharging
additional unsuccessful employees. The cost of using the plaintiffs' test
would be relevant as well. How much cost is fair?
Another issue concerns the degree to which the plaintiffs' test di-
minishes the adverse impact. As before, the extremes are easy. If the
employer's test disqualifies all blacks, but the plaintiffs' test disqualifies
equal percentages of the races, the plaintiffs' test (other things being
equal) is superior. If, on the other hand, blacks pass the employer's test
at 79 percent the rate of whites and the plaintiffs' test at 80 percent the
rate of whites, the benefit of switching to the plaintiffs' test is insignifi-
cant. What should the outcome be if blacks pass the employer's test at
70 percent the rate of whites and the plaintiffs' test at 80 percent the rate
of whites?
These issues are interrelated. The degree to which adverse impact is
reduced may affect the cost properly imposed on an employer. The gen-
eral question is the same one we saw in connection with proving job re-
latedness: where is the point at which the employer's interest in efficient
selection outweighs blacks' interest in equal employment opportunity?
Plainly, the answer is difficult.
8. Back Pay
A final problem of adverse impact that we will discuss is how to
remedy it. Section 706(g) empowers a court to enjoin unlawful employ-
ment practices and order additional relief, including back pay. No theo-
retical difficulty is presented by an injunction levied against a test that
has an adverse impact and is not job-related; the employer need simply
find another selection criterion. But a serious theoretical difficulty is
presented by back pay. On the assumption that only victims of discrimi-
nation are entitled to relief, how do we identify which members of the
plaintiffs' class were actually disadvantaged by the illegal selection crite-
rion? The answer is that we cannot.
Not every qualified black excluded by an illegal selection criterion is
entitled to back pay. In any given case, the available work force could
easily include hundreds of blacks and whites who competed for a handful
of jobs. Compensation should be awarded only to those blacks who the
court determines would have won the opportunity in question but for the
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he discrimination. 93 Yet such a determination is generally impossible, for
we cannot know who would have been successful under a non-discrimi-
natory selection criterion. Plaintiffs will not offer evidence of such a cri-
terion; they can hardly do what their employer could not do, and the
court will have no rational way to identify the true victims of discrimina-
tion. Even if the employer were required and able to prove the existence
of a particular valid criterion, there would be little reason to believe she
would have used this criterion instead of some other criterion.94
For example, the high school diploma requirement in Griggs ex-
cluded 88 percent of black men in the state. Of course, only a few mem-
bers of this group lost jobs they would otherwise have won because Duke
Power had only a specific number of job vacancies during the limitations
period. Suppose there were 100 such vacancies. Then, if Duke Power
had not required a diploma, at most 100 blacks would have been hired.
Yet actually there were fewer than 100 black victims of adverse impact
discrimination because whites (including some of the 68 percent of white
men in the state who lacked diplomas) would have competed for the
available jobs and rightfully won a number of them. Perhaps the court
could resort to the plaintiffs' proxy for the available work force to deter-
mine how many jobs would have been awarded to each race. Because the
male population of North Carolina (which is the proxy on which the
Supreme Court relied) was three-quarters white and one-quarter black,
the court might conclude that blacks would have won (1/4 x 100 =) 25 of
the jobs.
The next problem is to identify which blacks would have been hired.
Should the court ask, who were the 25 best qualified and interested
blacks in the state? The difficulty with this question is that the court
would have to apply a job-related standard to determine which blacks
were the best qualified. Who should bear the cost of developing such a
standard-if the task can be done at all? Perhaps the court will conclude
the cost belongs on the employer, who has already been found to have
discriminated. But whoever bears the burden of developing a valid selec-
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93. Other qualified blacks lost the chance to compete for a job they would not have won. They
may be entitled to an injunction guaranteeing their right to compete fairly in the future, but they lost
no back pay.
94. In a sense, it is theoretically impossible to determine how much money the victim of a
wrongful death would have earned during the rest of his life, for we cannot know what the future
would have held for this person. Like Gauguin, he might have decided to go to Tahiti. Yet we can
be sure the victim was wrongfully killed, and we are willing to award his family what the average
person in his position would have earned.
Adverse impact presents the opposite case. We do not know which individuals were the victims
of the discriminatory selection criterion. Yet, assuming we know the total number of such persons,
we can learn with some precision the amount of money the whites hired in the victims' places actu-
ally earned. (Not knowing the identity of the victims, however, we cannot know how much money
should be subtracted from an award of back pay by reason of the victims' other earnings or failure to
seek suitable work.)
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tion standard, there would be no guaranty that Duke Power would have
used that particular standard during the limitations period. It is entirely
possible that two tests, both valid to some degree, will select different
persons.
Should the court ask instead, whom would Duke Power have hired
if it had not used the diploma requirement? The hiring officer of the firm
might be asked, "If your superior had ordered you to abandon the di-
ploma requirement, how would you have decided whom to hire?" The
answer to such a counter-factual question can only be speculative, of
course.
Since it is theoretically impossible to identify the victims of Duke
Power's discrimination, the court might look for a practical solution.
Thus, if 25 jobs should have gone to blacks, and if blacks got only five
jobs, the court might apportion the back pay for 20 jobs across the class
of plaintiffs. In the alternative, the court might provide each member of
the class of plaintiffs an opportunity to appear and demonstrate his right
to recover, and the court could award relief (by some standard or other)
to the 20 best qualified blacks who appeared. We would be sure that the
employer paid her debt to the class of blacks, but we could never be sure
that the real victims of discrimination have been made whole. For those
reasons, perhaps back pay ought not be awarded in adverse impact
cases,95 and clearly back pay is a thorny issue in such cases.
II
ADVERSE IMPACT AND THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
The theory of adverse impact may not be well understood by the
legal community, and administration of the doctrine may entail signifi-
cant problems; yet if Congress intended to enact this definition of dis-
crimination, the job of the courts would be to explicate the theory
correctly and devise solutions for the problems of administration. If, on
the other hand, Congress did not intend to enact adverse impact-in-
deed, considered and rejected its major applications-its theoretical and
practical problems are great enough that the courts should seriously re-
consider the doctrine. And if it appears that Congress disapproved of
behavior to which adverse impact leads, the courts should overrule the
doctrine in it entirety.
95. The writer believes that back pay should certainly be withheld in one type of adverse im-
pact case. If the employer uses a validated selection criterion, but the plaintiffs establish the exist-
ence of an equally valid criterion that has a lesser adverse impact and is no more expensive than the
employer's, the plaintiffs deserve to win the case but not to collect back pay. An employer who uses
a validated test should not be penalized because another valid test (of which she was unaware) may
exist.
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A. The Opinions of the Courts
1. In the District Court: Present Effects of Past Discrimination and
Adverse Impact Rejected
The source of the adverse impact definition of discrimination is the
action Willie Griggs and others brought against their employer, the
Duke Power Company. The case began in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, District Judge Gordon
presiding.96 Duke Power generated and distributed electric power.97
The plaintiffs were members of a class composed of present and future
black employees at the Dan River Station,98 which was located in
Draper, North Carolina.99 Aside from some miscellaneous jobs, the
work force at Dan River was divided into five departments: operations,
maintenance, laboratory and test, coal handling, and labor.1°O Before
July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII,101 black employees at Dan
River were allowed to work only in the labor department, which had a
lower pay scale than any other department. 102
In an attempt to improve the general quality of its work force, 103
Duke Power in 1955 made a high school diploma a prerequisite to enter-
ing (whether as a new hire or a transferee) all departments except la-
bor,104 but no person who was employed at the time this requirement
took effect was demoted or discharged for want of a diploma.105 Because
blacks were allowed at that time to work only in the labor department, 106
the high school diploma requirement effectively applied only to white
employees and applicants.
Beginning on July 2, 1965, Duke Power ended its policy of segregat-
ing blacks into the labor department.107 At this time Duke Power also
implemented new hiring rules. To be hired into the labor department, an
applicant had to score satisfactorily on the Revised Beta Test.IOB To be
hired into any other department, an applicant had to have a high school
diploma and score satisfactorily on both the Wonderlic Personnel Test
96. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C. 1968),affd in part, rev'd in part
and remanded, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
97. Id. at 244.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 245.
101. President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law on July 2, 1964. See 78 Stat. 241
(1964).
102. 292 F. Supp. at 247.
103. Id. at 248.
104. Id. at 245. The date 1955 does not appear in the opinion of the district court, but the date
is given in the opinion of the court of appeals, 420 F.2d at 1229.
105. 292 F. Supp. at 245.
106. Id. at 247.
107. Id. at 248.
108. Ill. at 245.
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and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test, Form AA.109 The in-
ter-departmental transfer policy was not changed; an employee who
wanted to change departments needed only a high school diploma. 110
Evidently, a problem with the new hiring rules developed quickly.
Judge Gordon reported that, "at the instigation of employees in the coal-
handling department,"lll Duke Power began in September of 1965 to
allow employees who lacked a high school diploma and who were work-
ing in the coal handling and labor departments to transfer to other de-
partments by achieving satisfactory scores on the Wonderlic and Bennett
tests.112 This new rule probably grew out of racial discontent. From
1955 to 1965 white coal handlers who lacked a high school diploma were
not allowed to transfer to the better departments, and apparently they
never protested this rule. But when Title VII took effect, blacks who
held high school diplomas 113 were eligible to transfer from labor into
departments from which uneducated white coal handlers were excluded,
and the latter must have complained. Accordingly, Duke Power allowed
persons employed on September 1, 1965 to transfer to other departments,
regardless of whether they had a high school diploma, so long as they
passed the Wonderlic and Bennett tests. 114
The plaintiffs claimed the diploma requirement was illegal because it
impeded their access to better jobs. 115 In the past, blacks had been dis-
criminatorily restricted to the labor department; thus, if black and white
counterparts-both lacking diplomas-had been hired on the same date,
the black would have been assigned to labor, whereas the white might
have been assigned to a better department. In the future, argued the
plaintiffs, if an opening developed in the better department, the white
would be eligible to apply for the position, but the black would not be (at
least, not without taking the Wonderlic and Bennett tests, which were
the target of the plaintiffs' second claim). Judge Gordon rejected this
argument, which reflected the "present effects of past discrimination"
definition of discrimination.116 He appreciated that plaintiffs labored
"under the inequities resulting from the past discriminatory promotional
practices of the defendant," 117 but he found in the legislative history that
Congress "realized the practical impossibility of eradicating all the con-
109. Id. at 246.
110. /d.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 247.
114. /d. at 246. The opinion of the court of appeals confinns that the coal handlers initiated the
request for change. 420 F.2d at 1229.
115. 292 F. Supp. at 247.
116. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 29-31.
117. 292 F. Supp. at 248.
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sequences of past discrimination."lls The judge was particularly sensi-
tive to the reach of the present effects definition of discrimination: "It is
improbable that any system of classification used by an employer who
has discriminated prior to the effective date of the Act could escape con-
demnation if [the plaintiffs'] theory prevailed, regardless of how fair and
equal its present policies may be.,,119 Accordingly, he concluded that
Title VII must be applied prospectively, no retroactively,12O and he
turned to consider whether the high school diploma requirement was
presently discriminatory. He found it was not, as it was intended to up-
grade the quality of Duke Power's work force and had been administered
fairly since the effective date of the Act. 121 In effect, Judge Gordon
adopted the disparate treatment definition of discrimination,122 which
outlaws an act if it is harmful to an employee and the reason for the act is
the employee's race. The high school diploma requirement did not of-
fend this definition because the purpose of the requirement was to im-
prove the work force, not to exclude blacks, and fair administration of
the requirement confirmed its legitimate purpose.
The plaintiffs' second claim was that the rule of September, 1965,
which allowed an employee who lacked a high school diploma to transfer
to another department only if he passed the Wonderlic and Bennett tests,
was discriminatory.123 Judge Gordon did not state the plaintiffs' argu-
ments in support of this claim, but they can be inferred from the opinion.
Apparently, the plaintiffs first argued the testing requirement was like the
diploma requirement in that testing was a burden imposed on blacks
(who had to take the tests to enter a better department) that was not
imposed on their white counterparts (who were already in the better de-
partments). The judge rejected this argument "for the same reasons ex-
pressed previously in the discussion of the high school requirement,"124
which seems to mean the judge found the tests were not discriminatory
because the intent behind them was legitimate, namely, to ensure the
quality of the work force, and they had been applied fairly since Title VII
took effect.
It appears the plaintiffs also argued the tests were unlawful because
118. Id.
119. Id. See supra notes 132-42.
120. See id. at 248. The judge distinguished Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968), on the ground that the policy attacked in that case "continued the old discrimina-
tory no-transfer policies except that four Negroes were allowed to transfer every six months without
effect on their seniority rights." 292 F. Supp. at 249. The transfer restrictions in place at the time of
trial served no business purpose, whereas the restrictions in Griggs served legitimate purposes. But
he added that, if "Quarles may be interpreted to hold the present consequences of past discrimina-
tion are covered by the Act, this Court holds otherwise." Id. at 248.
121. Id.
122. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 334 n.1S.
123. 292 F. Supp. at 249.
124. Id.
470 INDUSTRIAL RELA TIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:429
they were outside the protection afforded by section 703(h) to "any pro-
fessionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administra-
tion or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race. . . ." Judge Gordon responded by point-
ing out that Senator John G. Tower of Texas had introduced an amend-
ment containing this language "to insure the employer's right to utilize
ability tests in hiring and promoting employees which practice had been
condemned by a hearing examiner for the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Commission."125 The plaintiffs relied on the Guidelines of the
EEOC, in which the meaning of the phrase "professionally developed
ability test" was limited to "a test which fairly measures the knowledge
or skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the appli-
cant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to measure the
applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobS."I26 The
Wonderlic and Bennett tests could not satisfy this Guideline because
they "were never intended to accurately measure the ability of an em-
ployee to perform the particular job available. Rather, they are intended
to indicate whether the employee has the general intelligence and overall
mechanical comprehension of the average high school graduate, regard-
less of race. . . ."127 The judge found the Wonderlic and Bennett tests
were lawful because they measured "qualities which the defendant would
logically want to find in his employees,"128 and the judge had already
decided the tests did not discriminate on the basis of race because they
had a legitimate purpose and were administered fairly since the Act took
effect.
Having decided the diploma and testing requirements did not vio-
late the Act, Judge Gordon dismissed the complaint,I29 whereupon the
plaintiffs appealed. 130 Judge Gordon did not expressly rule on the valid-
ity of the adverse impact definition of discrimination, and apparently it
was not urged on him.I3I Nevertheless, he rejected the heart and soul of
125. Id. at 249-50.
126. See id. at 250. The Guideline was issued by the EEOC on August 24, 1966. The full text
of the Guideline may be found in the DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-I-E-3 (Sept. 7, 1966).
127. 292 F. Supp. at 250. The plaintiffs also attacked the employer's allocation of overtime, ld.,
but their arguments and the judge's ruling have no bearing on the aspects of the case on which this
article focuses.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 252.
130. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
131. A showing of adverse impact begins with proof that proportionately more blacks than
whites are disadvantaged by an employer's act. If the plaintiffs had argued the education require-
ment had an adverse impact, they would have compared percentages of blacks and whites who
lacked diplomas. Because Judge Gordon's opinion did not state what percentages of black and white
existing or potential employees of the defendant lacked diplomas, we may infer the plaintiffs did not
argue the educational requirement had an adverse impact on blacks. Similarly, the opinion did no
compare black and white performances on the Wonderlic and Bennett tests, supporting the inference
that the plaintiffs did not argue the testing requirement had an adverse impact on blacks.
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adverse impact, for he held the diploma and testing requirements were
lawful because they were intended to serve a legitimate purpose and were
administered fairly. For him, discrimination depended on the reasons
for, not the effects of, an employer's act. This point is important, of
course, because of the Supreme Court's eventual disposition of the case.
~en 2. In the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
a. Judge Boreman for the Majority: Present Effects Adopted But
Adverse Impact Rejected
On appeal, Judge Boreman of the Fourth Circuit, writing for him-
self and Judge Bryan, found only one error, albeit a significant one, in the
decision of the district court. Judge Gordon had refused to accept the
present effects of past discrimination definition of discrimination. The
leading case recognizing this definition was Quarles v. Phillip Morris,
Inc.,132 in which Judge Butzner of the Fourth Circuit, sitting in the dis-
trict court by designation, was confronted with an employer whose de-
partments once had been segregated by race. Thereafter, strictly limited
numbers of blacks were allowed to transfer into the formerly all-white
department. Judge Butzner found violations of Title VII because a black
who took a job in the better-paying, formerly white department "would
find himself junior to white employees holding less employment seniority
who got their positions by reason of the company's formerly racially seg-
regated employment policy."133 Although Judge Gordon in Griggs sug-
gested a distinction between Quarles and the case before him, more
significantly he had rejected the whole present effects definition of dis-
crimination.134 But the circuit court judges preferred the approach of
their own Judge Butzner, whose views had already been adopted by the
Fifth Circuit,135 and held that "present and continuing consequences of
past discrimination are covered by the Act." 136
In applying the present effects definition to the appellants, Judge
Boreman distinguished among the named plaintiffs. Ten of them had
been hired before the high school diploma requirement was adopted in
1955. Three of these had diplomas at the time of their initial employ-
ment and, between the effective date of the Act and the decision of the
court of appeals, each had been promoted out of the labor department.
One black completed a high school equivalency course shortly before the
court of appeals issued its opinion; too little time had elapsed to deter-
mine whether he would be advanced without discrimination, but it ap-
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132. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
133. Id. at 514.
134. See supra note 120.
135. 420 F.2d at 1230, citing United States v. Local 189, United Papennakers and
Paperworkers, 416 F.ld 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
136. 420 F.2d at 1230.
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peared to the court that Duke Power was no longer discriminating
against blacks with high school diplomas. None of these four blacks re-
ceived injunctive relief.137 Six other blacks who had been hired before
1955 lacked high school diplomas. 138 These men the court found were
suffering the present effects of past discrimination because they were
locked into the labor department, while white employees who similarly
lacked high school diplomas were allowed to remain in better depart-
ments and could be promoted within those departments.139 These six
blacks, wrote Judge Boreman, were entitled to a waiver of the diploma
requirement. They were also entitled to a waiver of the testing require-
ment, since their white counterparts were not so burdened. 140
Four blacks remained. They too lacked high school diplomas, but
they had been hired after the diploma requirement had been put into
place. 141 Whether they were the victims of discrimination depended on
whether the diploma and testing requirements were lawful under Title
VII,142 and Judge Boreman proceeded to analyze those requirements
under the Act. First, he ruled the employer had a valid business purpose
for adopting the diploma requirement.143 Then he considered whether
the testing requirement ran afoul of the Tower amendment. 144 He said
there was no evidence that the tests had been administered unfairly, but
there was evidence that the tests were professionally developed, reliable,
and valid.145 Apparently, the criterion the judge thought the tests validly
measured was the performance of an average high school graduate. 146
But this criterion was inappropriate, argued the plaintiffs, as the EEOC
had construed the Tower amendment to authorize only tests that mea-
sure ability to do specificjobs, 147 and Judge Gordon had already held in
the district court that Duke Power's tests were not job-related. 148 So the
question in the court of appeals became, as it had become in the district
137. Jd. at 1229, 1237. The plaintiffs had not requested monetary relief. Jd. at 1236 n.9.
138. Jd. at 1230.
139. Jd. at 1230-31.
140. [d. at 1231.
141. [d.
142. [d. at 1232-33.
143. The purpose was that Duke Power preferred to train its own employees for supervisory
positions; accordingly, it hired only high school graduates, who could have a reasonable expectation
of promotion. An expert who had observed the Dan River operation testified without contradiction
that a high school education provided training that was needed to perform tasks in the higher skilled
classifications. Id. at 1232-33.
144. [d. at 1233.
145. [d. A test is reliable if it consistently produces the same results. A test is valid if it accu-
rately measures the criterion the test is designed to measure.
146. "The minimum acceptable scores used by the company are approximately those achieved
by the average high school graduate, which fact indicates that the tests are accepted as a substitute
for a high school education." [d. at 1233.
147. Id.
148. Jd. at 1234.
I
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court, whether or not to adopt the EEOC's interpretation of the Tower
amendment, and, as the district court had done, the court of appeals
rebuffed the Commission. Relying on legislative history, Judge Boreman
concluded that the Tower amendment to section 703(h) was intended to
protect general intelligence and ability tests, so long as they were fairly
administered and acted upon.149
The court of appeals also rejected the adverse impact definition of
discrimination. In deciding whether the diploma and testing require-
ments were lawful, Judge Boreman focused on Duke Power's state of
mind. He noted the diploma requirement had a legitimate motive,
namely, facilitating the internal promotions policy. 150 He was convinced
that the date of establishment of the diploma requirement (1955, when
overt job segregation was still lawful, so that covert means of discrimina-
tion were unnecessary), the adverse effect of the diploma requirement on
whites as well as blacks, and Duke Power's willingness to reimburse
black employees for their expenses in completing their educations,
proved the requirement was not meant to discriminate against blacks.
And he found further evidence of good faith in Duke Power's fair post-
Act hiring, promotion, and transfer behavior.
This focus is important. The plaintiffs had urged the court to adopt
an essentially objective standard to decide whether the diploma and test-
ing requirements were proper. On such a standard, the requirements
would have been lawful only if they measured ability to do a job, as op-
posed to measuring "the extent to which persons have acquired educa-
tional and cultural background which has been denied to Negroes."I5I
In other words, by the plaintiffs' standard, selection criteria which ex-
cluded proportionately more blacks than whites (as Duke Power's did)
would have been illegal unless the criteria predicted success on the job.
This standard reflected the adverse impact definition of discrimination
but, like Judge Gordon of the district court, Judge Boreman of the court
of appeals rejected adverse impact. For him, Duke Power's liability
turned on whether the diploma and testing requirements were chosen in
a good-faith attempt to serve legitimate business purposes or in an at-
tempt to disadvantage black people.152 That the requirements seemed to
149. Id.
150. The judge gave no examples of illegitimate motives, but some obvious ones would have
been to give the better jobs to whites, to placate white employees who refused to work with blacks, or
to satisfy customers' taste for segregation.
151. 420 F.2d at 1232 (quoting from the appellants' brief).
152. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, discussed in the next section, Judge Sobelotf ex-
pressed the same view of Judge Boreman's approach to the issues:
Distilled to its essence, the underpinning upon which my brethren posit their argu-
ment is their expressed belief in the good faith of Duke Power. For them, the crucial
inquiry is not whether the Company can establish business need, but whether it has a bad
motive or has designed its tests with the conscious purpose to discriminate against blacks.
Id. at 1245-46 (Sobelotf, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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be reasonable steps towards legitimate business purposes was an indica-
tion of the employer's state of mind. Ultimately, the issue turned on the
nature of the employer's judgment, not the court's.
b. Judge Sobeloff, Concurring and Dissenting: Adverse Impact
Endorsed
Judge Sobeloff concurred with Judges Boreman and Bryan regard-
ing the four blacks who had completed high school and the six who had
been hired before 1955; he too accepted the present effects definition of
discrimination. But he dissented regarding the four blacks who had been
hired after the educational requirement had been implemented. Saying
of Title VII, "[t]he statute is unambiguous,"153 he approved of the ad-
verse impact definition of discrimination because "the statute interdicts
practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in substance."154 He
continued, "The critical inquiry is business necessity and if it cannot be
shown that an employment practice which excluded blacks stems from
legitimate needs the practice must end.,,155
153. [d. at 1238.
154. [d.
155. [d. (emphasis in original). Judge Sobe1off cited three cases in support of this conclusion,
but none relied on adverse impact. The first case was Quarles v. Philip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968), in which strictly limited numbers of blacks were allowed to transfer from the
fonnerly black department to the formerly white department. As mentioned in the text above,
Quarles is the leading present effects case, but it is not an adverse impact case. See supra notes 132-
34 and accompanying text. Judge Butzner expressly framed the issue as, "Are present consequences
of past discrimination covered by the act?" [d. at 510. And he answered this question by saying,
"The plain language of the act condemns as an unfair practice all racial discrimination affecting
employment without excluding present discrimination that originated in seniority systems devised
before the effective date of the act." [d. at 515. Quarles could have been an adverse impact case.
That definition is broad enough to include most present effects cases. Thus, Judge Butzner could
have held that Philip Morris's seniority system had an adverse impact on blacks and was not justified
by business necessity; but he did not. And, whereas adverse impact generally includes present ef-
fects, the converse is not true: adverse impact reaches many cases in which the present effects of past
discrimination are not at issue. For example, consider an employer who opens a new business and
requires of applicants that they have attained a certain level of education, a certain height and
weight, or a certain score on a paper-and-pencil test. Any of these practices may well have an
adverse impact on a class protected by Title VII, yet none of the persons who are adversely affected
was ever an employee of this employer, so none could claim to suffer the present effects of past
discrimination. Accordingly, the substantive contents of the present effects and adverse impact defi-
nitions of discrimination are not congruent, and a court that expressly adopts the former does not
impliedly adopt the latter. Quarles, therefore, provided no authority on which Judge Sobeloff could
properly base his adoption of the adverse impact definition of discrimination.
The second case cited by Judge Sobeloff, Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), was also a present effects case. As in
Quarles, there had been segregated lines of progression, and the issue was the appropriate way for
blacks to enter the formerly white domain. The third case on which Judge Sobeloff relied was Local
53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the union accepted as new
members only the sons or nephews of present members. Because of discrimination before Title VII
took effect, all present members were white. (This fact was implied by the court of appeals and
expressly stated by the district court, 294 F. Supp. 368, 371 (E.D. La. 1967).) This case might
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Having committed himself to adverse impact, Judge Sobeloff pro-
ceeded to apply it to the facts of Griggs. The first step was to establish
that the high school diploma and testing requirements favored whites.
He showed favoritism in the diploma requirement by citing 1960 data
indicating that 34 percent of white males in North Carolina had com-
pleted high school, as compared with 12 percent of black males.156 As
for the testing requirement, the judge apparently lacked data on the spe-
cific forms of the Wonderlic and Bennett tests used by Duke Power; 157
nevertheless, he cited a law review article that argued that blacks gener-
ally scored lower than whites on standardized tests,158 and he mentioned
an EEOC decision concerning an employer who administered a battery
of tests passed by 58 percent of the whites, but only 16 percent of the
blacks, who took it.159 As proof of the combined effect of the diploma
and testing requirements, the judge said, "Whites far overwhelmingly
better than blacks on all the criteria, as evidenced by the relatively small
promotion rate from the Labor Department since 1965."160 The
Supreme Court relied on this proof, and our observations on it appear
below.
The next step in establishing adverse impact is to prove a causal
connection between the plaintiffs' race and their treatment by their em-
ployer. This step is necessary because Title VII was plainly not meant to
outlaw all discrimination that may affect employment. For example, the
Act was not intended to prohibit an employer from hiring his white
brother-in-law instead of a better qualified black applicant. Rather, it is
clear in the language of sections 703(a)(l) and (2) that Title VII outlaws
only discrimination against an individual "because of such individual's
race." Judge Sobeloff apparently articulated the causal link he thought
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perhaps have served as precedent for the adverse impact definition, were it not for the court's finding
that the nepotic rule had been adopted for the purpose of excluding blacks. Also, in light of the
defeat of an amendment specifically designed to prohibit nepotic admissions practices, see infra notes
360-61 and accompanying text, the decision seems erroneous. Accordingly, none of the cases cited
by Judge Sobeloff supported the adverse impact definition of discrimination.
156. 420 F.2d at 1239 n.6 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id.
158. Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Pair Employment Laws: A General Approach
to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1638-41, cited at 420 F.2d at
1239 n.6.
159. 420 F.2d at 1239 n.6. The interested reader will find it difficult to locate the EEOC deci-
sion. The citation given by Judge Sobeloff(CCH Empl. Prac. Guide ~ 1209.25) now leads to discus-
sion of another matter. The Supreme Court also cited this decision, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6, but that
citation (CCH Empl. Prac. Guide ~ 17,304.53) no longer leads to anything in print. Fortunately, a
photocopy of the Commerce Clearing House report of the EEOC decision was appended to the Brief
for Petitioner in the Supreme Court, and briefs in the Supreme Court are privately published. (One
such publication is entitled Law Reprints, Labor Series, v. 4, no. 4, 1970/1971 Term, and the CCH
report of the EEOC decision may be found at pp. 285-86.) The CCH report does not contain the full
text of the EEOC's decision, but the report does reprint the information to which the courts referred.
160. 420 F.2d at 1239 n.6.
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necessary when he wrote, "Since for generations blacks have been af-
forded inadequate educational opportunities and have been culturally
segregated from white society, it is no more surprising that their per-
formance on 'intelligence' tests is significantly different from whites' than
it is that fewer blacks have high school diplomas."161 Thus, the judge
reasoned that Duke Power failed to promote the plaintiffs because of
their race in that race caused blacks' segregation and inadequate educa-
tion, which caused blacks to lack diplomas and score poorly on tests,
which caused blacks to fail to satisfy Duke Power's requirements for
promotion.
The final step in adverse impact analysis is to decide whether the
selection criteria that favor whites over blacks because of race are justi-
fied by business necessity-that is, are job related or predict success on
the job. Before taking this step, however, Judge Sobeloff addressed the
argument that Duke Power's tests were protected by the Tower amend-
ment, regardless of whether they were job related, because the amend-
ment requires only that tests be professionally developed and not
designed, intended, or used to discriminate. The judge rejected this argu-
ment because the EEOC Guidelines interpreted the Tower amendment
as applying only to job-related tests,162 and he offered five reasons for
accepting the Guidelines. First, he said, the interpretation of a statute by
the agency charged with the statute's administration is entitled to great
deference in the courts. 163 Second, the EEOC's interpretation made
good sense because a professionally developed test that is appropriate for
one job (for example, a typing test for a secretary) might be inappropriate
for another job (for example, a teacher). 164 Third, the majority's reading
of the Tower amendment invited employers to evade the Act by choosing
tests that favored whites and were irrelevant to job performance. 165
Fourth, the judge stated that other courts had reached similar results,
and finally he said the Guideline was in conformity with congressional
intent. 166
161. Id. at 1240.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1240-41.
164. Id. at 1241.
165. Id.
166. Id. None of Judge Sobeloff's reasons is persuasive. Administrative interpretations are enti-
tled to great deference only if they express the intent of Congress. That Congress did not intend to
outlaw adverse impact is shown below. See infra notes 210-571 and accompanying text. An em-
ployer who uses a typing test to select a teacher may act irrationally, but Title VII is not a law
against stupidity. An employer who attempts to evade the Act by choosing tests that favor whites is
engaged in disparate treatment, which is illegal regardless of whether adverse impact is illegal.
Finally, Judge Sobeloff said that other courts had reached results similar to the EEOC's posi-
.
tion. It appears he used "similar" loosely. He cited three cases: Quarles v. Philip Morris, 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.O. Va. 1968), United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969), and Dobbins v. Local 212, Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). All of these
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Having accepted the Guidelines, Judge Sobeloff turned to the ques-
tion of whether Duke Power's tests were job related. The district court
had found they were not, and the testimony of Duke Power's expert
proved only that the tests determined if the subject had the ability of a
high school graduate. In response to the argument that more intelligent
employees were needed at the entry level so they could be promoted to
higher jobs, the judge said the company had not shown its selection crite-
ria were related to any job at all.167
Although Judge Sobeloff's views may not have persuaded his col-
leagues on the court of appeals, his reasoning apparently did influence
the Justices of the Supreme Court, for the Court's unanimous168 opinion
followed the line of argument and incorporated the principal reasons
Judge Sobeloff had advanced.
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3. In the Supreme Court: Adverse Impact Adopted
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Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The opinion opened by accepting the adverse impact definition of dis-
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cases were decided under the present effects definition of discrimination, so their precedential value
in an adverse impact context is uncertain. Quarles offered Judge Sobeloff the most support, holding
that numerical restrictions on transfers from a formerly black department to a formerly white de-
partment were illegal. The judge quoted a sentence from the Quarles opinion: "The restrictions do
not result from lack of merit or qualification." 279 F. Supp. at 513, quoted at 420 F.2d 1241. This
language suggests that business necessity might have justified the transfer restrictions. No other
possible defense was mentioned in the opinion, which may imply the belief that no other defense was
possible. Therefore, because discrimination can be established under both the present effects and the
adverse impact definitions without proof that the defendant had a specific intent to disadvantage
blacks, the suggestion in Quarles that only business necessity would be a defense to a prima facie
showing of present effects discrimination is, by analogy, a (faint) suggestion that only business neces-
sity (for example, a job-related test) would be a defense to a prima facie showing of adverse impact.
But the adverse impact definition applies to many more cases than the present effect definition,
leading one to suspect that more defenses might be appropriate under the former, broader definition.
The analogy to Quarles is at best weak.
Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers is not analogous at all. The opinion of course contained the
language Judge Sobe1off quoted: "it is essential that journeyman's examinations be objective in na-
ture, that they be designed to test the ability of the applicant to do that work usually required of a
journeyman. . . ." 416 F.2d at 136, quoted at 420 F.2d at 1241. However, the defendant union to
which this language applied had deliberately excluded blacks from membership, and one of the
union's techniques was a subjective test that had no definite passing score and was administered by
one man, whose decision was not subject to review. The court's requirement of an objective, job-
related test in these circumstances says nothing about whether a test must be job-related if the disad-
vantage to blacks was not effected purposefully.
As for Dobbins, of which Judge Sobe1off said merely, "Accord," 420 F.2d at 1241, the court
made abundantly clear (in a most refreshing style) that the defendant union had deliberately admin-
istered tests so difficult that no one, black or white, could pass them (except for three "Einsteins," of
whose success the court seemed suspicious), and the union's purpose for giving such hard tests was
to discourage blacks from pursuing membership. As in the Sheet Metal Workers case, the holding
that the defendant had acted out of a motive to disadvantage blacks destroys any value Dobbins
might have as precedent for a case like Griggs, in which there was no intent to disadvantage blacks.
167. 420 F.2d at 1243.44.
168. Justice Brennan took no part in the case. 401 U.S. at 436.
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crimination.169 Because adverse impact was a new way of defining dis-
169. Id. at 429-30. One may question how clearly the Court perceived the adverse impact defi-
nition. The first sentence of the opinion read:
We granted the writ in this case to resolve the question whether an employer is pro-
hibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, from requiring a high school education
or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is shown to be significantly related to successful
job performance, (b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been filled only
by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites.
Id. at 425-26 (footnote omitted). Clauses (a) and (b) of this sentence are sufficient to define adverse
impact; clause (c) is superfluous. But it is more than superfluous: for, by referring to a "longstand-
ing practice of giving preference to whites," clause (c) incorrectly implies that purposeful discrimina-
tion in the past is a necessary element of adverse impact.
The same error occurs later in the opinion. After giving the facts of the case and the holdings
below, the Court stated: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory practices." Id. at 430. This sentence is a good statement of the present effects
definition of discrimination, under which past discriminatory practices (such as segregation into an
all-black department) may not be allowed to disadvantage blacks after the effective date of the Act.
The sentence is a poor statement of the adverse impact definition, under which a selection criterion
(such as a written test used for entry-level hiring) may be illegal because of its disproportionate
exclusion of blacks whom an employer has never met, let alone discriminated against in the past.
Based on these sentences, it may be argued that the Supreme Court did not intend to adopt the
adverse impact definition in Griggs. The foregoing passages notwithstanding, the intent to adopt
adverse impact is evident from other statements in the opinion and the precise holding of the case.
Two other passages in the opinion reveal that the Court intended to accept the adverse impact
definition of discrimination. An accurate statement of this definition is contained in this passage:
"The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but dis-
criminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is pro-
hibited." Id. at 431. The following sentence, though less precise, also defines adverse impact cor-
rectly: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in-headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability." Id. at 432.
The holding of the case also demonstrates that the Court meant to adopt adverse impact. The
writ of certiorari was limited to the adverse impact claim. As we have seen, the court of appeals
divided blacks without diplomas into two groups, those who had been hired before the diploma
requirement was established and those who had been hired afterwards. The former group was af-
forded relief under the present effects definition; the latter group was denied relief because the appel-
late court rejected the adverse impact definition. The employer did not seek review of the holding in
favor of the former group. The latter group petitioned for certiorari, framing the question as
whether Title VII was violated by the use of selection criteria that excluded a disproportionate
number of blacks and were not job related. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 2. Thus, the Supreme
Court noted that the court of appeals had held the diploma and testing requirements were lawful
because, "in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, use of such requirements was permitted by the
Act. In so doing, the court of appeals rejected the claim that because these two requirements oper-
ated to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of Negroes, they were unlawful under
Title VII unless shown to be job related." 40 1 U.S. at 429 (footnote omitted). In the next sentence,
the Court wrote, "We granted the writ on these claims." Id.
The petitioners were victorious in the Supreme Court. They were blacks who lacked diplomas
and were hired after the diploma requirement was established. They were not suffering the present
effects of past discrimination because their white counterparts, who also lacked diplomas and were
hired after the diploma requirement was established, were similarly restricted to the labor depart-
ment unless they passed the tests. The Supreme Court was fully aware of these facts. See id. at 424
n.4. The court of appeals, which accepted present effects but not adverse impact, denied the petition-
429
1985] GRIGGS' FOLL Y 479
lis-
crimination,17O a reader might expect to find a serious effort in the
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ers any relief because they were not suffering the present effects of past discrimination. 420 F.2d at
1235-36. Accordingly, when the Supreme Court wrote, "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is,
as to that portion of the judgment appealed from, reversed," 401 U. S. at 436, the Court held a cause
of action was proved by blacks who had experienced neither disparate treatment nor present effects
of past discrimination, but who had suffered the adverse impact of the diploma and testing
requiremen ts.
170. B. SCRLEI & P. GROSSMAN, 2d ed., supra note 8, at 5 n.l2, point out that Griggs was
foreshadowed by Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (CD. Cal. 1970), afJ'd as modified,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). The employer refused to hire persons who had been arrested for
crimes other than minor traffic violations (regardless of whether the applicants had been convicted).
The court held for the plaintiff because it found that blacks were arrested more often than whites,
and there was no proof that persons who have been arrested but not convicted make less efficient or
honest employees.
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and The Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 71 n.46, claimed that several cases foreshadowed adverse
impact, but most of the cases Blumrosen cited were based on the present effects definition of discrim-
ination. Quarles v. Philip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); see supra notes 155, 166 and
accompanying text. Dobbins v. Loca12l2, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); see supra note
166 and accompanying text. Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); see supra note 155 and accompany-
ing text.
In Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), cited by Blumrosen, a
black was denied employment because of negative recommendations from previous employers. He
brought a class action and established that, as of the time of his charge to the EEOC, less than two
percent of the defendant's employees were black, whereas blacks comprised nearly twenty-two per-
cent of the population of the state. The court held that these statistics proved a violation of Title VII
as a matter of law. This holding obviously ran counter to the clear language of §703(j); nevertheless,
even if the holding were correct, it would provide scant basis for the claim that the case anticipated
adverse impact. Another aspect of the case came closer. The defendant relied on present employees
to refer applicants for vacant jobs. Because most existing employees were white, most applicants
were white. We can easily see from today's perspective that this policy had an adverse impact on
blacks, but the court's rationale for disapproving the policy was that it produced present discrimina-
tion by building on pre- Act bias.
A similar case Blumrosen cited is Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La.
1969). (The article mistakenly cites the opinion at 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1970), which dealt
only with class certification.) The pertinent issue in Clark was that the employer hired at the gate
without publicly announcing or advertising openings. As the result of this practice, news of job
openings spread by word of mouth primarily to whites. The court did not discuss adverse impact,
however; rather, the court specifically held the defendant's conduct was deliberately intended to
discriminate against blacks.
Blumrosen cited Gregory, which is appropriate. He also appropriately mentioned Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970). (The article mistakenly cites the opin-
ion at 310 F. Supp. 537 (1970), which dealt only with racially segregated local unions.) The em-
ployer in Hicks required applicants and employees desiring to transfer to better jobs to pass written
tests, which whites passed at substantially higher rates than blacks. Although the court relied for
authority on present effects cases, the opinion explicitly stated that tests, though not adopted to
disadvantage blacks, are illegal if they operate to prefer whites over blacks unless the tests are justi-
fied by business necessity. (This holding should come as no surprise to the reader; the plaintiffs were
represented by Cooper and Sobel, who represented the plaintiffs in Griggs.)
Thus, the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Griggs was anticipated by two district court opin-
ions in 1970. Although the statement in the text that adverse impact was a new way of defining
discrimination must be qualified to this extent, it remains basically true that adverse impact, like
Pallas Athena from Zeus, sprang full grown from the mind of the Supreme Court.
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citations to legislative history or precedent or even legal theory, one finds
only a few undocumented assertions. For example:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited. 171
* * * *
Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that, Congress has
placed on the employer to burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. 172
The Court cited not a line in a committee report, not a colloquy on the
171. 401 u.s. at 431.
172. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). Most of the Court's other assertions about the Congres-
sional intent to prohibit adverse impact were equally unsupported by argument or authority:
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory practices.
Id. at 430.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
Congress proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrimi-
nate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may
not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the
stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condi-
tion of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort again to the fable-provided
that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use.
Id. at 431.
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability.
Id. at 432. Perhaps the Court believed that repeating a proposition many times can substitute for
proving it.
One passage in the opinion, however, offered an argument to show that Congress intended to
outlaw adverse impact:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30. There are two problems with this argument. In the first place, it places far too much
weight on the term "equality of opportunity," which appears in the title but not the text of the Act.
In the second place, we can assume the truth of the first two sentences just quoted, and still it does
not follow that Congress intended to outlaw adverse impact. The Court's argument assumed that
equality of opportunity has a clear and settled meaning. In fact, of course, the term is ambiguous. It
can mean anything from a chance to file an application to a strictly enforced ratio. Therefore, the
Court's attempt to infer the means (proscribed conduct) from the ends (equality of opportunity) was
bound to fail. It would have been much better to have reversed the process. The correct interpreta-
tion of equality of opportunity depends on the specific conduct that Congress chose to prohibit. If
Congress intended to outlaw only disparate treatment, equality of opportunity would mean freedom
from intentional disadvantage because of race.
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lds floor of either house of Congress, not the testimony of a witness before a
committee, not even the report of a journalist in a newspaper. The rea-
son is that no such evidence exists. Indeed, there is overwhelming evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to legislate adverse impact, as will
appear below.
Having adopted the adverse impact definition of discrimination, the
opinion briefly noted the evidence that Duke Power's diploma and test-
ing requirements disproportionately disadvantaged blacks. Regarding
the diploma requirement, a footnote recited the 1960 census data show-
ing that 34 percent of the white males in North Carolina but only 12
percent of the black males had completed high school. 173 The Court did
not explain why it chose to compare the absolute rates of success of
blacks and whites in the total population on the diploma criterion. As
shown above, other comparisons were possible, and the way a compari-
son is made can be important. 174 Nor did the Court reveal the standard
it used to determine that the disparity between 34 percent and 12 percent
was legally significant. Perhaps the Court believed the standard need not
be stated because any disparity would be significant; or perhaps the
Court believed that a small disparity might not be significant, but this
one was large enough, and the line could be drawn in future cases.175
The evidence the Court accepted to prove that the testing require-
ment had an adverse impact is startling. The opinion stated:
Similarly, with respect to standard tests, the EEOC in one case
found that use of a battery of tests, induding the Wonderlic and Bennett
tests used by the Company in the instant case, resulted in 58% of whites
passing the tests, as compared with only 6% of the blacks.176
Apparently, there was no evidence in the trial court that the blacks who
took Duke Power's tests fared less well than whites. Also, the battery of
tests in the EEOC decision apparently included tests besides the Wonder-
lic and Bennett, so that there was no evidence that any blacks scored
below whites on the set of tests actually used by Duke Power. In Accord-
lIe
es-
r
)
173. Id. at 430 n.6.
174. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. As a further illustration, suppose 1,000
blacks and 1,000 whites apply for jobs by taking a written test, and 15 blacks and 50 whites pass and
are hired. The white success rate is (50 -;- 1,000 =) 5%, the black success rate is (15 -;- 1,000 =)
1.5%, and the absolute difference of success rates is (5% - 1.5%=) 3.5%-which is much less than
the absolute difference of (34% - 12% =) 22% in Griggs. But looking at relative success rates
reveals another picture. In Our example, the black success rate is (1.5% -;- 5% =) 30% of the white
success rate, and this disparity is greater than the one in Griggs, where the black rate was (12% -;-
34% =) 35% of the white rate. Thus, the way a disparity is calculated is an important question.
175. As noted above, the most widely used comparison today is between relative rates of suc-
cess. It is generally considered that a disparity is significant unless the black success rate is four-
fifths or 80% percent of the white race. In Griggs, the black rate was only (12 -;- 34 =) 35% of the
white rate.
176. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6 (citation omitted).
177. The EEOC decision involved a respondent/employer that allowed employees who passed
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ingly, an employer was held liable because a battery of tests used by an-
other employer had an adverse impact on blacks who applied for work at
another company! Although it may be true that blacks tend to achieve
lower grades than whites on standardized tests, considerations of due
process surely require that a defendant be held responsible for his own
behavior, not that of others.
In the next step of its argument, the Court dealt with the issue of
causation. As noted above, the Act clearly requires proof of a causal link
between the plaintiffs' race and what happened to them. Therefore, it
was not sufficient for the Court to state merely that the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy Duke Power's selection criteria while some whites passed the cri-
teria. It was necessary for the Court to establish that the plaintiffs' fail-
ure was caused by their race. The Court essayed to establish such a
causal connection in these words:
The Court of Appeals' opinion, and the partial dissent, agreed that,
on the record in the present case, "whites register far better on the Com-
pany's alternative requirements" than Negroes. This consequence would
appear to be directly traceable to race. Basic intelligence must have the
means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Be-
cause they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education
in segregated schools and this Court expressly recognized these differ-
ences in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). There,
because of the inferior education received by Negroes in North Carolina,
this Court barred the institution of a literacy test for voter registration on
the ground that the test would abridge the right to vote indirectly on
account of race. 178
Containing express and implied claims, the reasoning in this argument
was more complex than may appear on the surface.
The argument began with the implied claim that the "basic intelli-
gence" of blacks was equal to that of whites. An unstated implication of
this claim was that, other factors being equal, blacks would achieve equal
certain tests to transfer from dead-end jobs, held chiefly by blacks, to line-of-progression jobs, held
chiefly by whites. All employees wishing to transfer had to pass the Wonderlic Personnel Test,
Form A (one cannot determine from the courts' opinions or the briefs in the Supreme Court which
form of the Wonderlic Test was used at Duke Power) and, depending on the specific jobs the em-
ployees sought, one or two other tests, one of which was the Bennett Test of Mechanical Compre-
hension, Form AA. It appears from the EEOC decision that no employee took only the Wonderlic
and Bennett tests given by Duke Power, and this is another reason why the statistics regarding the
respondent before the EEOC cannot be applied to the employer in Griggs. A third reason is that the
employees who took the test in the EEOC decision cannot be considered a random sample. In
consequence, the EEOC decision shows only what happened to one group of people, taking a differ-
ent combination of tests, at one point in time.
178. Id. at 430 (footnote and citation omitted). Judge Sobeloff had relied on the same reasoning
in the court of appeals: "Since for generations blacks have been afforded inadequate educational
opportunities and have been culturally segregated from white society, it is no more surprising that
their performance on 'intelligence' tests is significantly different from whites' than it is that fewer
blacks have high school diplomas." 420 F.2d at 1239, n.6.
\
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success with whites in graduating from high school and in taking apti-
tude tests. We can accept the truth of these claims without hesitation.
Another implied claim was that quality of education accounted for
the differences in black and white graduation rates and test scores. This
claim might be questioned. For example, environmental factors like fam-
ily wealth and social norms would also seem to affect graduation rates.
Nevertheless, we can accept the truth of this claim if we believe that
quality of education is probably the single most important determinant of
graduation rates and test scores.
Then came three express claims. The first was that the education
provided to the plaintiffs was inferior to the education provided to
whites. Although the Court's proof of this claim was questionable, 179 the
claim was in all probability true. The second express claim was that the
cause of the plaintiffs' inferior education was their race. No proof was
offered for this claim, but, in light of American history, the claim seems
accurate in the sense that racial prejudice led to inferior education for
blacks. The third express claim was that the plaintiffs were less success-
ful than whites on Duke Power's selection criteria. The evidence sup-
porting this claim has been discussed above.
The Court's argument on causation may be summarized as follows:
Duke Power discriminated against the plaintiffs because of their race in
that race caused the plaintiffs' inferior education; inferior education
caused the plaintiffs to lack diplomas and score poorly on tests; and lack
of diplomas and poor test scores caused Duke Power to reject the plain-
tiffs' applications. We may accept the truth of each of these claims, and
nevertheless entertain reservations about the Court's reasoning. In par-
ticular, we will focus below on the notion of causation implied in this
argument. We will see the Court adopted a theory of causation that is
unusual in the law and was not intended by Congress.
The prima facie case of adverse impact discrimination was now in
place: selection criteria disadvantaged proportionately more blacks than
whites because of the blacks' race. Therefore, ruled the Court, the bur-
den shifted to the employer to prove that the criteria were job related.
The Court asseted that Congress intended the employer to carry this bur-
den: "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employ-
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179. The proof of the claim rested on a mischaracterization of Gaston County. The last sentence
of the quotation above conveyed the impression that this case held that all blacks in North Carolina
had received inferior education. Such a holding, of course, would have included the plaintiffs in
Griggs (assuming they were educated in North Carolina). But in fact the case held only that blacks
educated in Gaston County had received inferior education. Gaston County v. United States, 395
U.S. 285, 288, 293-96 (1969). Because Draper was more than 100 miles northeast of Gaston County,
it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in Griggs had been educated there. Thus, there appears to have been
no proof that the plaintiffs had received an inferior education.
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ment in question.,,18o This statement is troubling because of the lan-
guage of the Act, its legislative history, and the theory of adverse impact.
First, let us consider the language. The sections that define conduct
outlawed by the statute (sections 703(a), (b), (c), and (d), and 704(a) and
(b)) all begin with the phrase, "It shall be unlawful employment prac-
tice. . . ." The sections that define conduct exempt from the statute
(sections 703 (e)(l) and (2), (g), and (h)) all contain the phrase, "it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice. . . ." These sections amount
to a lengthy definition of discrimination that specifically includes some
conduct and specifically excludes other conduct. Use of a professionally
developed ability test, for example, "shall not be an unlawful employ-
ment practice." Such a test is simply not discriminatory under Title VII.
Therefore, proof that a test meets the standards of section 703(h) is not a
defense, but a demonstration that the employer's conduct was lawful ab
initio. Analogous to evidence in an action for battery that the defendant
never touched the plaintiff, proving that an employer's test meets the
requirements of section 703(h) is not an excuse for discrimination, but
proof that discrimination never occurred.
Legislative history confirms this interpretation of the Act. The "de-
fenses" relevant to the argument of this article are contained in section
703(h), which protects seniority systems and ability tests. As first passed
by the House of Representatives, the civil rights bill was silent on these
practices. 181 This silence should not be mistaken for an absence of intent,
however. All the proponents of the bill in the House agreed that senior-
ity systems would not be endangered.182 The issue of ability tests did not
arise until the House sent the bill to the Senate.
180. 401 U.S. at 432. This sentence not only indicated that the employer carries the burden, but
also characterized the nature of the burden: the employer must prove the requirement has a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question. In other places in the opinion, the burden was
characterized in somewhat different words (emphasized in the following quotations): "The touch-
stone is business necessity." Id. at 431. "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Ne-
groes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. "On the
record before us, neither the high school completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is
shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used."
Id. "In the context of this case, it is unnecessary to reach the question whether testing requirements
that take into account capability for the next succeeding position or related future promotion might
be utilized upon a showing that such long-range requirements fulfill a genuine business need." Id. at
432. "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. . . has issued guidelines interpreting
§ 703(h) to permit only the use of job-related tests." Id. at 433 (footnote omitted). "What Congress
has forbidden is giving [testing] devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demon-
strably a reasonable measure of job performance.." Id. at 436. "What Congress has commanded is
that any tests must measure the person for thejob and not the person in the abstract." Id. Presuma-
bly, all of these characterizations were meant to express the same idea, that selection criteria with an
adverse impact must be validated according to the standards in the EEOC Guidelines.
For another view of the meaning of these terms, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, 2d ed., supra
note 8, at 112-14.
181. Title VII as passed by the House appears at 110 CONGo REc. 8202-05 (1964).
182. See, e.g., id. at 1518 (statement of Rep. Celler).
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In the Senate, it was clear from the start that the proponents of the
bill believed that it would not outlaw bona fide seniority systems183 or
ability tests.184 Thus, Congress' definition of discrimination always ex-
cluded seniority systems and ability tests. Explicit protection for these
practices was written in to section 703(h), explained Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, because many of his coIleagues had complained, "if that's
what you meant, why didn't you say it?,,185 Because seniority systems
and ability tests were never thought to be discriminatory, legislative his-
tory demonstrates that proof that a seniority system or ability test is pro-
tected by section 703(h) cannot be considered a defense.
A third reason the Court's statement about defenses is troubling is
conceptual. We have seen above that when an employer shows a test is
valid, she destroys the plaintiffs' prima facie case by proving their proxy
was false. Thus, the language of the Act, its legislative history, and the
theory of adverse impact all militate against the Court's characterization
of proof of job relatedness as a defense.
Finally, the Court dealt with Duke Power's reliance on the Tower
amendment to section 703(h), which "authorizes the use of 'any profes-
sionally developed ability test' that is not 'designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race. . . .' ,,186 The district court had found the
tests were professionally developed, fairly administered, and adopted for
the purpose of upgrading the work force, but these findings were unavail-
ing, held the Supreme Court, because the EEOC Guidelines limit the
protection of section 703(h) to tests that are job related. 187 "The admin-
istrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to
great deference. Since the Act and its legislative history support the
Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the guide-
lines as expressing the will of Congress.,,188
None of the Court's reasons for accepting the Guidelines was per-
suasive. The first was the status of the EEOC as the enforcing agency.
Whatever respect Congress intended the courts to pay rulings of other
administrative agencies, Congress did not intend the courts to defer the
EEOC rulings. Section 706(a)189 of the Act invested the Commission
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183. See id. at 5874 (statement of Sen. Keating); id. at 5423 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id.
at 6564 (statement of Sen. Kuchel), id. at 7207 (Dept. of Justice memorandum); id. at 7213 (Inter-
pretative Memorandum). For a fuller discussion of this point see infra notes 362-69 and accompany-
ing tex t.
184. 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964) (INTERPRETATIVE MEMORANDUM); id. at 6415-16 (state-
ment of Sen. Case); id. at 9707 (statement of Sen. Clark); id. at 8370, 9107 (Bipartisan Civil Rights
Newsletter); id. at 13,504 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). For a fuller discussion of this point see
infra notes 370 to 428 and accompanying text.
185. 110 CONGo REC. 12,707 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
186. 401 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 433-34.
189. The substance of the relevant provisions of the Act now appears in § 706(b).
;s
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with responsibility to investigate charges of discrimination, to determine
if there is reasonable cause to believe charges are true, and to endeavor to
eliminate unlawful employment practices. Note that the Commission
was empowered, not to decide whether discrimination exists, but only to
decide whether there is reasonable cause to believe a charge of discrimi-
nation is true. An Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII, prepared
by Senators Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania and Clifford P. Case of New
Jersey, explained the narrowness of the Commission's role:
The suit against the respondent [employer] . . . would proceed in
the usual manner for litigation in the Federal courts. It would be a trial
de novo and not, in any sense, a suit for judicial review of a Commission
determination. In fact, the Commission never makes any determination
that respondent committed an unlawful employment practice; it merely
ascertains whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that he
did. 190
Also, the first sentence of section 713(a) reads: "The Commission shall
have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable
procedural regulations to carry out the provision of this title." The word
"procedural" was not put there carelessly. Representative Emmanuel
Celler of New York inserted it on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives for the express purpose of barring the Commission from issuing
substantive regulations.191 Sections 706(a) and 713(a) destroy the argu-
ment for deference to EEOC regulations (and may account for the
EEOC's calling its regulations "Guidelines"). As a result, the Guidelines
deserve deference only to the extent that they are persuasive. The
Supreme Court itself has taken the same position in other cases.192
The Court's second reason for accepting the Guidelines was the Act
itself. The evidence in the Act was apparently the word "used," which
the Court italicized. The idea must have been that a test that has an
adverse impact and is not job related is used to discriminate. 193 But this
argument disregarded the ordinary meaning of the word "used." Human
motivation is implied when the "s" is pronounced like a "z" and the
word describes the action of an agent or object. To say, "The woman
used the knife to disfigure her attacker," is clearly to imply that her pur-
pose was disfigurement. Similarly, to say, "The employer used the test to
discriminate," is to imply that her purpose was discrimination. 194 More-
over, interpreting "used" as the Court did was inconsistent with the nat-
190. 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum).
191. Id. at 2575.
192. See, e.g., General Elec. V. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-41 (1976).
193. In Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), Justice Stewart stated that the term
"used to discriminate" incorporated an adverse impact standard into § 703(h). Id. at 157 n.4 (Stew-
art, 1., dissenting).
194. When the
"s" of "used" is pronounced like "s" in "sofa" and refers to a pattern of past
behavior, "used" has another meaning that is not relevant here. "He used to go home at 5:00."
,
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ural reading of the preceding verbs in the section-"designed,
intended"-which undoubtedly point towards the employer's motiva-
tion. Thus, the language of the Act does not support the Guidelines.
The Court's third reason for accepting the Guidelines was the legis-
lative history of the Act. The evidence in the legislative history was dis-
cussed in the following passage:
Senators Case of New Jersey and Clark of Pennsylvania, co-managers of
the bill on the Senate floor, issued a memorandum explaining that the
proposed Title VII "expressly protects the employer's right to insist that
any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job
qualifications. Indeed the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring
on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or
color." 110 Congressional Record 7247.195
In a footnote, the Court mentioned that the court of appeals had errone-
ously concluded that employment tests need not be job related because
the lower court had relied on
an earlier Clark-Case interpretative memorandum addressed to the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of Title VII. The Senators said in that
memorandum:
"There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona
fide qualification tests where, because of differences in background and
education, members of some groups are able to perform better on these
tests than members of other groups. An employer may set his qualifica-
tions as high as he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have
these qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of
test performance." 110 Congressional Record 7213.
However, nothing there stated conflicts with the later memorandum deal-
ing specifically with the debate over employer testing, 110 Congressional
Record 7247 (quoted from in the text above), in which Senators Clark
and Case explained that tests which measure "applicable job qualifica-
tions" are permissible under Title VII. 196
One who went to the Congressional Record might be astonished to find
that the Court committed three elementary errors of scholarship in this
passage. First, the memorandum on which the Supreme Court relied
was not the Clark-Case Interpretative Memorandum, but rather one pre-
pared under the direction of Senator Case alone; the memorandum on
which the court of appeals had relied was the genuine joint product.
Naturally, the joint Interpretative Memorandum is the more authorita-
tive of the two. Second, the Case memorandum was introduced on
March 26th 197-before, not after, the Interpretative Memorandum,
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195. 401 U.S. at 434 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
196. Id. at 434-35 n.ll.
197. 110 CONGoREC. 6415-16 (1964). This memorandum was reprinted at id. at 7246-47. Per-
haps the C~>Urtsaw only the reprint.
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which was introduced on April 8th.l98 The later expression of views, of
course, is the more important. And, third, the genuine Interpretative
Memorandum is silent on the issue of constitutionality.l99 Thus, the im-
pression the Court gave-that testing was only a minor part of the mem-
orandum on which the court of appeals relied, whereas testing was the
principal burden of the memorandum of which the Supreme Court re-
lied-was false. The Case Memorandum was directed exclusively at test-
ing, but the Interpretative Memorandum was addressed to all of Title
VII, and testing was a significant part of the document. 200
Another part of the legislative history the Court cited was the
Tower amendment. Its first version protected ability tests that were
"designed to determine or predict whether [an applicant for employ-
ment] is suitable or trainable with respect to his employment in the par-
ticular business or enterprise involved."2Ol This version (which, the
Court implied, protected only job-related tests) was defeated because of
"its loose wording which the proponents of Title VII feared would be
susceptible of misinterpretation."202 Two days later, the second version
of the Tower amendment was introduced and adopted with the support
of Title VII's supporters. 203 "The final amendment, which was accepta-
ble to all sides, could hardly have required less of a job relation than the
first,"204 argued the Court, so that "the conclusion is inescapable that the
EEOC's construction of § 703(h) to require that employment tests be job
related comports with congressional intent."205 But this conclusion is far
from inescapable. Congress intended to protect all professional ability
tests that were fairly administered and acted upon; it was altogether una-
ware of the concept of job relatedness, as we shall see below.206
The district court had found as fact that Duke Power's tests did not
accurately measure the ability of a person to do a specific job, and the
company had offered no evidence to show the diploma requirement was
related to successful performance on the job; to the contrary, there was
evidence that employees who lacked diplomas and were exempt from the
testing requirement performed their work satisfactorily.207 Accordingly,
Duke Power failed to carry the burden of proving its selection criteria
198. Id. at 7212-15.
199. Immediately before the Interpretative Memorandum, there appears in the Congressional
Record a memorandum on constitutionality introduced by Senator Clark. Id. at 7207.
200. The paragraph of the Interpretative Memorandum dealing with testing appears above in
the text accompanying supra note 196 as part of the quotation from footnote II of Griggs. 401 U.S.
at 434-35 n.ll.
201. Id. at 436 n.12, citing 110 CONGo REc. 13,492 (1964).
202. 401 U.S. at 436 n.I2.
203. Id. at 435.
204. Id. at 436 n.12.
205. Id. at 436.
206. See infra notes 370-428 and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 431-32.
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were job related, and the court of appeals' judgment in favor of the com-
pany on this issue was reversed.
The Supreme Court, which was unfair to Duke Power in holding it
liable based on evidence that another employer's tests had an adverse
impact, may have been unfair in another way as wel1. With two unim-
portant exceptions,208 Griggs was the first reported decision to hold that
selection criteria that are adopted in good faith and that do not preserve
the effects of past discrimination must be job related. The district court
had held against the plaintiffs on this issue, so that, both at the time
Duke Power applied the diploma and testing requirements to the plain-
tiffs and at the time Duke Power presented its evidence in the trial court,
the law appeared to permit an employer to rely on a professionally devel-
oped test so long as it was not deliberately used to disadvantage because
of race. As appears in its brief in the Supreme Court, the company di-
rected its evidence at establishing that the diploma and testing require-
ments were adopted for legitimate purposes,2°9 and the district court
credited this evidence. A fairer disposition of the case would have been a
remand to the trial court to allow Duke Power an opportunity to offer
evidence showing the requirements were job related.
Demonstrating injustice in one case, however, is not the point of this
article. Let us now turn to a close examination of the legislative history
of Title VII and related materials to determine whether Congress in-
tended to promulgate the adverse impact definition of discrimination.
B. The Intent of Congress
1. A Brief Legislative History of Title VII
Many civil rights bills were introduced into the Eighty-eighth Con-
gress.2IO The most important of those dealing with equal employment
opportunity was H.R. 405, sponsored by Representative James Roosevelt
of California. This bill was referred to the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, which held hearings and recommended passage;211 but
the bill never came to a vote in the House of Representatives. While
H.R. 405 was still in committee, Representative Celler introduced the
Kennedy Administration's omnibus civil rights bill, H.R. 7152,212which
eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although this bill con-
tained titles on voting, public accommodations, public facilities, and pub-
208. See supra note 170. Gregory was decided on July 28, 1970, after both the district court and
court of appeals decisions in Griggs. Hicks was decided even later-November 6, 1970. Thus
neither case could have served as notice to Duke Power of the need to prove the selection criteria
was job related.
209. Brief for Respondent at 14-19,401 U.S. 424.
210. Vaas, Title VII' Legislative History, 7 B.c. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 433 (1966).
211. H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
212. Vaas, supra note 210, at 434.
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lic schools, the bill lacked provisions concerning fair employment
practices in the private sector of the economy. H.R. 7152 was referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary,213 which amended the bill to in-
clude a title on fair employment practices; this new title was patterned
after H.R. 405 and incorporated without change the language in Repre-
sentative Roosevelt's bill that defined unlawful employment practices by
employers and unions.z14 The Judiciary Committee reported favorably
on H.R. 7152,215 and the House of Representatives passed the bill on
February 10, 1964.216Except for the addition of sex as a protected class,
the House did not change the language defining unlawful employment
practices which the Judicary Committee had borrowed from H.R. 405.
This language appeared as sections 704(a) and (c) of H.R. 7152.
In the Senate, the majority whip, Senator Humphrey, and the mi-
nority whip, Thomas Kuchel of California, served as floor managers for
H.R. 7152.217 Bipartisian co-captains were also designated for each ma-
jor title of the bill. Senators Clark and Case were the co-captains for
Title VII.218 Because the Senate took the unusual step of placing H.R.
7152 directly on the calendar,219 there was neither committee report nor
hearing in the Senate on the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Nevertheless, co-captains Clark and Case provided the Senate
with a document entitled, "Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of
H.R.7152."22O This memorandum, which is a detailed discussion of the
fair employment practices title of the civil rights bill, is tantamount to a
committee report and is the single most authoritative piece of legislative
history on Title VII.221
Although proponents of the civil rights bill at first hoped the Senate
would adopt H.R. 7152 without amendment, the need for substantial re-
vision soon became evident, and a bipartisan group began to meet pri-
vately. The group included Mike Mansfield of Montana, majority leader
of the Senate; Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, minority leader of
the Senate; Senators Humphrey and Kuchel; Representative William
McCulloch of Ohio, the ranking minority member of the House Judici-
213. 109 CONGo REC. 11,252 (1963).
214. This language was contained in §§ 5(a) and 5(c) of H.R. 405 as reported by the House
Comm. on Education and Labor and in §§ 704(a) and 704(c) ofH.R. 7152 as reported by the House
Comm. on the Judiciary.
215. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
216. 110 CONGo REC. 2804-05 (1964).
217. [d. at 6812 (statement of Sen. Mansfield); id. at 9244 (statement of Sen. Jordan).
218. [d. at 6528 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
219. [d. at 3693-96,3719.
220. [d. at 7212.
221. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 V. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2589 n.I4 (1984); Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 73 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977).
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ary Committee; and A torney General Robert Kennedy. 222 The meetings
of the group bore fr t on May 26, 1964, when Senator Dirksen intro-
duced Amendment. 656.223 Commonly referred to as the Mansfield-
Dirksen substitute, it was an amendment in the nature of a substitute for
the entire bill. On y 10, 1964, Senator Dirksen offered Amendment
No. 1052,224which was a substitute for Amendment No. 656. Both the
first and the second Mansfield-Dirksen substitutes carried forward un-
changed the language in the H.R. 7152 defining unlawful employment
practices by employers and unions; however, the sections were renum-
bered 703(a) and (c) and now appear as such in the law.225
On June 11, 1964, Senator Tower called up his Amendment No.
605,226 which was designed to protect employers' use of professionally
developed ability tests. The amendment was opposed by the leadership
and was defeated.227 Two days later, Senator Tower offered a reworded
version of the amendment. 228 The new language had been cleared
through the leadership, was acceptable to all concerned, and was adopted
by the Senate.229
On June 19, 1964 the Senate passed H.R. 7152, as amended, and
returned the bill to that House of Representatives. 230 The House con-
curred in the Senate's amendments on July 2, 1964,231 and President
Lyndon Johnson signed the bill into law on the same date.
mI-
. for
ma-
for
LR.
nor
t of
late
I of
the
:0 a
tive
2. Intent as an Element of Discrimination
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the di-
ploma and test requirements without any "intention to discriminate
against Negro employees." We do not suggest that either the District
Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer's intent;
but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem em-
ployment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in
headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.
The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by special
efforts to help the undereducated employees through Company financing
of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high school training. But Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment prac-
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222. Vaas, supra note 210, at 445.
223. 110 CONGo REC. 11,926 (1964).
224. Id. at 13,310.
225. Hereinafter, the two substitutes will be referred to in the singular (the Mansfield-Dirksen
substitute) because they were identical for our purposes.
226. 110 CONGo REC. 13,492 (1964).
227. Id. at 13,505.
228. Id. at 13,724.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 14,511.
231. Id. at 15,897.
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tice, not simply the motivation.232
Intent to discriminate is irrelevant to the adverse impact definition
of discrimination. If Congress conceived of discrimination as including
an element of intent, adverse impact was not meant to be part of Title
VII. Both the language and the legislative history of the Act contain
clear indications that the discrimination Congress meant to outlaw was
purposeful, intentional, and motivated by racial animus or stereotyped
thinking. Contrary to what the Supreme Court said in Griggs, the evi-
dence shows that Congress did direct the thrust of the Act to the motiva-
tion behind employment practices.
Plain language in the Act demonstrates the importance of motive.
Section 706(g) reads, "If the court finds that the respondent has inten-
tionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employ-
ment practice charged in the complaint, the court may [order
appropriate relief]." The word "intentionally" was not part of H.R.
7152, but was added by the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute. Senator
Humphrey, a leading member of the team that wrote the substitute and
one of its four co-sponsors, explained why "intentionally" was added to
the bill:
Section 706(g) is amended to require a showing of intentional viola-
tion of the title in order to obtain relief. This is a clarifying change.
Since the title bars only discrimination because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin it would seem already to require intent, and, thus,
the proposed change does not involve any substantial change in the title.
The expressed requirement of intent is designed to make it wholly clear
that inadvertent or accidental discrimination will not violate the title or
result in entry of court orders. It simply means the respondent must
have intended to discriminate. 233
The meaning of this passage is straightforward. Intent is part of the stat-
ute, and "intentionally" was added to section 706(g) so the courts would
not forget it.234
232. 401 U.S. at 432.
233. 110 CONGo REC. 12,723-24 (1964). The second sentence, which says that intent is part of
the title, helps defeat any argument that intent is an element of the conduct prohibited by §703(a)(I)
but not §703(a)(2). See infra notes 518-71 and accompanying text.
234. It can be argued that an employer intends to discriminate so long as he means to do the act
which has a disproportionate exclusionary effect on blacks, and perhaps this argument draws
strength from Senator Humphrey's reference to "inadvertent or accidental discrimination." This
argument is misguided for common sense and technical reasons.
Senator Humphrey was not a lawyer, so that when he said "the respondent must have intended
to discriminate," he probably meant what a layman would normally mean by those words. To
intend to discriminate is, in ordinary speech, to disadvantage blacks purposefully, that is, to do them
some harm with that desire in mind. The reason for adding "intentionally' to § 706(g) was simply to
protect the innocent employer who means no harm to anyone, but perhaps gives the appearance of
discrimination.
If it be objected that Senator Humphrey was hardly a layman in regard to the law and that
other senators were lawyers, the rejoinder is that technical analysis leads to a similar result. "Acci-
tion
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It may be argued that the intent required by section 706(g) is merely
the intent to act, but not the specific intent to disadvantage because of
race; in other words, that discrimination is an intentional, not a negli-
gent, act. After all, Senator Humphrey spoke of inadvertent or acciden-
tal discrimination. One problem with this argument is that inadvertent
or accidental discrimination is hard to imagine. Would anyone seriously
contend that an employer discriminated against a black because the
wrong box on an evaluation form was carelessly checked and the black
was rejected instead of hired? The Senator's words make more sense if
we interpret them to mean that an employer who does not mean to disad-
vantage blacks, but does so inadvertently (for example, by hiring only
high school graduates in the good-faith belief that they improve the qual-
ity of the work force) does not violate the law. Even if serious cases of
accidental discrimination can be conceived, the argument is completely
refuted by a passage in the Interpretative Memorandum that demon-
strates that Congress's definition of discrimination included motive:
Requirements for the keeping of records are a customary and neces-
sary part of a regulatory statute. They are particularly essential in Title
VII because whether or not a certain action is discriminatory will turn on
the motives of the respondent, which will be best evidenced by his pattern
of conduct on similar occasions.235
This passage demonstrates that motive was an element in Congress's defi-
nition of discrimination.236
dental discrimination" can have two meanings to a lawyer. It may refer either to an employer who
performs an act he does not mean to perform, or to an employer who performs an act which has a
consequence he does not want to ensue. An example of the former possibility is a negligent act, for
example, an automobile accident; an example of the latter possibility is use of a selection criterion
(such as a test) that excludes blacks, not with the desire of excluding blacks, but in the mistaken
belief that the test predicts success on the job. Either possibility leads to the conclusion that only
purposeful discrimination was outlawed.
Assume Congress was thinking of an employer who performs an act he does not mean to per-
form. In this case, adding "intentionally" to § 706(g) was meant to protect the employer who dis-
criminates negligently. The model would have been tort law, in which an act that is not negligent is
intentional. In tort law, "intentional" means purposeful; consider, for example, the distinction be-
tween an intentional battery and a negligent blow. An intentional tort is an injury the defendant
desired to inflict. Thus, if Congress sought to protect the employer who does something he really did
not mean to do, the conclusion follows that only employers who purposefully discriminate are liable
under Title VII.
Alternatively, assume Congress was thinking of an employer who performs an act that has an
undesired consequence. This employer means to do the act, but does not desire its effect. If Con-
gress sought to protect this employer, it clearly intended that only employers who act with a desire
to disadvantage blacks would be liable. Such employers, of course, purposefully discriminate.
235. 110 CONGo REC. 7214 (1964).
236. Almost as important as language that got into the Act is language that did not get into the
Act. In both the House and the Senate, an amendment was proposed that would have added the
word "solely" to various sections of Title VII, including §§ 703(a)(I) and 703(a)(2), so that an em-
ployer's act would have been legal unless it was motivated by race and nothing else. Id. at 2728
(motion by Rep. Dowdy); id. at 13,837 (motion by Sen. McClellan). Although the amendment was
defeated in both houses, id. at 2728, 13,838, it is useful for our purposes because it reveals that both
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The House and Senate debates provide a wealth of evidence that
motive was part of Congress's definition of discrimination. One of the
most interesting colloquies took place between Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
of North Carolina, a staunch opponent of the civil rights bill, and Sena-
tor Case, one of the co-captains for Title VII. The following exchange
clearly reveals the senators' common belief that motive was an element of
discrimination. Indeed, Senator Case, after first seeming to deny the im-
portance of mental state (perhaps for fear of being led into a trap by the
wily senator from North Carolina), vigorously defended the role of
motive:
Mr. CASE. .
Mr. ERVIN.
has in mind.
Mr. CASE. No. I would like the Senator to read the words, since
he is talking about the bill.
Mr. ERVIN. The language is "on account of race, color, creed, or
national origin."
Mr. CASE. That is correct.
Mr. ERVIN. That is a matter of intent. The intent in the man's
mind is going to be judged, not by him, but by somebody else.
Mr. CASE. Yes, but in the time-honored custom of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence, under the terms of the bill it would be determined by a
court of law.
Mr. ERVIN. It would be determined not by the external acts in
the case, but by what some Federal employee believes was in the mind at
the time period.
Mr. CASE. The Senator from North Carolina is trying to make it
appear that it is unusual to have a determination of what is right or
wrong depend on a mental state. Practically speaking, this has been uni-
versally true.
Mr. ERVIN. . . .
It is dangerous to judge a man on the basis of the contents of his
mind rather than on the basis of the character of his external act.
. . What is an unlawful employment practice?
It is the contents of a man's mind. It is the intent he
Mr. CASE. Here we have a number of externals. There would
I
I\1
~.
~
i
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chambers believed that motive was part of the definition of discrimination. If senators and repre-
sentatives had believed otherwise, two arguments against the amendment would logically have been
made. First, it was unnecessary because motive was irrelevant. Second, the amendment could have
been construed by a court as adding motive where it was intended to be omitted. Neither of these
arguments was made. Instead, the amendment was opposed because our legislators believed motive
was an element of discrimination, and they perceived that the purpose of the amendment was to
protect the employer who acted out of mixed motives. As Senator Case put it, "The difficulty with
this amendment is that it would render Title VII totally nugatory. If anyone ever had an action that
was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of." Id. at 13,837
(statement of Sen. Case). Thus, both the proponents and opponents of the amendment thought that
motive was an integral part of discrimination.
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have to be an employment. There would have to be an employer. There
would have to be a business. These are tangibles. There would have to
be a refusal to give a person employment. Obviously, that is a physical
fact, or at least a tangible factor.
The only question that arises would be "why?" The question would
be, Why was the man refused?237
Other evidence on the role of motive in Congress's definition of discrimi-
nation is discussed in the margin below.238
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237. Id. 7253-55. See also id., at 13,078 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
238. Representative Joseph G. Minish of New Jersey had the employer's mental state in mind
when he said, "It is essential that we assure equal employment opportunities for all Americans so
that men and women will be considered for jobs on the basis of merit, not on the color of their skin.
It is grossly unfair that the aspirations of so many of our fellow citizens continue to be frustrated by
the discredited prejudices of racists." Id. at 1599. If prejudice was the evil, state of mind was the
focus.
Representative John H. Dent of Pennsylvania believed that state of mind was an aspect of
discrimination when he said, "I know, as you all know, nothing in this legislation will make a lamb
lie down with a lion nor will it remove the spots from a leopard. Discrimination, bigotry, and
prejudice are as old as man himself. . . ." Id. at 2601. This was a common theme in both the
House and the Senate. Opponents of the civil rights bill said the law cannot change men's hearts or
minds. Proponents agreed, but rejoined that the law can change behavior based on prejudice and
bigotry .
Representative Robert P. Griffin of Michigan also conceived of discrimination in terms of state
of mind. He was speaking in opposition to an amendment introduced by Representative William T.
Cahill of New Jersy that would have outlawed the nepotic admission rules of some unions. See id. at
2593. Representative Griffin argued that Title VII as written would already reach the case of using
such rules as a subterfuge, but "there are factors such as seniority, length of employment, and other
factors which could affect union membership, union rights, and so forth, and have nothing to do
with color, race, or creed." Id. at 2594. Then the following exchange occurred:
Mr. CAHILL. I wonder if the gentleman would let me have his expert opinion
about a small union which excluded applicants from membership because they were not
sons or brothers of members. If they excluded a Negro because he was not a brother or son
of one of the members, would the gentlemen say that the bill as presently written would
take care of that situation?
Mr. GRIFFIN. If the admission rule were adopted for that purpose, for the purpose
of actually excluding Negroes, then I believe the bill would cover it; however, that would
be a question of fact. Again, I must say that the gentleman's amendments raise a number
of different problems and a lot of factors outside the scope of the limited subjects we are
trying to deal with in this legislation.
Id. at 2594. In Representative Griffin's mind, Title VII covered purposeful discrimination and
should not have been enlarged to apply to other kinds of conduct, even though the effect of those
other kinds of conduct was disadvantageous to blacks.
Representative Durward G. Hall of Missouri, an opponent of the civil rights bill, also thought
that discrimination required a hostile motive:
In the technical sense of the word, an employer discriminates every time he hires
someone, as long as there is more than one applicant for the position. What Federal officer
can say whether such discrimination is based on race, education, religion, appearance, ex-
perience, personality, or the wayan applicant responds to questions? . . . In short, moral
intent is difficult to legislate.
Id. at 2603. Senator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, another opponent of the bill, echoed the same
theme and manifested the same belief that state of mind was an element of discrimination:
I find it hard to see anyone will be able to tell when such illegal practices have occurred
and when an employer is exercising his legitimate prerogative to hire and fire to promote
the best interest of his business. There is no accurate way to measure the subjective inten-
tions of an employer.
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Further insight into Title VII can be gained from the other titles of
Id. at 5092.
Senator Tower believed that an intent to disadvantage blacks was part of the definition of dis-
crimination. He argued that the proponents of Title VII had failed to present evidence of wide-
spread discrimination against minorities; then, perhaps to explain why the proponents had not
presented such evidence, or perhaps to prove they could never present it, he added, "Indeed, unless
they can read an employer's mind, they cannot be sure why an employer takes any action he takes in
regard to his employees." Id. at 7773. Senator Robertson held a similar view. Speaking as a former
prosecuting attorney, he said, "[I]n all criminal actions, the intent is the essence of whatever crime is
charged. . . . Here we are speaking about a new crime, the crime of discrimination." Id. at 8428.
And Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire counseled senators to
think twice before they vote in favor of the passage of a bill which would make it possible
for an investigator or a Federal administrative officer to reach a conclusion, and thus make
it incumbent on the small businessman to carry the case to the courts if he is to get justice.
In addition, let us remember. . . that this title deals with a state of mind; namely, that if it
is charged that Mr. A or Mr. B was not promoted because of his race, his church, or his
nationality, the question will be: What was the employer's intent?
Id. at 13,092. Senator Ervin criticized Title VII for its emphasis on state of mind:
The bill would not make the guilt or innocence of an employer dependent on his external
act. It would make his guilt or innocence depend upon the contents of his mind. The only
basis upon which the man would be judged would be what he had in mind. That would be
a dangerous power.
Id. at 5613.
Therefore, I respectfully submit that if we want to have a safe legislation, just legisla-
tion, legislation under which truth can be determined with any degree of accuracy, we
should have legislation based on the truth that, while God can look upon the heart, and
while God can determine the state of mind of an individual, that power is beyond any
bureaucrat. . . .
Id. at 5614.
Finally, during the debates on ability tests and the Tower amendment, which are discussed in
detail below, the Senate focused exclusively on the employer's state of mind. For example, Senator
George A. Smathers of Florida was plainly concerned with employers' intentions when he said:
In addition to lawyers, corporations would also have to hire a herd of psychologists to
discover whether an employer had some discrimination in his heart, or whether he will
have to have two sets of tests for a man who applies for a particular job, because it may be
that the applicant would come from a culturally disadvantaged group. I am not quite sure
what that is. . . . But certainly it would take away from the employer his right to require
an examination, give it to everyone, and say, 'I will take the man who makes the highest
and best grade, because that is the man who can do the best for my company.'
"
Id. at 7036. Senator Towers and Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia were discussing the Motorola
case (which was the origin of the debates on ability tests) when both gentlemen revealed a focus on
an employer's state of mind:
Mr. TALMADGE. In the Motorola case in Illinois, an examiner of the State Com-
mission determined that someone had been discriminated against because of the use of a
certain examination; is that correct?
Mr. TOWER: That is correct. Furthermore, it was ordered that the examination no
longer be used by that company in connection with its employment practices.
Mr. TALMADGE: Would the Senator from Texas venture a guess as to how such a
government agency, using personnel who might be alleged to be experts in thought control,
would be able to determine whether there had been an intent to discriminate when an
employer had decided to employ a particular applicant, and when, thereafter, the applicant
might have alleged that he had been discriminated against because he was a Baptist or
because he was a Methodist, and so forth?
Mr. TOWER. In my opinion, it could not be made; in my opinion, that could not be
determined. For that purpose, the Commission or its assistants would have to be mind
readers.
Id. at 9026. Lastly, Senator Humphrey, speaking of intelligence tests like the one used by the Motor-
ola Co. and arguing that the Tower amendment was unnecessary because it was redundant, demon-
strated an unmistakable focus on employers' intentions. He said, "These tests are legal. They do not
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of the Civil Rights Act-of 1964.239 Judges and scholars attempting to inter-
pret Title VII typically ignore the rest of the bill, as though Title VII
were a separate piece of legislation. In fact, Title VII was one of eleven
titles of a single bill that was often times considered title by title, but
other times considered as a whole. The Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, for
example, applied to the entire bill, not merely to Title VII. Accordingly,
we can learn about Title VII by examining the other titles of the bill. We
can inquire whether a motive or purpose to discriminate was part of the
definition of discrimination in the other titles of the bill.
The answer to the inquiry is clearly that Congress did intend motive
to playa role in the other titles of the bill. Title I applies to voting rights.
In determining whether a person is qualified to vote in a federal election,
state officials must apply the same standards to blacks as to whites and
may not deny a black the right to vote "because of error or omission on
any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act
requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determin-
ing whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such
election." This language was aimed at the practice common in the South
of disqualifying blacks for highly technical failures to complete registra-
tion forms correctly.240 Such behavior, of course, was motivated by ra-
cial animus. Although the language of Title I could be read to establish
purely objectively standards,241 the legislators who enacted this language
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need to be legalized a second time. They are legal unless used for the purpose of discrimination."
Id. at 13,504.
239. The Supreme Court has examined other titles of an act to learn the intent behind the title
in issue. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 117 (1982).
240. See, e.g., 110 CONGoREc. 1519 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 6529 (statement of
Sen. Humphrey). Rep. Silvia O. Conte of Massachusetts recounted the story of
the Negro who went to register to vote in a town in the Deep South that had a literacy test.
He said to the registrar, "I want to vote." The registrar said, "Can you read?" He
said, "I certainly can read." The registrar took a newspaper, which was written in Japa-
nese and he says, "Can you read that headline?" He said, "No."
The registrar said, "I want to give you every opportunity to vote. Can you read that
subheadline?"-which was written in Japanese. He said, "No, I cannot."
The registrar said, "Man, we love you people, so I will give you one other chance.
Can you read this subheadline?"
The Negro studied it intently and said, "Yes, I can. It says, 'No Negro is going to
vote in this county.'
"
Id. at 1635. See a/so id. at 1693-95 (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 1547 (statement of Rep.
Rogers).
241. Objective standards may be aimed at purposeful misconduct, for some conduct carries the
index of the motive behind it. If a white is allowed to register to vote, but an otherwise identical
black is not allowed to register, the most likely reason for the different outcomes is race. Indeed,
unless the registrar could offer a satisfactory reason for the different outcomes, race would be not
merely the most likely, but in fact the only reasonable explanation. Probably for this reason, Title I
is cast in objective terms. It requires state officials to apply the same rules to blacks as to whites.
This standard, though objective on its face, is plainly aimed at application of different rules for the
purpose of disqualifying blacks. There is no legitimate reason for different rules for each race.
Title I also prohibits state officials from disqualifying voters because of immaterial errors on
voter registration forms. This standard, too, is objective on its face, but is also plainly aimed at
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had purposeful discrimination in mind.
Title II prohibits discrimination and segregation in public ac-
comodations. The title begins, "All persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of any place of public accommoda-
tion. . . ." That motive was meant to be part of the definition of
discrimination under this title is evident from a colloquy between Repre-
sentative Robert P. Griffin of Michigan, who became concerned that the
quoted language created a new, broad right, and Representative Celler,
who focused on the proprietor's state of mind.242 Because the subjective
reasons of the owner of the restaurant control whether discrimination
under Title II exists, motive is an element of the definition of discrimina-
tion in this title.
Title III creates no new substantive rights, but gives the Attorney
General power to initiate law suits on behalf of blacks who, because of
their race, are deprived of the equal protection of the laws in regard to
use of public facilities (other than schools). Title IV also creates no new
rights, but gives the Attorney General power to initiate law suits on be-
half of blacks who, because of their race, are deprived of the equal pro-
tection of the laws in regard to public schools. Section 410 of Title IV
reads, "Nothing in this title shall prohibit classification and assignment
for reasons other than race, color, religion, or national origin." The
word "reasons" plainly points to the actor's state of mind.
registrars who purposely seized upon minor errors to disqualify blacks because of their race. Thus,
while the language of Title I may seem to create objective standards, the congressional intent behind
the language was to outlaw purposeful discrimination against blacks.
242. Representative Griffin posited a restaurant that required men to wear dinner jackets:
Two men corne to the door, one with a dinner jacket and one without. The restaurant
admits them both. Five minutes later another gentleman comes to the door without his
dinner jacket. The restaurant owner says, "You cannot corne in; we have a rule that you
must have a dinner jacket on." The prospective customer points to the language of section
201 and says, "All persons are entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of public accommo-
dation and without discrimination."
Suppose the owner is not discriminating on the basis of race or color because, let us
say that all three of the prospective customers are white. . . .
[d. at 2000. Representative Celler replied:
So that when one person comes in with a tuxedo, and another person comes into the res-
taurant without a tuxedo, and the one with the tuxedo is served and the one without a
tuxedo is not served, that need not be discrimination based upon race, creed, or national
origin. That may be based on something sartorial.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Then the language does not apply to or control other types of dis-
crimination that have nothing to do with race, color, religion, or national origin?
Mr. CELLER. In order to fully comprehend what is sought by section 201, you
have to read all of Title II.
[d. Then Representative Armistead I. Seldon, Jr. of Alabama joined the discussion:
Mr. SELDON. Suppose the third man is not white, and did not have a dinner jacket.
Mr. CELLER. If that is tantamount to discrimination on the ground that the man
was not white, not because he did not wear a tuxedo, but for the reason he was nonwhite,
then the proprietor of that restaurant could be subject to the provisions of the act.
!d.
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Title V pertains to the duties and procedures of the Commission on
Civil Rights and does not concern us here. Title VI, however, is very
important to us. Section 601 reads, "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." If Congress defined discrimination in Title VI to include motive,
this fact would be further evidence that Congress intended motive to be
an element of discrimination in Title VII.
The legislative history of Title VI reveals that Congress intended
this title to outlaw purposeful misconduct; adverse impact was simply
never discussed. For example, during debate in the House of Represent-
atives on Title VI, Representative Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina
said:
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I would be the first to recognize that race or color of skin is a basis
for prejudicial discrimination. But can we look into the mind of any man
and determine whether his discrimination is based 011prejudice or some
other basis? Some persons do not like people with red hair because they
have had unfortunate experiences with people whose hair is this color.
Some people are prone to distrust people who are narrow between the
eyes. These are just two examples of thousands of reasons, sane or other-
wise, that people use in reaching their bases of judgment in relation to
their fellow men.243
Title VI was aimed at discrimination based on racial prejudice, but not at
discrimination based on, for example, the gap between one's eyes. Be-
cause we cannot look into each other's minds, he argued, we will not
know whether one person disadvantages another for lawful or unlawful
reasons and, therefore, Title VI should be defeated. The focus on the
actor's state of mind is unmistakable.
Senator Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia shared this focus. He
threatened that, if Title VI were passed and
if two people should ask for a job cutting weeds on the shoulders of the
roads in the State of California, and one of them happened to be of one
color and the other happened to be of another color, and the chairman of
the highway board or the hiring authority of the State of California hap-
pened to pick someone for that particular job who was displeasing to the
Federal Bureau of Roads under that interpretation, all Federal highway
funds of the State of California could be cut off.244
Senator John O. Pastore of Rhode Island replied:
The language is, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin." That
is the standard. . . . If a foreman says, "You can do the work far better
than a white man can, but I will not take you because you are colored," I
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243. ld. at 2496.
244. Id. at 6048.
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do not think anyone would say there should not be some reprisal against
action of that kind. 245
In Senator Pastore's example, the foreman's reason for rejecting the
black is his color. Without question, motive was an element of this defi-
nition of discrimination. Motive was also an element in the definitions of
the several senators who believed that Title VI would establish the stan-
dard of color blindness for federal programs.246 Once again, Senator
Pastore's remarks were typical:
Private prejudices, to be sure, cannot be eliminated overnight. How-
ever, there is one area where no room at all exists for private prejudices.
That is the area of governmental conduct. As the first Mr. Justice
Harlan said in his prophetic dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559:
"Our Constitution is colorblind."
So I say to senators, must be our Government.247
Senator Pastore, who was a co-captain for Title VI,248 equated color
blindness with government agents' suppressing their private prejudices
and disregarding the color of citizens. Unquestionably, he focused on the
agents' reasons for action, that is, on state of mind.
The legislative history of Title VI is clear and uniform. Congress
intended the title to outlaw purposeful discrimination-disparate treat-
ment, not adverse impact.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Title VI on three
occasions. The Court's interpretations reflect tension between clear legis-
lative history, which shows an intent to outlaw only purposeful discrimi-
nation, and administrative (and perhaps judicial) desire to expand the
title to adverse impact cases.
In Lau v. Nichols,249 the plaintiffs were a class of thousands of stu-
dents of Chinese ancestry who did not speak English. They sued the San
Francisco school system under Title VI, claiming the system discrimi-
nated against them because the system neither taught them to speak Eng-
lish nor provided them with instructors who spoke Chinese. Since the
plaintiffs did not contend the system purposefully disadvantaged them
because of race or national origin, the issue was whether intent to dis-
criminate is an element of section 601. Both the opinion of Justice Doug-
las for the Supreme Court and the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart
and two other Justices were grounded on section 602 of Title VI, which
245. Id. at 6049.
246. See id. at 12,675 (statement of Sen. AlIott); id. at 5253, 5864, 5866, 6543, 6547 (statements
of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7102 (statement of Sen. Javits); id. at 6561 (statement of Sen. Kuche1); id.
at 2494, 6047, 7055 (statement of Sen. Pastore); id. at 8346 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
. 247. /d. at 7064.
248. Id. at 6528 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
249. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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directs federal agencies to issue guidelines to achieve the objectives of the
title. A guideline promulgated by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare barred use of "criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their
race.
,,250 Relying on this guideline, the Court held the school system in
violation of Title VI.
Although a reader of this case might reasonably conclude it held
that motive is not an element of discrimination under Title VI,251 the
precise rationale of the majority opinion is uncertain. It is possible the
Court held the regulation indicated that Congress intended the title to
prohibit adverse impact;252 it is also possible the Court held that, regard-
less of congressional intent, an administrative agency had properly exer-
cised its authority in issuing a regulation by which the school system had
agreed to abide. In light of the legislative history of Title VI, the former
rationale would have been incorrect. We have just seen that Congress
did not intend the title to outlaw adverse impact, whatever the executive
branch of government may have thought.253 Whether the latter rationale
would have been correct need not concern us because out purpose is not
to decide whether the outcome of Lau was right, but rather to learn how
Congress defined discrimination in Title VI. That Congress may have
authorized the executive department to prohibit additional conduct
under Title VI does not bear on Title VII because no such authorization
was given to the EEOC.
Title VI was at issue again in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke.254 A state medical school had a special admissions program
that reserved 16 of 100 entering positions for minorities. A white male
applicant was denied admission, though his college grades and test scores
were higher than those of applicants admitted via the special program,
and he filed suit under Title VI and the equal protection clause of the
federal Constitution. Basing its decision solely on the Constitution, the
Supreme Court of California declared the special admissions program
unlawful, enjoined the school from taking the race of applicants into con-
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250. 33 Fed. Reg. 16,299 (1968).
251. So thought Justice White in Guardians' Ass'n v. Civil ServoComm'n of the City of New
York, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3226 (1983).
252. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion supports this possibility. He said it was unclear
whether Title VI itself prohibited the school system's practices, but he concurred on the ground that
the regulation was reasonably related to the purpose of the law. Had he understood the majority to
hold against the school system on the ground on which he concurred, he probably would not have
felt the need to write separately.
253. In fairness, it must be added that several federal agencies charged with enforcing Title VI
issued regulations similar to the one in Lau. See, e.g., 33 Fed. Reg. 16,275 (Department of Agricul-
ture); id. at 16,280-81 (Housing and Home Finance Agency); id. at 16,284-85 (Department of La-
bor); id. at 16,288 (General Services Administration); id. at 16,293 (Department of the Interior); id.
at 16,305 (National Science Foundation).
254. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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sideration, and ordered the school to admit the plaintiff.255 The United
States Supreme Court ruled only on the statutory claim. Five Justices256
held Title VI is coextensive with the prohibitions of discrimination in the
Constitution, which they said permits an admissions process to take race
into account; accordingly, the judgment against the special admissions
program was reversed. The remaining four Justices257 believed that "the
proponents of Title VI assumed that the Constitution itself required a
colorblind standard on the part of government.,,258 Although these four
Justices would not agree with the other five that Title VI prohibits no
more or less than does the Constitution, the four concluded that Con-
gress intended Title VI to bar the use of race to exclude anyone from
participation in a federally funded program. These four Justices, joined
by one of the other five259(who believed that the Constitution allowed
taking race into consideration but prohibited quotas), held that the plain-
tiff had been wrongfully excluded from medical school.
Between Lau and Bakke, the Court held in Washington v. Davis260
that the Constitution prohibits only intentional discrimination and does
not reach cases of adverse impact. Therefore, a reader of Bakke might
reasonably conclude that the five Justices who reversed the judgment
against the special admissions program had implicitly overruled the
holding of Lau that Title VI bars adverse impact.261 If Title VI prohibits
only what the Constitution does, it follows that Title VI bars only inten-
tional discrimination.
The Court's most recent decision on the scope of Title VI is Guardi-
ans Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York.262
The plaintiffs challenged written examinations used to make entry-level
appointments to the city's police department. The examinations had an
adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics, but the city argued that the
examinations were lawful under Title VI because it prohibited only con-
duct motivated by discriminatory intent. The court of appeals agreed,
holding that intent was a necessary element of a Title VI claim,263 but the
Supreme Court overruled the second circuit on this issue. In three opin-
ions, five Justices held that motive is not an element of a Title VI claim
255. 18 Ca1.3d 34 , 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
256. Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, J.J.
257. Burger, c.J., and Stewart, Rehnquist, Stevens, J.J.
258. 438 U.S. at 416.
259. Powell, J.
260. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
261. So thought three Justices of the Supreme Court. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130,
159, 162 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.). Two judges of the
Second Circuit reached the same conclusion. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232,
270 (Kelleher, J.) and 274-75 (Coffrin, J.).
262. 103 S. Ct. 322 I (1983).
263. 633 F.2d 232 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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because of the regulation to this effect.264 The dissenting Justices argued
the regulation was invalid because Bakke established that Congress in-
tended Title VI to prohibit only what the Constitution prohibits, that is,
intentional discrimination.265 No Justice of the Court took the position
that Title VI of its own force bars adverse impact.
Reflecting on these three cases, one notes that in Lau both majority
and concurring opinions relied on the administrative regulation; neither
opinion examined the legislative history. In Bakke, the five Justices who
held that race could properly be considered in the admissions process
believed that Congress intended Title VI to prohibit what the Constitu-
tion prohibits. These Justices discussed the legislative history of Title VI
at length. In Guardians Association, the Justices focused on Lau, Bakke,
and the administrative regulation, not on legislative history. Thus, the
Supreme Court has looked at the congressional intent behind Title VI on
only one occasion-in Bakke-and a majority arrived at the same con-
clusion as this article: Congress intended Title VI to prohibit only inten-
tional discrimination.
Titles VIII, IX, X, and XI do not create new substantive rights and
are not important for present purposes. The evidence from Titles I, II,
IV, and VI points unwaveringly towards the conclusion that motive was
part of the definition of discrimination under these titles. It would be
strange if Congress intended only Title VII to embody another definition
and said absolutely nothing to this effect in the language or legislative
history of the civil rights bill.
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3. Prohibition of Quotas
Another persuasive indication that Congress had no purpose to en-
act the adverse impact definition of discrimination appears in the debates
over quotas. Section 703G) was added to Title VII to guarantee that a
racial imbalance would not be equated with discrimination. This pur-
pose defeats any argument that Congress intended adverse impact.
A recurring theme in the discussion of Title VII was whether it re-
quired or would lead to racial quotas. Opponents of the bill charged over
and again that it prescribed or would result in quota hiring and reverse
discrimination-that is, discrimination against whites in favor of blacks.
The charge came in two varieties. In the simpler one, which character-
ized its earlier appearances, the charge was that the bill itself required
quotas.266 In the subtler variety, which characterized its later appear-
264. 103 S. Ct. at 3222 (White, J.); id. at 3239 (Marshall, J.); id. at 3249 (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, J.J.).
265. Id. at 3236-37 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 3238-39
(O'Connor, J.).
266. For example, Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher of New Jersey said, "Equally danger-
ous to the freedoms of an Americans, including those this bill professes to help, is the section which
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ances, the charge was that the mere obligation not to discriminate would
lead to quotas and reverse discrimination. 267
To the simple charge that Title VII required quotas, proponents re-
sponded that the bill did not require them. When Senator Olin D. John-
ston of South Carolina said it did, Senator Humphrey said it did not.268
When a newspaper article claimed it would, Senator Humphrey replied it
would not.269 When Senator Smathers said it could, Senator Humphrey
said it could not.270 In explaining Title VII to the House of Representa-
tives immediately before the House passed the final version of the bill,
Representative McCulloch said without qualification, "The bill does not
permit the Federal Government to require an employer or union to hire
or accept for membership a quota of persons from any particular minor-
ity group.,,271 And most authoritatively of all, the Interpretative Memo-
will force employers to hire workers on the basis of color rather than ability." 110 CONGoREC.
1645. Similar concerns over quotas and reverse discrimination were expressed by several other rep-
resentatives. See id. at 2557 (statement of Rep. Winstead); id. at 2557-58 (statements of Reps.
Dowdy g and Ashmore); id. at 2560 (statements of Reps. Johansen and Alger); id. at 2569 (state-
ment of Rep. Gross); id. at 2576 (statement of Rep. Pofl). Senators Russell B. Long of Louisiana
and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina took the same position. Id. at 7902.
267. As Senator George A. Smathers of Florida put it,
there is no question in my mind that when a man has to submit his records [to the EEOq,
and he has always hired a certain group of citizens, or a certain type of citizens, to work for
him, and the Government goes through his records and says, "you have employed all of
one kind; you must have in your heart a feeling of discrmination against persons of another
type," that person will have to protect himself against such a situation. . . . So he will
protect himself by hiring a certain number of colored people in order to keep the majesty
and the might of the Federal law and its large bureaucracy off his neck.
Id. at 7800. (Note the Senator's assumption that the EEOC would accuse an employer of purposeful
discrimination ("you have in your heart a feeling of discrimination").) Senator Lister Hill of Ala-
bama feared the same mechanism when he referred to a hypothetical employer
who employs 50 men. Ten of those employees can be identified with a minority group. If
the employer has to layoff eight men, would he be likely to discharge any of the ten men
who could later claim "discrimination" whether it existed or not, and who could file
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, causing the employer ex-
pense and possible punishment?
Id. at 8447. See also id. at 8500-01 (statement of Sen. Smathers); id. at 8617-18 (statements ofSens.
Sparkman and Stennis); id. at 13,076 (statement of Sen. Sparkman).
268. Id. at 5092.
269. Id. at 5423.
270. Id. at 6000-01. Other senators got into the act as well. Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.
of New Jersey compared non-discrimination in employment to non-discrimination in jury selection:
as Supreme Court decisions regarding juries had not required a quota of blacks on each jury, so Title
VII would not require that each covered employer hire a certain number of blacks. Id. at 8921.
Senator Hill charged that Title VII would require racial balance, to which Senator Clark responded
with a memorandum from the Department of Justice. The relevant passage read:
[I]t has been asserted Title VII would impose a requirement for "racial imbalance." This is
incorrect. There is no provision, either in Title VII or ir any other part of the bill, that
requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal court to require preferential treat-
ment for any individual or any group for the purpose of achieving racial balance. No
employer is required to hire an individual because that individual is a Negro. No employer
is required to maintain any ratio of Negroes to whites. . . .
Id. at 7207.
271. Id. at 15,893.
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randum said the same thing:
There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial
balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to
maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would in-
volve a violation of Title VII because maintaining such a balance would
require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race.272
To the more subtle charge that Title VII would lead to quotas be-
cause evidence of racial imbalance would constitute proof of discrimina-
tion, proponents of the bill replied that racial imbalance was not
discrimination. Representative Cellar said that an imbalance could not
be rectified under the bill: "Only actual discrimination could be
stopped.,,273 Referring to the infamous Motorola decision, which he evi-
dently interpreted to invalidate a pre-employment test because relatively
fewer blacks than whites passed it (the case will be discussed in detail
below), Senator Case said a similar decision could not happen under Title
VII because "even a Federal court could not order an employer to lower
or change job qualifications simply because proportionately fewer Ne-
groes than whites are able to meet them.,,274
Clearly, there was no support for the theory that racial imbalance
equals discrimination. Even the Civil Rights Commission rejected any
such equation: "[R]acial patterns of employment do not necessarily
prove discrimination. "275 The reason the theory was so unpopular was
the conclusion to which the theory led, namely, quotas. If racial imbal-
ances were discrimination, quotas were the solution. But quotas were
rejected by every legislator who discussed them and by black leaders as
well. For example, the National Director of the Congress of Racial
Equality, James Farmer,276 who characterized his organization as the
nonviolent marines of the civil rights movement,277 was asked by Senator
Clark, on behalf of Senator Jacob J. Javits of New York, whether Mr.
Farmer believed in quotas.278 He answered, "Not a quota system, Sena-
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272. Id. at 7213. See a/so id. at 5808 (statements of Sens. Stennis and Keating); id. at 6563
(statement of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 8370 (Bipartisan Civil Rights Newsletter No. 28).
273. Id. at 1518.
274. Id. at 7246.
275. U.S. COMMISSIONONCIVILRIGHTS,1961 REPORT,3 EMPLOYMENT38 [hereinafter cited
as 1961 REPORT]. See a/so id. at 32.
276. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Emp/oyment and Manpower, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 217 (1964) (Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937).
277.
Senator CLARK. Mr. Farmer. . . perhaps you could briefly state for the record the
relationship between the NAACP, CORE, and the Urban League? Where do these various
organizations fit into each other's scheme and to what extent do they coordinate?
Mr. FARMER. Yes; you might say, Senator, that the Urban League is the State
Department of the civil rights movement. The NAACP, the War Department; I suppose
then you would call the CORE the nonviolent marines.
Id. at 224 (Hearings on S.1937).
278. Id.
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tor, we are opposed to a quota system. . . ."279 Roy Wilkens, executive
director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and chairman of the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights,28O held the same view: "[O]ur association has never supported
the idea of quotas. We feel that quotas are not fair, not even to the
[black] applicant.,,281
Everybody opposed quotas, but, unlike the weather, somebody fi-
nally did something about them. After expressing his distaste for quotas
and his conviction that Title VII did not permit them, Senator Gordon
Allott of Colorado offered an amendment to guarantee that "no quota
system would be imposed if Title VII becomes law."282 The amendment
provided:
The court shall not find, in any civil action brought under this title, that
the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment
practice charged in the complaint solely on the basis of evidence that an
imbalance exists with respect to the total number or percentage of per-
sons of any race. . . employed by an employer. . . in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race. . . in any com-
munity . . . without supporting evidence of another nature that the re-
spondent has engaged in or is engaging in such practice.283
Senator Allott's amendment attacked quotas by disarming the mecha-
nism that would purportedly lead to them: evidence of racial imbalance
could not stand alone as proof of discrimination. As the story of Title
VII unfolded, this amendment never came to a vote. The reason was not
that the amendment was unacceptable or forgotten. Rather, the amend-
ment was so obviously in line with the ideas of the proponents that it was
incorporated into the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute. With minor
changes, the Allott amendment became section 7030), which reads:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race. . . of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or per-
centage of persons of any race. . . employed by any employer. . . in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race
. . . in any community. . . or in the available workforce in any
community. . . .
In his analysis of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, Senator Humphrey
made clear that this section was included to prevent Title VII from being
interpreted to require quotas.284 Senator Dicksen concurred.285
279. Id.
280. Id. at 196.
281. Id. at 204.
282. 110 CONGoREC. 9881.
283. Id. at 9881-82.
284. Senator Humphrey stated:
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Section 703(j) was written to guarantee that the Act would never
require quotas, either directly or indirectly. Nothing in the language of
the bill directly required quotas, as the proponents said on numerous
occasions; but quotas could result indirectly if courts inferred discrimina-
tion from a racial imbalance. As a result, section 703(j) was meant to
ensure that a racial imbalance would never be equated with discrimina-
tion. Therefore, the following two sentences were considered synony-
mous: Title VII does not require quotas. Racial imbalances are not
discrimination.
This analysis is strengthened by taking into account the parallel
treatment of racial imbalance under Title IV of the civil rights bill. Ra-
cial imbalance could have been equated with discrimination in schools as
well as in jobs. Representatives and senators were well aware that imbal-
ance existed in the North as well as in the South. But there was an im-
portant difference to our legislators: in the South, imbalance resulted
from law; in the North, from housing patterns.286 To the chagrin of
Southerners,287 Title IV was aimed only at de jure segregation and not at
de facto segregation;288 a provision that would have eliminated racial im-
balances in public schools had already been killed by the House Judiciary
Committee.289 When the possibility was suggested that Northern prac-
tices might be considered discriminatory under Title IV, the House
swiftly amended the definition of "desegreation" to include the clause,
"but 'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public
A new subsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of racial balance among employ-
ees. The proponents of the bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that title VII
does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by
giving preferential treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts have persisted, sub-
section (j) is added to state this point expressly.
Id. at 12,723.
285. Senator John J. Williams of Delaware objected that Title VII might require an employer
"to maintain a racial ratio in his employment roughly equal to the racial ratio existing in his commu-
nity"; Senator Dirksen responded, "The Senate substitute bill expressly provides that an employer
does not have to maintain any employment ratio, regardless of the racial ratio in the community."
Id. at 14,329. Then Senator Williams of Delaware placed in the Congressional Record a memoran-
dum prepared by a staff member of the Judiciary Committee on the effect of the Mansfield-Direksen
substitute on quotas:
One of the important changes made by the Senate was the protection provided for
employers who operate in areas where minorties live. An employer cannot be forced to
discharge employees or employ additional employees in order to achieve a racial balance.
An employer with 100 employees who may be all white cannot be required to meet a quota
even though his plant is located in a neighborhood that is 50 percent Negro.
Id. at 14,331.
286. Id. at 5267-68 (statements ofSens. Ervin and Keating); id. at 5341-42 (statements ofSens.
Russell and Douglas); id. at 5858-59 (statements of Sens. Eastland, Javits, and Keating).
287. Id. at 6840-41 (statement of Sen. Stennis); id. at 7563-64 (statements of Sens. Sparkman,
Thurmond, and Long); id. at 12,161 (statement of Sen. Ellender).
288. Id. at 13,821 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
289. Id. a.t 1530 (statement of Rep. McCulloch).
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schools in order to overcome racial imbalance."29o Yet the issue of racial
imbalance in schools had not been laid to rest. Further to protect North-
ern ways, the Senate amended Title IV to prohibit any official or court of
the United States from "seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school
by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to
another. . . ."291 Both the House and Senate amendments survived a
motion to delete them in the Senate.292 In short, racial imbalance was
not discrimination under Title IV.
Thus, in the places in the civil rights bill where racial imbalance was
relevant, Congress scrupulously guarded against the risk that an imbal-
ance might be equated with discrimination: for if imbalances were ille-
gal, quotas would result, and quotas were abominated.
Yet the Supreme Court has approved of quotas. In United Steel
Workers v. Weber,293 an employer and a union agreed through collective
bargaining that the employer would establish on-the-job training pro-
grams to teach unskilled workers how to become craft workers in several
facilities. Recognizing that the employer's craft workers were almost ex-
clusively white, while blacks composed a substantial fraction of the labor
force surrounding each of the facilities, the agreement also provided that
half of the openings in the training programs would be reserved for
blacks.294 The standard for admission to the programs was an em-
ployee's seniority relative to other members of his race. Brian Weber, a
white, was not admitted to the program in Gramercy, Louisiana, though
blacks with less seniority than his were admitted. He sued on the ground
that Title VII outlaws discrimination against whites as well as blacks.295
He lost. The majority of the Supreme Court held that race-conscious
affirmative action programs that are designed to break down old patterns
of racial discrimination and that do not unnecessarily trammel the inter-
ests of white employees are permitted by the Act. 296
Justice Rehnquist in dissent presented the arguments for Mr.
Weber.297 Without repeating them in detail, we may note the two most
powerful. First, the plain language of the statute protects whites as well
as blacks from racial discrimination. 298 Second, the legislative history
290. /d. at 2280.
291. The amendment was contained in § 407(a)(2) of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute. /d. at
13,312.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
Id. at 13,819.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Id. at 197-98.
/d. at 199.
/d. at 208.
Id. at 219-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 226-30. For example, § 703(d) reads:
I t shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer. labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retrain-
ing, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual because
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leaves no doubt that the language of the statute means what it says.299
For example, the Interpretative Memorandum said explicitly:
Title VII would have no effecton established seniority rights. Its effect is
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has
been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be
simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. It would not
be obliged--or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes,
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired to
give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers
hired earlier.3°O
These arguments are fully consistent with the legislative history of sec-
tion 7030), but the Court rejected them.
There is a straight line from Griggs to Weber. Once the Supreme
Court adopted the adverse impact definition of discrimination, employers
had to keep their numbers in order. Validation of tests is too costly.
Indeed, because a test may turn out to lack job relatedness or differential
validity, the money spent on validation can be completely wasted. Con-
struction of valid tests is even more costly and carries its own risk: an
ignored sub-class taking the test may suffer an adverse impact and, even
if the test miraculously predicts success on the job for all protected
classes, law suits still have to be defended against persons who, seeing
only the adverse impact, claim discrimination. The desideratum-a job-
related, differentially valid test without an adverse impact-remains to be
realized (indeed, probably cannot be realized while characteristics vary
across classes). Therefore, so long as the Court remained committed to
Griggs, the result in Weber was the most efficient way to mold legal doc-
trine. Employers must be allowed to discriminate in favor of blacks in
order to dispel the appearance of adverse impact. If Brian Weber had
won his law suit, employers, who as a practical matter lack access to
valid tests, would have lost adverse impact cases; but courts, as a matter
of remedy, would have ordered the employers to give jobs and back pay
to the black plaintiffs. Thus, the ultimate result would have been the
same, however Weber was decided. The victory for the employer and the
union was simply more efficient in terms of economics and allocation of
judicial effort. Yet this result, the logical extension of Griggs, would have
been abhorred by the Eighty-eighth Congress.
This is not to say the fact of an imbalance was thought to be alto-
gether immaterial. An ambiguous act may take on meaning in light of an
imbalance. According to the Interpretative Memorandum:
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
299. Id. at 230-52.
300. llO CONGo REC. 7213 (1964).
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While the presence or absence of other members of the same minority
group in the work force may be a relevant factor in determining whether
in a given case a decision to hire or to refuse to hire was based on race,
color, etc., it is only one factor and the question in each case would be
whether that individual was discriminated against. 301
In other words, although racial imbalance is not discrimination, imbal-
ance may be evidence of discrimination. What does racial imbalance
tend to prove? We have seen above that Congress intended motive to be
an element of the definition of discrimination. An imbalance may ex-
plain the motive that lies behind a person's behavior. The employer who
claims that she preferred a white over a black because of qualifications
could be impeached by evidence that she consistently preferred whites
over blacks.302
Section 7030) should have killed adverse impact aborning. Con-
gress did all it could to make proof of racial imbalance nothing more
301. [d. at 7213. The Interpretative Memorandum was written before §703G) was added to the
bill. Nevertheless, the Memorandum remains a valid guide to legislative intent because, as Senator
Humphrey explained, that section "does not represent any change in the substance of the title. It
does state clearly and accurately what we have maintained all along about the bill's intent and
meaning." [d. at 12,723.
Members of the House of Representatives also understood that racial imbalance could be evi-
dence of an intent to discriminate. Representative August E. Johansen of Michigan posited the
hypothetical case of an employer who needs to hire 100 unskilled workers; 75 blacks and 75 whites
apply. All 75 whites but only 25 blacks are hired.
Do the other 50 Negroes or anyone of them severally have a right to claim they have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or color. . . ?
If all other factors were equal-or, at least, if there were not any differences which
were distinguishable-and all the 150 applicants were entirely suited for employment, what
protection would the employer or the union hiring agent have against a charge of discrimi-
nation. . . ?
[d. at 2560. Representative Goodell tried to reassure Representative Johansen that, "if applicants
are equal in all other respects there will be no restriction. One may choose among equals. So long as
there is no distinction on the basis of race, creed, or color it will not violate the act." [d. Yet
Representative Johansen was not reassured: "How will it be possible to prove that subjectively there
was not an element of discrimination. . . .?" [d. The best reply Representative Goodell could
make was, "The burden would be on the complainant to show that there had been discrimination."
[d.
Representative Johansen had a valid point. The imbalance in his example is so extreme that the
employer would be hard pressed to convince a court that a motive other than race caused her to hire
all of the white applicants but only one-third of the black applicants. For our purposes, however, the
representatives were in perfect agreement. They agreed that statistics would be evidence of state of
mind.
302. The House of Representatives shared this understanding:
Nothing in the act is intended to allow charges to be brought based upon disproportionate
representation of members of any race. . . within any business enterprise or labor organi-
zation. General rules as to percentages, quotas, or other proportional representation shall
not be the basis of charges brought under this act. However, disproportionate representa-
tion may be considered as background evidence in an unlawful employment practice pro-
ceeding under this act.
H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1963). This report was written before § 703(j) was
drafted and, thus, stands as evidence that congressional intent on quotas and the use of statistics was
consistent.
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than evidence of an employer's state of mind. Yet by adopting adverse
impact, the Supreme Court has done precisely what Congress feared, for,
as we have seen above, the existence of racial imbalance is the ultimate
issue in adverse impact litigation, and the motivation to adopt quotas is
overwhelming.
4. Causation
The words "because of race" in sections 703(a)(l) and (2) indicate
that Congress did not intend to outlaw all discrimination against blacks,
but only discrimination caused by race. It is discrimination of a sort for
a white employer to hire his white son-in-law instead of a better qualified
black; yet surely Congress did not mean Title VII to ban such behav-
ior.303 The notion of causation embodied in adverse impact is unortho-
dox in the law. The legislative history of Title VII not only lacks
evidence that Congress intended to embrace such a notion, but in fact
contains evidence to the contrary.
Three notions of causation are widely understood and, if any of
them were reflected in adverse impact theory, an argument could be
made that Congress intended this definition of discrimination. These no-
tions are motive, necessity, and sufficiency. Motive, of course, is no part
of adverse impact. Necessary (or but-for) causation exists if B would not
have happened unless A had happened first. Race would have been a
necessary cause of Duke Power's failure to hire blacks if only blacks had
been rejected. But the selection criteria excluded whites as well as
blacks; therefore, the plaintiffs' race was not a necessary cause of their
fate.304 Sufficient causation exists if B happens whenever A happens.
Race would have been a sufficient cause of Duke Power's failure to hire
blacks if all blacks had been rejected. But the selection criteria included
some blacks; therefore, the plaintiffs' race was not a sufficient cause of
303. This example illustrates what has come to be caIled institutional racism. It is a social
institution in this country for whites to marry whites. The white employer has a white wife, and
their white daughter chooses a white husband. Thus, the employer may harbor no ill will towards
blacks as employees, yet, because of the social institution to which he and his family conform, his
preference for his son-in-law necessarily eliminates all black candidates for the job. Adverse impact
tends to mitigate institutional racism, but there is no' evidence that the Eighty-eighth Congress in-
tended Title VII to affect this phenomenon. Rather, Congress focused on the more pressing problem
of overt racism, for example, employers who openly refused to hire any blacks or assigned them to
menial jobs.
304. In a superficial way, Griggs is a but-for case: but for their race, plaintiffs would have stood
a better chance of being hired. But some whites were also excluded, and not all blacks were, so the
true casual element overlapped race-was associated with race-but it was not identical with race.
Certainly it cannot be said with respect to any individual black (and the Act protects individual, not
groups; see infra notes 306 to 311 and accompanying text) that but for his race, he would have
satisfied the section criteria. A host of factors other than race (for example, illness, poverty, and
death of a parent) may have explained an individual case. AIl that can be said is that blacks as a
group had a lower probability of success than whites, but the cause of the difference in probabilities
is unknown.
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their fate. Hence, it appears that the notion of causation reflected in ad-
verse impact is not one of the ordinarily understood ideas that Congress
might have accepted without debate.
As noted above, plaintiffs in an adverse impact action rely on a com-
parison of rates of association. Proof that proportionately more whites
than blacks in an available work force are eligible for a job is proof that
the association between being white and being eligible is higher than the
association between being black and being eligible. We have referred to
such proof as "associative causation." Thus, in Griggs the plaintiffs
showed that 34 percent of white men, but only 12 percent of black men,
satisfied the diploma requirement.
In what sense did race cause these associations? As we have seen,
the Supreme Court argued in Griggs that race caused blacks' inferior ed-
ucation, which caused them to fall to satisfy the diploma and testing re-
quirements, which caused Duke Power to refuse to promote the
plaintiffs. Based on this argument, the Court effectively created an ir-
rebutable presumption that disparities between black and white perform-
ances on selection criteria are caused by race. 305 In other words, if a
selection criterion excludes more blacks than whites in the available work
force, race is deemed to be the cause of the disparity. Association be-
comes causation.
There is no evidence that the proponents of Title VII had any such
idea in mind. If Congress had intended to create an irrebutable presump-
tion that race causes different rates of association, surely there would be
traces of such an intent in the legislative history. There probably would
have been discussion of the different notions of causation. For example,
the maxim that correlation does not imply causation is widely known.
An intent to use correlations or associations to establish liability would
unquestionably have sparked considerable debate on Capitol Hill and in
the press over whether correlations prove anything at all about race. In
addition, all of the steps but the last in the Supreme Court's causal se-
quence are beyond an employer's control. Duke Power did not create
305. It may be argued that the presumption is rebuttable because a showing that a selection
criterion is job related proves that the cause of a given disparity is not race, but blacks' relative
inability to perform the job. This argument is erroneous because proof that a criterion is job related
bears only on the issue of choosing a fair proxy for the available work force. Job relatedness demon-
strates that the plaintiffs' proxy for the available work force was inappropriate because a better proxy
(those who succeed on the job-related criterion) exists. If proof that a selection criterion is valid
rebutted the presumption that race caused the disparity between black and white performances, then
proof of another criterion with equal selective utility and a lesser adverse impact would rebut the
rebuttal and reestablish race as the cause of the disparity. In truth, however, proof of a valid alterna-
tive criterion with a lesser adverse impact simply generates a new and better proxy for the available
.
work force. None of these steps bears on causation. After all the dust has settled, the court must
choose the best available proxy for the available work force. If a selection criterion has an adverse
impact on this proxy, race is presumed to be the cause of the disparity and the employer loses the
case.
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1- the South's system of segregated schools, and Duke Power could not
abolish the system. Duke Power did not force blacks to leave school
early or score poorly on ability tests and could do little to change these
facts. Had Congress intended to make an employer responsible for being
the last actor in a chain of events, surely there would have been debate
over whether an employer should be held liable for the acts of others.
Yet one would search the Congressional Record and the transcripts of
committee hearings in vain for any such debates or discussions. The is-
sues simply were not raised.
Finally, we have seen above that motive was an element of our legis-
lators' definition of discrimination. Thus, causation in its ordinary sense
of motive (for example, an employer fails to promote a black because of a
belief that other employees will not accept supervision from a black), and
not an association between race and performance on a selection criterion,
was the causal link Congress had in mind.
All these factors taken together-congressional silence on an issue
obviously pertinent to the theory of causation implied in adverse impact,
the unorthodox nature of associative causation, and the intent of Con-
gress to include a more conventional notion of causation, namely, mo-
tive, in the definition of discrimination-amount to convincing proof that
Congress did not intend the words "because of such individual's race" to
signify the notion of causation underlying adverse impact.
s
5. Individual Rights
Further evidence that Congress did not intend the adverse impact
definition of discrimination can be found in the focus on individual rights
in the language of sections 703(a)(1) and (2):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail and refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual. . . because of such in-
dividual's race. . .
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive. . . any individual of employment opportunities. . . be-
cause of such individual's race. . . . [Emphasis added.]
The same focus on individual rights appears in the language of the other
major titles of the Civil Rights Act. Title I on voting rights does not
guarantee that a certain percentage of blacks will register or vote, but
that each black citizen will be treated like a white citizen. Title II on
public accommodations does not require that a hotel or restaurant hold a
certain number of beds or tables for blacks, but that an individual black
be served on the same basis as a white. Title III on public facilities other
than schools does not require that space be reserved for blacks in public
facilities, but instead authorizes the Attorney General to sue on behalf of
an individual who complains that she has been deprived of the equal pro-
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tection of the laws in the use of public facilities. Similarly, Title IV on
desegregation of public schools does not require that schools be inte-
grated with a quota of blacks (we have already noted that "desegrega-
tion" does not mean assignment of students in order to overcome racial
imbalance), but rather authorizes the Attorney General to sue on behalf
of a student who has been denied equal protection by a school board or
been denied the opportunity to attend a public college by reason of race.
And Title VI on federally assisted programs also creates and protects
individual rights. It begins, "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race. . . be excluded form participation in, be denied the ben-
efits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." The language of the titles that
created and protected rights indicates a concern with individual, not
group rights.
The legislative history of the civil rights bill confirms that Congress
had only individual rights in mind. Consider this statement to the House
of Representatives by John V. Lindsay of New York:
This legislation, Mr. Chairman, does not, as has been suggested hereto-
fore both on and off the floor, force acceptance of people in schools, jobs,
housing, or public accommodations because they are Negro. It does not
impose quotas or any special privilegesof seniority or acceptance. There
is nothing whatever in this bill about racial balance as appears so fre-
quently in the minority report of the committee.
Everything in this proposed legislation has to do with providing a
body of law which will surround and protect the individual from some
power complex. The bill is designed for the protection of individuals.
When an individual is wronged, he can invoke the protection to himself,
but if he is unable to do so because of economic distress or because of fear
then the Federal Government is authorized to invoke that individual pro-
tection for that individual, and not on behalf of anyone else.306
This speech reveals congressional intent to create and protect individual
rights, not just in Title VII, but in the entire civil rights bill. The Inter-
pretative Memorandum reveals the same intent specifically with regard
to Title VII. The key sentence for present purposes is this: "It must be
emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual."307
Title VII unquestionably created individual rights, as the Supreme Court
itself has twice recognized. 308
In spite of this congressional intent to protect individuals, not
groups, the Supreme Court created a group right and protected a group
306. 110 CONG, REC. 1540 (1964).
307, /d. at 7213.
308. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982); City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
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interest when it adopted the adverse impact definition of discrimination.
The plaintiffs in Griggs won by proving that the diploma and testing re-
quirements were more onerous on blacks as a group than on whites as a
group. It was immaterial that a significant number of individual blacks
either had diplomas or could pass the tests; the requirements were illegal
because they were discriminatory against the class of blacks. Had the
facts of Griggs been that equal percentages of blacks and whites held di-
plomas and passed the tests, the plaintiffs would have lost the case; there
would have been no adverse impact. Yet nothing about the individual
plaintiffs would have changed. They still would have been excluded from
employment opportunities by criteria that were not job related.
This result is completely at odds with what the Court was later to
write about individual rights in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water
and Power v. Manhart:309
The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treat-
ment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or
national class. . . . Even a true generalization about the class is an in-
sufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generaliza-
tion does not apply.310
This language is inconsistent with the theory of adverse impact, under
which an employer may use a test that proportionately fewer blacks than
whites pass if the test predicts success on the job. But the test need not
be perfect; seemingly, any significant correlation between test and job
performance suffices. It follows that some persons who score poorly on
the test would in fact be good workers; yet they may be rejected. There-
fore, "a true generalization about the class" of below average performers
on the test becomes a lawful basis for "disqualifying an individual to
whom the generalization does not apply." This fact is true of both blacks
and whites. Accordingly, under adverse impact it is the performance of
the group, not of individuals, on which the employer's liability turns.
That Griggs created a group right is further manifested in the notion
of causation on which the Court relied-a notion we have seen Congress
did not intend. The Court reasoned that race caused whites to provide
blacks with inferior education, which caused blacks to drop out of school
and score poorly on ability tests, which caused the plaintiffs to fail to
meet Duke Power's requirements for promotion. There was no evidence
that the individual plaintiffs had receixed inferior education; the evidence
proved only that their group had been disadvantaged in this way. As-
suming the plaintiffs' education was inferior, there was no proof that it
caused them to drop out of school and flunk Duke Power's tests. For all
the Court knew, the plaintiffs might have dropped out of school because
309. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
310. !d. at 708.
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of reasons like economic hardship or poor health, and the blacks who
took the tests in the EEOC decision might have failed for any number of
possible reasons. In reality, there was no proof that race accounted for
these plaintiffs' failure to meet the promotion requirements. What was
proved was that race was associated with the level of performance of the
group to which the plaintiffs belonged. Clearly, the adverse impact defi-
nition protects a group interest and creates a group right. 311 Congress
never intended and indeed, as all the signs indicate, rejected this sort of
right.
In contrast, the disparate treatment definition of discrimination is
fully consonant with the purposes of Congress. Under this definition, the
employer's motive is the key: it is not unlawful to treat two employees
differently, even if one is black and the other is white, unless the reason
for the diference is race. This emphasis on motive ensures that only
individual rights are protected. Suppose, for example, a black applies for
a job, and she is rejected in favor of a white. The issue is why the em-
ployer rejected the black. She could offer direct or indirect proof of the
employer's motive. She might present evidence that the employer had
made disparaging comments about blacks' right or ability to hold jobs;
the employer might reply that those comments did not affect his judg-
ment about who was better able to do the work in question. The black
might try to show that she was fully qualified for the job, and the em-
ployer might respond with proof that the white who got the job was bet-
ter qualified. Or the black might introduce statistical evidence showing
that so few blacks were hired that the employer's claim of racial indiffer-
ence is incredible. Whatever the nature of the evidence, all of it would
ultimately relate to this individual black-her qualifications for the job
and the employer's feelings towards her. Even if the black brings a class
action suit, alleging that she and a thousand other blacks were rejected
because of race, the focus remains on individual rights so long as the
employer's motivation is the key issue. If the plaintiff proves all mem-
bers of her class were rejected because the employer had reached his
quota for blacks, each member of the class was rejected because of her
race. Of course, throughout disparate treatment analysis, the notions of
causation are traditional. The focus is on motivational causation, i.e., the
employer's reasons for action, and the nature of the causal nexus is the
but-for standard. A plaintiff who proves that her race was the reason she
was not hired has proved that, but for her race, she would have been
hired.
311. The opinion of Justice Powell in Connecticut v. Teal frankly recognizes that group rights
and interests are at stake under the adverse impact definition. 457 U.S. at 456, 457 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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6. State Legislation
Other persuasive evidence that adverse impact was no part of the
civil rights bill is provided by the way Congress regarded state fair em-
ployment practice (FEP) laws. Section 706(b) provides that, if state or
local law prohibits a practice that a person believes is outlawed by Title
VII, the person must pursue the state or local remedy for at least 60 days
before filing a charge with the EEOC. Section 709(b) permits the EEOC
to cooperate with state and local agencies; the Commission may "utilize
the services of such agencies and their employees and, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, may reimburse such agencies and their em-
ployees for services rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out
this title." Section 708 provides that Title VII shall not relieve any per-
son of any duty or liability created by state or local law unless the law
requires or permits the doing of an act that is illegal under Title VII.
Thus, Congress took pains to ensure that local agencies would have the
first opportunity to deal with employment discrimination and that local
law would not be preempted by federal law.
Many representatives and senators believed that Title VII would not
affect their states because they already had FEP legislation in place. For
example, Representative Celler told the House that one-half the states
had laws against employment discrimination and that Title VII would
simply extend those laws to the other states.312 Representative Fred B.
Rooney of Pennsylvania assured the House that Title VII would not cre-
ate new obligations for employers in FEP states,313 and Senator
Humphrey provided similar assurance to the Senate.314 The Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, Burke Marshall, wrote Senator Len
B. Jordon of Idaho that Title VII would not affect his constituents be-
cause "discrimination in employment would be handled by State officials
under the Idaho law and. . . title VII would have but little effect within
the State.,,315 Similarly, Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas thought Title
VII would not affect the Sunflower State.316 Some senators went even
further. Senators Allott and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin believed their
states had stronger, broader laws than Title VII already in force.317
312. 110 CONGo REC. 1521 (1964).
313. Id. at 1625. See also id. at 1644 (statement of Rep. Cleveland); id. at 1646 (statement of
Rep. Fraser).
314. Id. at 6548. Because the House had added sex as a protected class and few states had laws
against sex discrimination in employment, Senator Humphrey excepted Title VII's ban on sex dis-
crimination from his assurance. See also id. at 14,249 (statement of Sen. Russell).
315. Id. at 9244.
316. Id. at 10,519-20.
317. Id. at 5814 (statement of Sen. Nelson); id. at 8431 (statement of Sen. Allott). Senators
Clark and Case, who were replying to objections that a federal statute was unnecessary because anti-
discrimination laws were in effect in more than half the states, including all of the major industrial
ones, gave three reasons why a federal law was needed. First, the states had experienced difficulty
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This legislative history is relevant because no state had adopted the
adverse impact definition of discrimination. Rather, only disparate treat-
ment was banned by the states.318 The members of Congress who said
that Title VII would not create new obligations in states with FEP laws
could not have understood Title VII to incorporate adverse impact, for
this definition imposes obligations far beyond those created by disparate
treatment.
Numerous scholarly articles contain evidence that only disparate
treatment was illegal in the twenty-five states, not to mention local gov-
ernments, that had FEP laws. Writing in the Vanderbilt Law Review in
1965, Arnold Sutin discussed The Experience of State Fair Employment
Commissions: A Comparative Study.319 He said that Congress entrusted
the primary administration of Title VII to state agencies where they ex-
ist, and he set his purpose as determining whether the state commissions
were ready to take on this responsibility. As part of this task, Professor
Sutin devoted twenty pages to discussion of the substance of state FEP
laws.320 Although he discussed the issue of causation, he did not men-
tion or exhibit any appreciation of adverse impact. Rather, he believed
that state laws required proof of motive as an element of prohibited con-
duct. He wrote, "Statutory language, legislative history, and constitu-
tional requirements unquestionably show that only prejudiced beliefs and
attitudes regarding the prohibited grounds, causally related to overt acts,
fall within the enforceable jurisdiction of the statute."321
In 1966 William Lamb published in the the Temple Law Quarterly
an article entitled Proof of Discrimination at the Commission Level. 322
His avowed purpose was to examine "proving racial discrimination at the
commission level, gathering and presenting evidence to a commission,
with "large, multi-phased operations of business in interstate commerce." Id. at 7214. Second, a
federal law would bring additional resources to bear on the problem of discrimination. Id. at 7217
(statement of Sen. Clark). This second reason appears to have been omitted by printer's error from
the Interpretative Memorandum. See id. at 7214. Third, twenty-two states had no FEP legislation,
and 60% of American blacks lived in those states. Id. If adverse impact had been part of Title VII,
the co-captains for Title VII would probably have added an additional reason why a federal law was
necessary: the states banned only disparate treatment, so Title VII was necessary to provide further
protection to blacks. But of course the Senators did not offer this reason. They perceived no differ-
ence between the conduct prohibited by state laws and the conduct Title VII was meant to prohibit.
Adverse impact was part of neither the existing state nor the proposed federal legislation.
318. The only pre-Title VII state decision we have found that approached adverse impact was
the hearing examiner's opinion in Motorola. "The ruling was the first on record in which any of the
more than 30 State FEPC's [Fair Employment Practice Commissions] had asserted authority over
tests a company may use in screening job applicants." Id. at 8648 (statement of Sen. Hart), quoting
an article by Todd E. Fandell in the Wall Street Journal of Apri121, 1964. If Motorola did embrance
adverse impact, Title VII most certainly did not, as Congress's reaction to Motorola demonstrates.
. 319. 18 VAND.L. REV. 965 (1965).
320. /d. at 1012.
321. Id. at 993-94.
322. 39 TEMP. L.Q. 299 (1966).
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and the relevant burdens of proof.,,323 Mr. Lamb said not a word on
adverse impact. Like Professor Sutin, Mr. Lamb defined discrimination
as "prejudice coupled with action or inaction motivated by the preju-
dice. . . . The mental element. . . forms a necessary part in any dis-
crimination case. . . ."324 Nothing could be further from adverse
impact, under which motive is irrelevant and the act of using a selection
criterion that is not job related and that excludes proportionately more
blacks than whites is illegal in itself.
The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I:
Employers by Arthur Bonfield appeared in the Northwestern Law Review
in 1967.325 He shared the understanding that motive was an essential
element of discrimination, for he stated that conduct becomes illegal
"only when it is coupled with a certain state of mind."326 Motive is so
critical to discrimination that Professor Bonfield expressly rejected one of
the clearest examples of adverse impact:
It is true that courts will look at the results of an individual's con-
duct as evidence of his intent, and that no specific criminal intent is re-
quired under the fair employment laws. But the courts will not stop with
just viewing the results of a person's conduct in these cases. If there is a
satisfactory explanation for conduct causing a discriminatory result, in-
ferences of illegal discrimination will be negated.
So, for example, if an employer will hire only college graduates on
the ground that he considers such training desirable for a particular posi-
tion, he does not violate the fair employment law even if in practice the
effectof this requirement is to discriminate against Negroes because there
are relatively few Negro college graduates. 327
The importance of this passage cannot be overstated. Professor Bonfield
was well aware that a selection criterion might exclude proportionately
more blacks than whites; he even went so far as to say that such a crite-
rion discriminated against Negroes. But it was not illegal discrimination
because of the absence of an unlawful motive. Whether the college re-
quirement might be job related either did not cross the author's mind or
was considered immaterial. This thoroughly documented article covers
not only state law, but also federal law and the Model State Civil Rights
Act. If adverse impact or job relatedness had any standing under any of
these laws in 1967, Professor Bonfield would surely have discussed these
ideas and could not have said what he did about a college requirement.
Finally, Michael Sovern published in 1966 a book entitled Legal Re-
straints on Racial Discrimination in Employment. Chapter 3 discussed
323. /d.
324. Id. at 300-01.
325. 61 Nw. u.L. REV. 907 (1967).
326. Id. at 955-56.
327. /d. at 964.
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state FEP laws. The statutes of virtually every state with anti-discrimi-
nation legislation were cited, yet adverse impact was never mentioned.
Thirty pages were devoted to Professor Sovern's assessment of the states'
enforcement activities, and numerous recommendations for improvement
were offered;328 yet nowhere was it recommended that the definition of
discrimination be enlarged to include adverse impact.
From these sources329 it is evident that adverse impact was not part
of state anti-discrimination laws in 1964. It follows that the belief of
representatives and senators that Title VII would not affect states with
FEP law-in other words, that the Act merely extended to blacks in
states without FEP laws the same protection enjoyed elsewhere-stands
as proof that Congress did not intend Title VII to prohibit adverse
impact.
7. Unawareness and Protection of Adverse Impact
The debates on Title VII in the House and Senate constitute another
significant body of proof that Congress did not intend the Act to include
the adverse impact definition of discrimination. Representatives and sen-
ators did not discuss adverse impact or the issues arising from it, and
legislators made statements that could not logically have been made if
the speakers had been aware of adverse impact. Even more important,
an amendment that would have outlawed an example of adverse impact
was rejected, and two amendments that protected the major examples of
adverse impact were adopted.
a. Unawareness of Adverse Impact and Statements Inconsistent
With It
If Congress intended to outlaw adverse impact, several major issues
would unquestionably have been aired during the extensive committee
hearings and floor debates. The fundamental tenet of adverse impact is
that an employment practice must not disadvantage blacks vis-a-vis
whites. Anyone aware of this tenet-particularly, one not eager to see a
civil rights bill enacted-would certainly have asked, "How do we know
when blacks are disadvantaged? If two percent of white and one percent
of black applicants are hired, are blacks disadvanaged?" Another impor-
tant tenet of adverse impact is that a job-related selection criterion is
lawful, regardless of its adverse impact. One aware of this tenet must
328. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 31-60
(1966).
329. Other publications may be noted. For example, the State University of New York at Buf-
falo held a conference on the topic, "Toward Equal Opportunity in Employment: The Role of State
and Local Government." Participants were leading practitioners and scholars in the field of civil
rights. Not a word on adverse impact or related issues appears in the 175 pages of proceedings of the
conference.
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surely have wondered, "What proof establishes that a test predicts suc-
cess on the job? How accurate must the test be in order to be considered
valid?" Once these questions were asked, many related questions would
have sprung to mind. For example, "How many employers now use tests
that are valid? How costly is it to validate a test? How likely will em-
ployers be to save the cost of validation by hiring enough blacks to dispel
the adverse impact of a test?"
But not even one such question was raised, or even hinted at, during
the longest debate in the history of the Senate; nor was any such issue
raised in the House debate or in the hearings on the employment discrim-
ination bills in both houses of Congress. The civil rights bill was care-
fully studied and vigorously opposed. The absence of metion of these
issues is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend Title VII to
outlaw adverse impact. Further substantiation of these assertions ap-
pears in the record.
(1) Title VII
Subcommittee No.5. of the House Judiciary Committee held public
hearings on H.R. 7152 for 22 days, and the full Judiciary Committee
held two more days of open hearings; the printed record of the hearings
ran to 1,874 pages.33O The Rules Committee took testimony on the bill
for five days, and the printed record was 663 pages.331 The House of
Representatives debated the bill for six days, and the Senate debated it
for another 83 days.332 (Lest one remark that a day of debate in Con-
gress can be brief, we may note that the Senate debates lasted over 534
hours, for an average of six and one-half hours per day.333) Except for an
amendment sponsored by Representative William T. Cahill of New
330. Hearings Before Subcomm. No.5, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on
Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding Civil Rights in Employment in Certain Cases Because of Race,
Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry, or Age, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
331. Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964). Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, Hearings on H Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess.
332. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 at 11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY).
333. Id. Nevertheless, the debates were not always well attended. Senator Clark remarked
once, "I am now speaking at a time when, in the Senate Chamber, there are 11 Senators-an unusu-
ally large number of Senators to be present, I may say, during the civil rights debate. Three of those
Senators are what might be termed 'captive Senators.''' 110 CONGoREC. 7199 (1964). The "captive
senators" were the presiding officer, acting majority leader, and Southern vigilante; each of the latter
two was present to guarantee against parliamentary tricks the other might deploy (for example, a
request for unanimous consent to limit debate or table the bill). See also id. at 9675 (statement of
Sen. Clark) and 12,827 (statement of Sen. Hruska).
Senators were not above attempting to take advantage of the empty chamber to make favorable
legislative history appear in the Congressional Record. Said Senator Smathers:
I would hope and presume that, as I speak this evening, if any senator does not agree
with something which I shall say, he will make that fact known so that we may get the
Record straight. If he stays and listens to that which I shall say, does not object to it, and
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Jersey and the examples of adverse impact that Congress specifically pro-
tected (these are discussed in detail below), nowhere in any of this mate-
rial did even one person present one example, real or hypothetical, that
would fall within the adverse impact definition of discrimination and
claim the bill under consideration would or should outlaw what hap-
pened.334 Of course, the instances of disparate treatment were legion.
Yet the occasions to raise adverse impact were many. For example,
in separate minority views in the report of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee on H.R. 7152, Representatives Richard H. Poff of Virginia and Wil-
liam C. Cramer of Florida named thirteen acts outlawed by Title VII,
does not offer his reasons as to why he thinks it is not right, I shall assume he thinks I am
right.
Id. at 7784. Perhaps Senator Smathers spoke ironically. He probably knew that most of Congress
had accepted President Johnson's invitation to attend the theater that evening. Id. at 7788 (state-
ment of Sen. Scott). Nevertheless, after Senator Smathers had gone on at some length about the
likelihood that Title IV would lead to busing of students, Senator Scott replied:
Conjuring up fears by reading into the bill that which is not in the bill, reminds me of
a line in Shakespeare. . . . The line from Shakespeare that I have in mind is, I think, from
"Henry IV" when Owen Glendower, the dour Welshman, says: "I can call spirits from the
vasty deep."
Hotspur replies: "Why, so can I, or so can any man; but will they come when you call
for them?"
The Senator from Florida can call spirits from the vasty deep of his fears, of his con-
cerns; but these spirits will not come when the senator calls them unless the spirits are
there to begin with.
Id.
334. The reader will note that the non-existent person in the text is described by a restrictive
clause: who presented a case of adverse impact and claimed it should be illegal. Both parts of the
clause are necessary because there were persons who presented cases of adverse impact. For exam-
ple, Joseph Ross, President of Davidson Bros. of Detroit, said:
Traditional testing methods have a built-in cultural bias which obscures, if not obliterates,
[blacks'] basic abilities and general aptitudes.
We have tried to use new employment interview techniques to eliminate this cultural
bias and these historical circumstances and to try to determine these actual native abilities
if we can probe into them.
Hearings on S. 1937, supra note 276, at 320. Roy Richardson, personnel manager of Honeywell-
Aeronautical Division, Minneapolis, also understood how tests disadvantage blacks:
We use aptitude tests, verbal ability tests, and, of course, typing tests and the like for
clerical jobs. It has been my experience that with the exception of professionals, engineers
and scientists, for example, that Negroes tend to score lower on verbal tests than one would
assume from their conversation and their apparent intelligence when you talk to them. I
don't know what [the] cause is of this phenomenon but I think it is true.
Senator CLARK. Has it occurred to you that it might be due to the fact that their
education has not been comparable in result although they might have gone through the
same number of grades of school?
Mr. RICHARDSON. I would think that would probably be a very important factor,
yes.
Partly because of that and partly for other reasons, therefore, I thin[k] any company
has to take that into account when they interview a Negro applicant who has taken a
verbal skills test. In general, we are not using tests as much as we used to. We do not lean
on them since we are not certain they are as good as they are supposed to be.
Id. at 425. Both of these witnesses appreciated that a test might exclude more blacks than whites,
yet not be job related. Neither of these witnesses, however, nor the senators who listened to the
witnesses' testimony, suggested there should be a law against such tests.
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but the representatives mentioned no form of adverse impact.335 Senator
Johnston read from and commented on this list on the floor of the Sen-
ate; he also said nothing of adverse impact.336
Equally enlightening are instances in which a legislator made a
statement he could not logically have made if he had believed that ad-
verse impact would be outlawed by Title VII. For example, Senator
John Stennis of Mississippi estimated the number of employees Title VII
would protect. He excluded all states with FEP laws.337 We have seen
that no state had adopted adverse impact in 1964. If the Senator had
understood Title VII to promulgate a definition of discrimination not
then existing in any state, would he not have included every employee of
every covered employer in the country?
Representative Paul C. Jones of Missouri argued that Title VII
would prohibit an employer from choosing employees who abstain from
alcohol and tobacco and attend church regularly. Representative Griffin
replied at once:
In the event [the bill becomes] a law, I would not want the statement of
the gentleman [Mr. Jones] to go unchallenged in the Record that under
that title an employer could not set up qualifications for employment,
such as required that the employee to be hired shall not drink or smoke
or swear, and so forth, because under this bill he can require any qualifi-
cation or discriminate on any other ground than race, color, religion, or
sex.338
If Mr. Griffin had thought adverse impact was banned by Title VII, he
could not have said that an employer could require any qualification for
employment. Selection criteria such as attending a church or refraining
from smoking or swearing are unlikely to be job related, but quite likely
to have an adverse impact on one class or another.
(2) Titles, L IL IlL IV, and VI
The other titles of the Civil Rights Act also reveal that Congress was
unaware of adverse impact or unwilling to prohibit it. Adverse impact in
335. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1963).
336. no CONGoREC. 6053 (1964). See also id. at 7781 (Senator Tower listed undesirable rul-
ings that might issue from the EEOC, but said nothing about rules on validating selection criteria or
any other aspect of adverse impact); id. at 13,092 (Senator Norris Cotten of New Hampshire cried
that Title VII would empower the federal government to harass small employers, but said nothing
about, for example, the cost of validating tests); id. at 7225, 7248 (Senators Erwin and Allen J.
Ellender of Louisiana belabored Senators Clark and Case that Title VII would be counter-productive
because black unemployment exceeded white unemployment in states with FEP laws; the co-cap-
tains for Title VII, had they been aware of adverse impact, would surely have replied that black
unemployment in the North was partially caused by employers' use of tests that had an adverse
impact and were not job related and that, by outlawing such tests, Title VII would diminish black
unemployment.
337. Id. at 9881.
338. Jd. at 2603.
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the context of voter registration would apply to a literacy test that is
passed by proportionately fewer blacks than whites. Yet Title I does not
outlaw such tests; it bans only the unequal administration of literacy
tests.339 Adverse impact in the context of public accommodations would
apply to hotels and restaurants whose prices are too high for blacks to
afford, but Title II does not require that prices be lowered. Adverse im-
pact in the context of public facilities would apply to the money a local
government spends on facilities used by blacks as compared to the money
spent on facilities used by whites. Of course, Title III does not count
coins, but refers merely to a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Adverse impact in the context of public education would apply to ra-
cially imbalanced schools. We have already seen how emphatically Con-
gress excluded the concept of racial imbalance from Title IV.
Adverse impact could apply to federally assisted programs in three
ways, but Congress was unconcerned with each of them, and this lack of
concern evinces an intent not to outlaw adverse impact under Title VI.
First, adverse impact could apply to the employment practices of recipi-
ents of federal funds. For example, if a farmer who received money
under the Agricultural Production Act discriminated against black hired
hands, the program would have an adverse impact on blacks. Congress
knew of this exact possibility and decided it was acceptable. Representa-
tive Ce1ler said that Title VI would not reach to the employment prac-
tices of the beneficiaries of federal programs.340 Representative Lindsay
agreed,341 as did Senator Humphrey.342
A second way adverse impact could apply in the context of federally
assisted programs is with regard to the volume of goods and services
339. That Congress intended a state could set its literacy standards as high as it liked is clear
from a colloquy in the House:
Mr. WHITENER. I ask the gentleman also, whether, under the language the bill
contains, what the Justice Department calls "standards" for testing literacy are not pre-
scribed by Federal legislation or proposed to be prescribed by this proposed Federallegisla-
tion?
Mr. CELLER. No; that is not the case. We would not touch the standard or the
qualifications or what have you which might be prescribed by the State. All we could do is
to provide that the State could have any kind of standard it wished but could not discrimi-
nate in the implementation of its standards.
Id. at 1694. Senator Humphrey agreed with Representative Celler. Id. at 6531.
Section 101(b) of Title I provides that, in any proceeding in federal court in which literacy is a
relevant fact, there shall arise a rebuttable presumption that a person who has completed sixth grade
is literate. Although Congress must have forseen that this presumption would tend to equalize the
percentages of black and white registered voters, the presumption does not outlaw a literacy test
merely because more blacks than whites flunk it. Moreover, the presumption is rebuttable; evidence
that a test required an eight-grade reading ability and that proportionate numbers of blacks and
whites with an eighth-grade education passed the test would seem to suffice to rebut the presump-
tion, even though proportionately fewer blacks than whites had completed eighth grade.
340. Id. at 1521.
341. Id. at 1542.
342. Id. at 6:54:5.
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received by blacks and whites. If whites received proportionately more
than blacks, the program would have an adverse impact on blacks. But
nothing in Title VI requires pro rata distribution. Rather, the title re-
quires nothing more than the avoidance of disparate treatment. 343
A third way adverse impact could apply to federal programs is in
the application of section 602, which allows the federal government to
cut off funds from discriminatory programs. Critics of Title VI pointed
out that blacks, being needy, would probably suffer the most from a cut-
off. For example, Senator Sparkman mentioned the effect of withholding
free school lunches.344 Senator Humphrey also appreciated that blacks
would be hit hardest if section 602 were invoked but, instead of opposing
cut-offs, he called for "a balance between the goal of eliminating discrim-
ination and the goal of providing education, food, and so forth, to those
most in need of it, including Negroes and members of other minority
groups.,,345 The point is that Congress knew that actions can have unin-
tended effects, but it did not define discrimination in terms of such ef-
fects. Indeed, if adverse impact were part of Title VI, the federal agency
which cut off funds to a discriminatory program might itself be guilty of
discrimination if blacks suffered more than whites. That Congress gave
this power to federal agencies indicates that adverse impact was not part
of the definition of discrimination under Title VI.
Other Equal Employment Opportunity Bills in the
Eighty-eighth Congress
As we have noted, H.R. 405, Representative Roosevelt's bill on
equal employment opportunity, was the source of Title VII. H.R. 405
was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor, which
took testimony on this and similar bills for ten days. In the printed rec-
ord of this testimony,346 which ran to 557 pages, there is no mention of
adverse impact.
The committee recommended passage of the bill, but this report is
also completely silent on adverse impact.347 Instead, the report focuses
on disparate treatment:
(3)
343. Representative Celler made this point clear when he said that Title VI requires an agency
to "establish nondiscriminatory standards of general application. This means it cannot apply one
standard of conduct to one person and a different standard of conduct to another." Id. at 1519. As
examples he gave instances only of disparate treatment. He said that hospitals and colleges receiving
federal money could no longer refuse to admit blacks. /d. He did not say that hospitals and colleges
would have to admit proportionately as many blacks as whites.
344. Id. at 8626.
345. Id. 6547.
346. Hearings Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and
Labor, House of Representatives, H.R. 405 and Similar Bills, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Hearings
were held on April 22, 30; May 3, 7, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29; and June 6, 1963.
347. H.R. REP. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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The basic purpose of H.R. 405 is to seek to eliminate arbitrary em-
ployment discrimination because of race. . . .
Job discrimination is extant in almost every area of employment and
every area of the country. It ranges in degrees from patent and absolute
rejection to more subtle forms of individious distinctions. Most fre-
quently it manifests itself through relegations to "traditional" positions
and through discriminatory promotional practices. 348
The report also contains evidence that the House shared the Senate's feel-
ings about quotas and the use of racial imbalance to prove
discrimination:
Nothing in the act is intended to allow charges to be brought based upon
disproportionate representation of members of any race, religion, color,
national origin, or ancestry within any business enterprise or labor organ-
ization. General rules as to percentages, quotas, or other proportional
representation shall not be the basis of charges brought under this act.
However, disproportionate representation maybe considered as back-
ground evidence in an unlawful employment practice proceeding under
this act. 349
H.R. 405 never reached the floor of the House, but many of its pro-
visions, including the sections defining unlawful employment practices,
were incorporated into Title VII ofH.R. 7152, the Kennedy Administra-
tion's omnibus civil rights bill. This bill was referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary, which extensively revised the bill-but did not change
the definitions of unlawful employment practices borrowed from H.R.
405-and recommended passage. The committee report on this bill, like
the report on H.R. 405, is completely silent on adverse impact and re-
lated issues.350
The House passed H.R. 7152 and sent the bill to the Senate. There
is no Senate committee report on the bill because the bill was placed
directly on to the floor of the upper chamber. Although the Senate
adopted more than 100 amendments to H.R. 7152 and rejected even
more,351 only two of them-the unsuccessful attempt to insert the word
"solely" before the word "because" and the equally unsuccessful attempt
(discussed below) to outlaw nepotic admission practices of labor un-
ions-affected the definitions of discrimination contained in sections
704(a)(1) and (2) of the House bill. These sections, renumbered sections
703(a)(1) and (2), were adopted by the Senate in exactly the same form as
passed by the House. Accordingly, the absence of allusion to adverse
impact and related issues in the House committee reports is solid evi-
348, Id. at 1.
349. /d. at 5,
350. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
351. Vass, supra note 210, at 456 n.lO 1.
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dence that neither house of Congress intended Title VII to incorporate
the adverse impact definition of discrimination.
H.R. 405 had a less successful cousin in the Senate, S. 1937. This
bill, also directed exclusively at employment discrimination, has been ig-
nored but deserves our attention because it was the subject of hearings
and a favorable committee report. 352 This bill would have taken the in-
termediate step between disparate treatment and adverse impact, but did
not reach adverse impact itself. Of course, even if S. 1937 would have
outlawed adverse impact, Congress chose to enact H.R. 7152 instead.
These facts are further proof that Title VII was not meant to prohibit
adverse impact.
S. 1937 was introduced into the Senate by Senator Humphrey and
thirteen co-sponsors353 during the summer of 1963. The bill was con-
cerned more with opportunity for equality than with equality of opportu-
nity. The heart of the bill was section 4(a), which read:
No person subject to this Act shall refuse or deny equal employment
opportunity to any individual because of race, color, religion, or national
origin. Such refusal or denial shall include any act or practice which,
because of an individual's race, color, religion, or national origin, results
or tends to result in material disadvantage or impediment to any individ-
ual in obtaining employment or the incidents of employment for which
he is otherwise qualified. 354
The language of this clause shows it was meant to sweep more broadly
than disparate treatment. The fundamental goal was to guarantee equal
employment opportunity, which was defined as the absence of any prac-
tice that results--or tends to result-in material disadvantage in employ-
ment opportunities. Did this goal reach as far as adverse impact?
Although there is some evidence to the contrary, the answer is no.
S. 1937 occupied the middle ground between disparate treatment
and adverse impact. To understand the lay of the land in the early
1960's, the contemporary meanings of three terms must be kept in mind.
The first is "fair employment practices," which meant absence of dispa-
rate treatment. The second is "affirmative action." Today, this term is a
synonym for goals and timetables, and it smacks of reverse discrimina-
tion (that is, a preference for blacks); then, the term meant only proactive
steps to recruit, utilize, and sometimes train blacks who otherwise would
not have applied for jobs or would have been assigned to jobs beneath the
blacks' abilities. "Equal employment opportunity" meant fair employ-
ment practices plus affirmative action. The right to equal employment
352. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
353. The co-sponsors were SenatorsCase,Clark, Douglas,Engle,Gruening, Hart, Longof Mis-
souri, McCarthy, Nelson, Newberger, Randolph, Ribicotf, and Williams of New Jersey.
354. S. 1937, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1963).
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opportunity written into section 4(a) of S. 1937 must be understood in
this sense.
And so the term was understood. In a statement to a Senate sub-
committee, Erwin Griswold, Commissioner of the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights, supported S. 1937 because it mandated equal
employment opportunity, which meant not only treating blacks without
regard to their race, but also informing blacks of job vacancies, referring
blacks through placement agencies, training blacks in the necessary
skills, and utilizing those skills.355 These steps constituted affirmative
action; they fell short of the requirements of adverse impact.
Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, held the same views. His state-
ment to the subcommittee indicated his understanding that affirmative
action included training programs within and without a firm.356 He fa-
vored S.1937 because it would have created an Equal Employment Op-
355, Mr. Griswold said:
This bill appropriately emphasizes the positive concept of equal employment opportu-
nity. The current economic and employment status of Negroes is not simply the result of
employers refusing to hire qualified Negro jobseekers. It is more the result of restrictive
practices of labor unions, both as to membership and apprenticeship training and of other
personnel and manpower systems established by tradition, habit, or convenience which by
their operation have the effect of excluding Negroes from employment opportunities.
Hearings on S. 1937, supra note 276, at 494. The last words of the quotation ("manpower systems
established by tradition. . . which by their operation have the effect of excluding Negroes from
employment opportunities") may seem to embrace adverse impact. The words do indicate that Mr.
Griswold supported S. 1937 because it looked beyond the intent of employers to the effects of sys-
tems on blacks. Nevertheless, Mr. Griswold revealed that he had 1960's-style affirmative action in
mind, and not adverse impact, as he elaborated on his general statements:
The goal is not merely to insure nondiscriminatory treatment of the Negro applicant when
he arrives at the personnel office, but rather to insure that Negroes as well as whites will
know of job vacancies, will be referred by placement agencies, and will possess the requisite
training to qualify. Nondiscrimination alone will not solve the problem we face if Negroes
never learn of jobs, are denied referrals by employment agencies, and are barred from
training facilities. Equal employment opportunity is properly defined by the statute in
terms of the entire employment process.
Id.
356. Mr. Wirtz mentioned to the subcommittee that Executive Order 10,925 required affirma-
tive action on the part of federal contractors. Id. at 394. He named five companies that were subject
to this requirement and, failing to meet it, had been warned they would be debarred from bidding on
federal contracts unless they mended their ways. Id. at 409. Typical of the steps taken by these
companies to restore themselves to grace were the following measures adopted by Comet Rice Mills
of Texas:
1. The company president had held conferences with heads of all divisions and man-
agers of all plants detailing the company's policies and delegating responsibility to top
management to see to it that equal employment opportunity was afforded in all respects.
2. The company wrote to all sources of recruitment stating specifically that it wished
referrals to be made without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin. It broadened
the base of its recuritement by including colleges and high schools which could refer mi-
nority group applicants.
3. It eliminated racial separation of departments and work assignments.
4. It eliminated racially separate sanitary facilities.
5. It standardized its rates of pay to provide a uniform system of evaluation without
regard to race.
6, It undertook a survey of the abilities and qualifications of its minority employees
to provide an objective basis for upgrading and promotion. (At the time of investigation, it
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portunity Administrator with power to require affirmative action of this
sort. But nothing in the Secretary's statement shows he believed the Ad-
ministrator could have prohibited adverse impact.
Finally, the most authoriative source on the meaning of S. 1937,
Senator Humphrey, told the subcommittee:
I think it has become increasingly evident that many of the problems
associated with the lack of employment opportunities result from the ex-
isting practices in the process of public and private employment, prac-
tices not directly related to overt discrimination. For example, there are
recruiting systems which never locate qualified Negro technicians and
typists because Negroes normally do not attend the trade and technical
schools on the recruiter's schedule. . . .
In short willful discrimination is often commingled with many im-
personal institutional processes which nevertheless determine the availa-
bility of jobs for nonwhite employees.357
If the last sentence of this statement were taken out of context, the sen-
tence might seem to embrace adverse impact. In context, however, the
sentence reveals that Senator Humphrey meant to go only one step be-
yond non-discrimination: he meant to reach equal employment opportu-
nity, which added affirmative action to non-discrimination. His
following remarks indicate that he stopped shy of adverse impact:
Therefore, this legislation departs from the traditional concept of
enforcing non-discrimination in employment and seeks to establish the
broader and more comprehensive obligation of promoting equal employ-
ment opportunities. Instead of, in other words, being the policeman, you
are in a sense here being the affirmative worker. Thus the administrator
is charged with the responsibility to see that no person subject to the act
denies equality of treatment in employment in all incidents of employ-
ment including not only hiring, promotion, transfer, and seniority, but
also the related areas of recruitment, recruitment advertising, apprentice-
ship, and training opportunities, membership in employee and labor or-
ganizations, and equality of access to the various facilities and services of
employment agencies. 358
Thus, the author and leading spokesperson for S. 1937 contemplated that
it would empower the government to require of employers something
more than ignoring the race of an applicant who appeared at the hiring
In
b-
n-
al
'It
19
'Y
'e
~
had no idea of the qualifications of its minority group employees since the application form
used for such applicants did not provide space for listing education or skills.)
7. Negro and Latin-American employees were upgraded to fill vacancies in various
skilled categories on a permanent basis. Others were upgraded to such jobs on a temporary
basis during the peak milling season.
8. As clerical vacancies occurred, minority group applications were solicited for the
first time. Of two vacancies which occurred, one was filled by a Negro applicant.
Id. at 411. These steps were plainly intended to eliminate disparate treatment and promote affirma-
tive action as contemporaneously defined.
357. Id. at 144-45.
358. Id. at 145.
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gate; the bill was intended to lead to affirmative outreach programs to
attract blacks and fully utilize their abilities. This intent, not an intent to
promulgate the adverse impact definition of discrimination, was written
into section 4(a) of the bill.359
Congress's action on S. 1937 supports the thesis of this article,
whether or not S. 1937 was intended to enact adverse impact. If the bill
was so intended, Congress's preference for Title VII suggests rejection of
adverse impact. If S. 1937 was not intended to reach adverse impact, this
fact is further proof that Congress was unaware of that definition of dis-
crimination. A few individuals may have approached it by moving from
advocacy of non-discrimination to advocacy of 1960's-brand affirmative
action, but they (and certainly Congress) had not yet taken the final step.
b. Protection of Adverse Impact
Although our legislators indicated no understanding of adverse im-
pact, they knew exactly what they wanted Title VII to outlaw. When
amendments were proposed that would have broadened the bill beyond
its purpose, they were defeated. One such amendment would have
banned conduct that falls within the ambit of adverse impact. Two other
amendments expressly designed to protect major instances of conduct
within the same ambit were introduced and adopted. The defeat of the
359. There is one piece of evidence that S. 1937 would have outlawed adverse impact. This
evidence appeared in a letter that Senator Clark wrote to the Wall Street Journal:
The opponents of the pending civil rights bill [H.R. 7152] have had striking success in
stirring confusion about what the bill would or would not do, and the Motorola case has
been a favorite hobby horse. Frankly, I prefer the Senate bill [So 1937] to title VII, and so,
I believe, do the 12 members of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee who
voted to report it favorably to the floor. I believe that the situation in the Motorola case
should be covered by Federal law.
But whatever my preferences, and those of my colleagues may be, the fact remains
that the issues raised by the Motorola case have nothing to do with Title VII of the pending
civil rights bill, and are plainly beyond its scope.
110 CONGo REC. 9107 (1964). The first paragraph of the quotation implies a belief that S. 1937
would have authorized the same result as the hearing examiner reached in the Motorola case, which
certainly approximated adverse impact.
But Senator Clark was not consistent on this score. After discussing with Senator Case the
differences between the enforcement provisions of several employment discrimination bills intro-
duced into the Eighty-eighth Congress, Senator Clark introduced a memorandum comparing S. 1937
and Title VII of H.R. 7152. Id. at 12,596. Prepared by the staff assistant of the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Employment and Manpower, whom Senator Clark praised highly, the memorandum specifi-
cally compared the behavior prohibited by the two bills-and mentioned nothing of advere impact.
Id., at 12,597. Taking into account Senator Clark's inconsistency, and weighing his Wall Street
Journal letter against the statements of the author of S. 1937, the Commissioner of the Civil Rights
Commission, and the Secretary of Labor, Senator Clark's separate view must be discounted heavily.
In another regard, though, Senator Clark's letter is entitled to considerable weight. Addressing
the bill for which the Senator was a co-captain, the second paragraph of the letter clearly indicates
that Title VII was not meant to go as far as S. 1937. Other senators also stated that Title VII was a
moderate bill. Id. at 8352 (statement of Sen. Proxmire); id. at 5336 (Sen. Humphrey's comments On
"Meet the Press"). By enacting Title VII, Congress indicated its preference for the more moderate
legislation.
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former amendment and the adoption of the latter two provide additional
proof that adverse impact goes beyond what Congress intended Title VII
to outlaw.
(1) Nepotism in Unions
The defeated amendment was offered by Representative Cahill.
Proposed as an addition to the definition of discrimination in section 704
ofH.R. 7152 (renumbered section 703 in the Act), the amendment would
have made it illegal for a labor union "to give preference to one applicant
for membership over another applicant for reasons other than job qualifi-
cations and for reasons which may have the indirect effect of causing
discrimination because of race. . . ."360 This amendment precisely iden-
tified the way a union's selection criteria can have an adverse impact.
Admissions rules which are not discriminatory on their face, but which
are not job related, can have the indirect effect of excluding blacks. Rep-
resentative Cahill gave a perfect example when he alluded to "small un-
ions that have handed down jobs from father to son and brother to
brother, and who have declined to accept membership even though the
members [applicants?] were qualified." A nepotic admissions rule was
bound to have an adverse impact on blacks because in 1964 many unions
had few or no black members; yet the House of Representatives rejected
the Cahill amendment. 361 Its opponents argued that it dealt with labor
relations, not discrimination. Clearly, the House's definition of discrimi-
nation did not reach adverse impact.
(2) Seniority Systems
Two other examples of adverse impact were considered by Con-
gress, and they were explicitly exempted from the law. Both were signifi-
cant issues. The first was the seniority system. When used to allocate job
opportunities, for example, to decide who is promoted or laid off, a sen-
iority system operates as a selection criterion. If blacks have been denied
the opportunity to accumulate seniority, the system has an adverse im-
pact, as the Supreme Court has recognized. 362
Yet Congress not only exempted seniority systems from Title VII,
but in fact believed at all times that seniority systems were beyond the
reach of the bill. From the outset, the proponents of Title VII. main-
tained that it would have no effect on seniority systems. In both houses
of Congress, critics charged the bill would destroy seniority, but advo-
cates consistently replied that seniority would not be affected. 363 The
360. Id. at 2593.
361. Id. at 2595.
362. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977).
363. See citations in id. at 350. In the House of Representatives, for example, the minority
report on H.R. 7152 of the House Judiciary Committee threatened, "The power gained by this title,
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Interpretative Memorandum said unequivocally, "Title VII would have
no effect on established seniority rights. "364 A statement from the De-
partment of Justice took the same position. 365 Senator Keating aptly
summed up the proponents' view of the effect of Title VII on seniority:
"I cannot believe that President Kennedy, President Johnson, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the leaders of the House,
on both sides of the aisle, in passing the bill so overwhelmingly were
doing so to abolish the system of union seniority. . . ."366 Senators
Humphrey367 and Kuchep68 agreed. Thus, as in the House, so in the
Senate, it was understood that seniority systems, which are a clear exam-
ple of adverse impact, were considered outside the definition of
discrimination.
After this understanding had been reached, a clause protecting bona
fide seniority systems was added to section 703(h). It might be argued
that the addition of this clause proves Congress intended to outlaw ad-
verse impact, that the clause was necessary because seniority systems
would have become unlawful had not specific protection been included.
But this argument ignores the legislative history of the clause. As the
Supreme Court has written, the clause:
was enacted as part of the Manfield-Dirksen compromise substitute bill
that cleared the way for the passage of Title VII. The drafters of the
if invoked, would destroy seniority in unions." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1963).
See a/so id. at 65, 71. But Representative Celler, chainnan of the Judiciary Committee, assured the
House that Title VII would not impair seniority systems. 110 CONGoREC. 1518 (1964). So finn was
this assurance that a Southern attempt to amend the bill to exempt "any employer whose hiring and
employment practices are pursuant to (1) a seniority system" was defeated. Id. at 2727-28. When
H.R. 7152 left the House, the bill said nothing about seniority systems, yet it was understood that
they were not affected.
Debate in the Senate flowed along similar lines. For example, Senator Dirksen asked a number
of searching questions about Title VII. One question was, "Nonnally, labor contracts call for 'last
hired, first fired.' If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires
they be first fired and the remaining employees are white?" [d. at 7217. To a person, every propo-
nent of Title VII who addressed the issue said that existing seniority rights would not be impaired.
Senator Clark responded to Senator Dirksen's question as follows:
Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last hired, first fired"
agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still be "first fired" as long as it is
done because of his status as "last hired" and not because of his race.
[d. at 7217.
364. [d. at 7213. The Memorandum continued:
[Title VII's] effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has
been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the
title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on
a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, pennitted-to fire whites
in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
[d.
365.
366.
367.
368.
[d. at 7207.
Id. at 5874.
[d. at 5423.
Id. at 6564.
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compromise bill stated that one of its principal goals was to resolve the
ambiguities in the House-passed version of H.R. 7152. As the debates
indicate, one of those ambiguities concerned Title VII's impact on ex-
isting collectively bargained seniority rights. It is apparent that section
703(h) was drafted with an eye toward meeting the earlier criticism on
this issue with an explicit provision embodying the understanding and
assurances of the Act's proponents: namely, that Title VII would not
outlaw such differences in treatment among employees as flowed from a
bona fide seniority system that allowed for full exercise of seniority accu-
mulated before the effective date of the Act. . . . The statement of Sena-
tor Humphrey. . . confirms that the addition of section 703(h) "merely
clarifies [Title VII's] present intent and effect." 110 Congo Rec. 12723
(1964).369
Congress was fully aware that seniority systems would have an ad-
verse impact on blacks, who, as the last hired, would be the first fired.
Nevertheless, Title VII's definition of discrimination was never intended
to reach seniority systems. These facts are evidence that Congress did
not intend to outlaw adverse impact.
(3) Ability Tests
Much of the debate on Title VII centered on employers' use of abil-
ity tests. The issue grew out of the Motorola case,370in which Leon My-
art, a black, claimed under the Illinois FEP law that the Motorola
Company had refused to hire him because of his race. Mr. Myart had
studied electronics in a vocational high school, received a high school
diploma from an adult academy, where he satisfactorily completed a
course for electrical and radio-television technicians, and subsequently
passed electrical and radio-television courses at another school. He also
had some practical experience "trouble-shooting" television sets in need
of repair. On July 15, 1963, he applied to the Motorola Company in
Chicago for the job of analyzer and phaser, which required trouble-
shooting radio, television, and stereophonic sets as they came off the as-
sembly line. Motorola gave Mr. Myart Test No. 10,371a 28-question
paper-and-pencil examination that was routinely administered to all ap-
plicants, and he failed. The author of the examination, Dr. Phillip Shur-
rager, admitted that it was essentially an intelligence test. The hearing
examiner for the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission deter-
mined that Test No. 10 was illegal because blacks, owing to their cultur-
ally deprived and disadvantaged background, achieved lower scores than
369. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States at 431 U.S. at 352 (footnote and citations
omitted).
370. The decision and order of the hearing officer are reprinted at 110 CONGo REC. 9030-33
(1964).
371. The questions on Test No. 10 were read into the Congressional Record by Senator Tower.
Id. at 9033.
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whites.372 The hearing examiner did not rule on the validity of the test;
that is, he did not discuss evidence on whether the test predicted success
on the job. Nor did he order that Motorola validate a new test (though
he did require that a new test be free of adverse impact). He simply
decided that intelligence tests were illegal selection criteria in Illinois so
long as whites achieved higher scores than blacks.
The decision and order were issued on February 26, 1964, and reac-
tion was swift. Within two weeks, the case was the subject of comment
on the floor of the Senate,373 and, before another week had passed, the
full text of the decision had been printed in the minutes of both houses of
Congress.374 Because the House of Representatives had passed H.R.
7152 before the decision was announced,375 congressional debate on Mo-
torola occurred in the Senate.
This debate played an important role in the Griggs opinion. Duke
Power argued its tests were protected by section 703(h) because they
were professionally developed and were not designed or intended to dis-
criminate; however, the company had not proved its tests were job re-
lated, and the Court sought to refute the company's argument by saying
that Congress intended section 703(h) to protect only job-related tests.
Nothing in the language of this section indicates such an intent. Indeed,
the words of the section-"any professionally developed ability test [that
is not] designed, intended or used to discriminate"-require only that the
employer choose a reputable test and administer it in good faith. The
section certainly says nothing about validating tests. Accordingly, the
Court had to look outside the statute for support.
The Court advanced two lines of argument to prove that section
703(h) was meant to protect only job-related tests. The first line, which
had two branches, focused on debates before the section became part of
the bill. In one branch of this argument, the Court maintained that crit-
ics of Title VII claimed the Motorola case made illegal all standardized
tests on which whites outperformed blacks, even if the tests were neces-
sary to the business. (If sound, this branch of the argument would have
established that the critics understood the concept of test validity and
feared that the bill might jeopardize valid tests.) In the other branch of
the first line of argument, the Court maintained that the proponents of
Title VII replied to the critics with assurances that the bill would not
affect job-related tests. (If sound, this branch of the argument would
have established that the proponents also understood the concept of test
validity and believed all along that valid tests would be lawful.) The
372. Id. at 9032.
373. [d. at 5081-82 (statement of Sen. Robertson).
374. Id. at 5312, 5662.
375. The House passed H.R. 7152 on February 10, 1964. Id. at 2804-05.
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second line of argument focused on the Tower amendment, which was
drafted, argued the Court, to protect only job-related tests. The initial
version of the amendment (Tower-I) was defeated because its language
would have protected tests that were deliberately used to discriminate.
Senator Tower reworded the amendment to avoid this risk, but, said the
Court, retained the purpose to protect only job-related tests. The revised
amendment (Tower-II) was adopted as section 703(h).376
Under the Court's reading of the debates on Motorola and the
Tower amendment, they would stand as evidence that Congress intended
to promulgate the adverse impact definition of discrimination. The argu-
ment runs thus: the amendment, which was designed to protect job-re-
lated tests, was inappropriate if Congress intended to outlaw only
disparate treatment. The validity of a test should not be a complete de-
fense in a disparate treatment case because a valid test could be perverted
to discriminatory ends. Validity is important, however, if Congress in-
tended to outlaw adverse impact. Without the Tower amendment, a test
with an adverse impact might have been banned, even if it were job re-
lated. Therefore, concludes the argument, adoption of the Tower amend-
ment is evidence that Congress intended to outlaw adverse impact.
But the Court misread the Motorola debate and the Tower amend-
ment. We find that Congress was altogether unaware of test validity or
job relatedness. For this reason, Congress believed the Motorola deci-
sion threatened the use of all ability tests, not merely job-related tests.
For the same reason, we find that the proponents of Title VII assured the
Senate that the bill would protect all fairly administered tests. And we
find that Tower-I was defeated not only because it might have protected
ability tests purposefully used to discriminate, but also because it was
thought to be unnecessary-for ability tests were not outlawed in the first
place. Thus, the debates on the Motorola case and the Tower amend-
ment reveal that Congress treated ability tests as it had treated seniority:
Congress knew tests can have an adverse impact and, nevertheless, opted
to protect them.
The Court's first line of argument was that, long before the Tower
amendment was introduced, senators knew about and wanted to protect
job-related tests. One branch of this argument concerned dire predic-
tions about the effect of Motorola:
The congressional discussion [of testing] was prompted by the deci-
sion of a hearing examiner for the Illinois Pair Employment Commission
in Myart v. Motorola Co. . ., That case suggested that standardized
tests on which whites performed better than Negroes could never be
used. The decision was taken to mean that such tests could never be
376. 401 U.S. at 434-36.
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justified even if the needs of business required them. 377
The first two sentences of this statement were true. Congressional debate
on testing was sparked by the Motorola case, which, threatened oppo-
nents of the bill, meant that all tests with an adverse impact on blacks
would become illegal if Title VII passed. But the third sentence was false
because it implied the Senate discussed justification of tests and believed
that job-related tests were justified, regardless of their effect on blacks. In
fact, the Senate never discussed justifying (validating) tests.. As we have
seen, neither house of Congress showed any awareness of job relatedness.
No one seemed to appreciate that a test might be invalid because it failed
to predict success on the job. Rather, senators simply assumed that tests
were useful and business needed them. The Court said the Senate feared
that Motorola endangered tests with an adverse impact, even though the
tests were justified by business necessity. In truth, the opponents of Title
VII did not distinguish between justified and unjustified tests. The oppo-
nents simply feared that Motorola endangered all tests with an adverse
impact.
The Court's line of argument was that, even before the Tower
amendment was introduced, senators sought to protect only valid tests.
The first branch, that opponents of Title VII feared it would vitiate job-
related tests, was misleading because opponents did not distinguish be-
tween valid and invalid tests. The second branch of the argument main-
tained that advocates of Title VII said it would not prohibit job-related
tests. This branch was also erroneous. The Court wrote:
Proponents of Title VII sought throughout the debate to assure the crit-
ics that the Act would have no effect on job-related tests. Senators Case
of New Jersey and Clark of Pennsylvania, comanagers of the bill on the
Senate floor, issued a memorandum explaining that the proposed Title
VII "expressly protects the employer's right to insist that any prospective
applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicablejob qualifications.
Indeed, the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of
job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color." 110 Congo
Rec. 7247.11(Emphasis added.)
11. The Court of Appeals majority, in finding no requirement in Title
VII that employment tests be job related, relied in part on a quotation
from an earlier Clark-Case interpretative memorandum addressed to the
question of the constitutionality of Title VII. The Senators said in that
memorandum:
"There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona
fide qualification tests where, because of differences in background and
education, members of some groups are able to perform better on these
tests than members of other groups. An employer may set his qualifica-
377. !d. at 434.
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tions as high as he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have
these qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of
test performance." 110 Congo Rec. 7213.
However, nothing there stated conflicts with the later memorandum
dealing specificallywith the debate over employer testing, 110CongoRec.
7247 (quoted from in the text above), in which Senators Clark and Case
explained that tests which measure "applicable job qualifications" are
permissible under Title VII. Certainly a reasonable interpretation of
what the Senators meant, in light of the subsequent memorandum di-
rected specificallyat employer testing, was that nothing in the Act pre-
vents employers from requiring that applicants be fit for the job.378
We have noted above that this passage contains three errors of scholar-
ship. These errors led the Court to rely on a memorandum prepared at
the behest of Senator Case (which the Court mistakenly labeled as "an
earlier Clark-Case interpretative memorandumH), rather than on the
genuine, jointly authored Interpretative Memorandum. The choice of
documents was important because the Court predicated much of its argu-
ment on a word that was used in one sense in one document but in a
different sense in the other document. The Court argued that Congress
intended all along to protect only job-related tests, and the proof of this
intent was the use of the word "qualifications.H The Court interpreted
the word to mean fitness for a job. Thus, the Court argued, when the
Case memorandum .stated that Title VII would protect an employer's
right to insist that a job candidate have the applicable qualifications,
Congress meant that the employer would be free to apply qualifications
that determine fitness-in other words, those which are job related.
The Court put too much emphasis on a single word; the meaning of
a statute may better be learned from a more comprehensive study of the
legislative history. Nevertheless, to the extent the word "qualificationsH
reveals the intent of Congress, the Court's argument fails because "quali-
fications" is an ambiguous word. It can mean fitness for a job, but it can
also mean prerequisites for obtaining a job.379 If the word were used in
this latter sense, Congress meant that the employer would be free to ap-
ply any qualification except race as prerequisite to a job. In this event,
the argument that the proponents of Title VII believed all along that the
bill protected only job-related tests would lack support.
378. Id. at 434-35.
379. A person may have one of these qualifications but not the other. For example, suppose an
employer will hire as a sales representative only an applicant with five years of experience selling the
company's product. Ms. A, who was the outstanding sales representative for the company's compet-
itor for four years, is not qualified because she cannot meet the prerequisite for obtaining the job, but
she is qualified in the sense of being fit to do the work. Ms. B, who was fired for inadequate perfonn-
ance after seven years as a sales representative for the company's competitor, is qualified because she
meets the prerequisites for obtaining the job, but she is not qualified in the sense of being fit to do the
work.
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In the Case memorandum, on which the Supreme Court relied,
"qualifications" may well have been used to mean fitness for the job. But
in the Interpretative Memorandum, the word was probably used to mean
prerequisites for obtaining a job. Two factors support this interpretation.
First, Senators Clark and Case wrote that the employer could set his
qualifications as high as he likes. Such qualifications could easily exceed
the requirements of the job (for example, a high school diploma as a
qualification for the job of shoveling coal). Second, another passage in
the Interpretative Memorandum clearly used "qualification" to mean
prerequisite for obtaining a job: .
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treat-
ment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor
which are prohibited by section 704 [renumbered 703] are those which
are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employment
is not affected by this title. 380
"Qualification" is equated with "criterion" (which in this context means
the same as prerequisite) for obtaining a job, and examples of criteria are
race, color, etc.-none of which affects ability to perform. Thus, in the
document which, by the Court's own reasoning, is the more authorita-
tive, there is no evidence that Congress intended to protect only job-re-
lated tests.
Although we risk staking too much on the meaning of a single word,
nevertheless, if that word is critical (as the Supreme Court implied), we
should not limit our search to two documents. We should examine the
congressional debates to determine how several representatives and sena-
tors used the word. Predictably, we find the ambiguous word was used
in both of its senses.
Once in a while, "qualifications" was used to mean fitness to do a
job. For example, Representative Celler reported that some people
claimed Title VII would thwart the hiring of cooks who specialized in
cooking gumbo, grits, and southern fried chicken.381 He replied, "Why,
such charges are ridiculous. As we have seen, the bill specifically aims at
the hiring of employees on the basis of qualification, not on the basis of
race. ,,382 "Qualification" meant ability to cook.383
380. 110 CONGo REc. 7213 (1964).
381. 420 F.2d 1242.
382. 110 CONGo REC. 1518 (1964).
383. Other examples include Representative Seymour Halpern of New York, who said that Ti-
tle VII's "only purpose is to remove any standard in connection with securing and maintaining
employment which is extrinsic to job qualifications." [d. at 1628. "Qualifications" could only have
meant fitness to do a job because the word was used in contrast to the phrase "standard in connec-
tion with securing and maintaining employment," and this phrase plainly means prerequisite for
obtaining a job. Senator Humphrey said, "We are attempting to pass a law which will provide that
when someone seeks a job, he shall be considered on the basis of his qualifications, on the basis of his
training, on the basis of his capacity, and that he shall not be excluded on the basis of his race." /d.
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Other times-by far the majority-"qualifications" was clearly used
to mean prerequisites for obtaining a job. Senator Tower-who, as au-
thor of the amendment that is so important to us, must be considered a
particularly authoritative source-used "qualifications" to mean prereq-
uisites for obtaining a job, in contradistinction to the word "skills,"
which he used to mean fitness to do the job:
There are qualifications for a number of things. There are qualifica-
tions for service in the Senate. There are qualifications for service as
President. There are qualifications for service as a Member of the House
of Representatives.
We lay down certain qualifications by law for various public offices
which require peculiar skills. Most states, for example, require that
judges be lawyers.
It is certainly right and proper for a private company to require that
a man possess certain skills necessary to perform the work required by
that company, or that he possess a sufficient intellect to be trainable to do
a specific jOb.384
"Qualifications" must have been used in its sense of prerequisites for ob-
taining a job because the Constitution and state law do not (unfortu-
nately) spell out the abilities necessary for success in public office. The
word "skills" referred to what a judge or an employee must do in his
work, that is, fitness to do the job.
Speaking of Senator Fulbright, Senator Clark said:
The Senator stated that this legislation "tampers with the right of em-
ployers to hire those who will best serve their business." I must frankly
disagree. There is nothing in Title VII--or any reasonable construction
of it-which supports this assertion. Its whole purport is simply to say to
employers: "Choose any job applicant you want, and set any job qualifi-
cation you want to use--except race, creed, color, national origin--or-
except where it is a bona fide occupational qualification-sex.,,385
Senator Clark clearly implied that race or sex could-but should not-be
a qualification for a job (except when sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification). In this sense, "qualification" can only mean prerequisite
for obtaining a job because the basic premise of Title VII was that race
never, and sex only rarely, has something to do with actual fitness to
perform. 386
at 5817. "Qualifications" meant fitness to do a job because the word was equated with training and
capacity.
384. Id. at 9025. Senator Tower's reference to "sufficient intellect to be trainable" may indicate
that his amendment was intended to protect intelligence tests.
385. Id. at 9678.
386. Other examples include Representative Griffin, who was replying to Representative Jones's
argument that Title VII would bar an employer from choosing employees who do not smoke or
drink and who go to church regularly. Representative Griffin said:
In the event [this bill becomes] a law, I would not want the statement of the gentleman
[Mr. Jones] to go unchallenged in the Record that under this title an employer could not
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I t is clear that the Supreme Court was mistaken to insist that the
word "qualifications" meant fitness to do a job; therefore, support for the
Court's argument that Congress always intended to protect only job-re-
lated tests disappears. Indeed, because representatives and senators used
the word more often in its sense of prerequisite for obtaining a job, it is
more likely-to the extent that legislative intent can be inferred from a
single word-that Congress intended to protect the use of any selection
criterion other than race.
The Court's second line of argument was that the legislative history
of section 703(h) shows that the Tower amendment was meant to protect
only job-related tests. The Court relied on legislative history, rather than
on the language of the section itself, because even the most nimble mind
would have to labor to find a requirement of validity in the text of the
section. 387
set up qualifications for employment, such as required that the employee shall not drink or
smoke or swear, and so forth, because under this bill he can require any qualification or
discriminate on any other ground than race, color, religion or sex.
Id. at 2603. "Qualifications" meant prerequisites for obtaining a job because not drinking, smoking,
and swearing have little to do with the performance of most jobs. The word had the same meaning
in this colloquy on the floor of the Senate:
Mr. STENNIS. If I lived in the Senator's state. . . would I have any right to be
employed by the Senator in his little manufacturing plant? . .
Mr. McCELLAN. I do not believe I have a right to demand the fruits of another
man's ingenuity, his enterprise, his industry, his thrift, his frugality. . . .
Mr. STENNIS. If I understand the Senator correctly, we apparently have the shoe on
the wrong foot. As a prospective employee, I have no basic right to have the Senator give
me a job. . . . I might be otherwise qualified, but I might be an older man that the Sena-
tor would wish to hire.
Me. McCLELLAN. There might be many reasons. There are differences in the per-
sonalities of people. Two men might be eligible for a job in the sense of qualifications.
They might have the qualifications to apply for the job. One might be a little superior to
the other, but the one who has the superior qualifications might have some undesirable
quirks of personality, whether he was black or white, Methodist or Baptist, Catholic or
Jew. He might have quirks of character that would influence the judgment of any em-
ployer in employing him.
Id. at 7876. Certainly "qualifications" referred to the prerequisites for obtaining the job, as the man
with the "superior qualifications" could not perform the work as well as the other man and was thus
less qualified in the sense of fitness to do the job.
Finally, in responding to objections that had been raised during the debate on Title VII, Senator
Clark used "qualifications" to mean prerequisites for obtaining a job:
Objection: The bill would make it unlawful for an employer to use qualification tests
based upon verbal skills and other factors which may relate to the environmental condi-
tioning of the applicant. In other words, all applicants must be treated as if they came
from low income, deprived communities in order to equate environmental inequalities of
the culturally deprived group.
Answer: The employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, and he may hire,
fire, and promote on the basis of test performance.
Id. at 7218. This quotation is particularly revealing. As in the Interpretative Memorandum, Senator
Clark said an employer may set his qualifications at any level-even one higher than required by the
job. And the employer may act on the basis of performance on tests of verbal skills, a statement that
deals a body blow to the EEOC Guidelines.
387. In quoting §703(h), the Court italicized the word "used," perhaps suggesting this word
indicates the intent of Congress to protect only job-related tests. But, as will appear below, "used"
;1
1
if
t
[}
j
e
g,
Ig
lan
IUS
.tor
!ltor
the
that
lOrd
;ed"
1985] GRIGGS' FOLL Y 541
Senator Tower's original amendment provided in part that a test
would be permissible, "if. . . in the case of any individual who is seeking
employment with such employer, [a professionally developed ability] test
is designed to determine or predict whether such individual is suitable or
trainable with respect to his employment in the particular business or
enterprise involved. . . ." 110 Congo Rec. 13492. This language indi-
cates that Senator Tower's aim was simply to make certain that job-re-
lated tests would be permitted. The opposition to the amendment was
based on its loose wording which the proponents of Title VII feared
would be susceptible of misinterpretation. The final amendment, which
was acceptable to all sides, could hardly have required less of a job rela-
tion than the first.388
In this passage, the Court ignored an alternative interpretation of Tower-
I under which the employer's motive, and not the validity of the test,
would determine whether use of the test was protected. The Court also
misconstrued the legislative history of the Tower amendment.
The Supreme Court considered it obvious from the text of Tower-I
that the amendment was drafted to protect only job-related tests. A close
reading of Tower-I, however, reveals an alternative construction that is
more faithful to the language of the proposal. The proposal read:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give any professionally
developed ability test to any individual seeking employment or being con-
sidered for promotion or transfer, or to act in reliance upon the results of
any such test given to such individual, if-
(1) in the case of any individual who is seeking employment with
such employer, such test is designed to determine or predict whether
such individual is suitable or trainable with respect to his employment in
the particular business or enterprise involved, and such test is given to all
individuals seeking similar employment with such employer without re-
gard to the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or
(2) in the case of any individual who is an employee of such em-
ployer, such test is designed to determine or predict whether such indi-
vidual is suitable or trainable with respect to his promotion or transfer
within such business or enterprise, and such test is given to all such em-
ployees being considered for similar promotion or transfer by such em-
ployer without regard to the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 389
Tower-I would have protected a test if it was designed by a professional
to predict whether a job applicant was suitable or trainable for the job.
Nothing in the language of the amendment said the test had to succeed
its purpose. In other words, Tower-I required, not that a test truly be
was added to the section for another purpose, namely, to prevent an employer from deliberately
using an otherwise non-discriminatory test for discriminatory purposes.
388. 401 U.S. at 436 n.l2.
389. 110 CONGo REC. 13,492 (1964).
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job-related, but only that the professional designer of a test try to achieve
such a result. 390
Such a reading of Tower-I is plausible for three reasons. First, this
reading gives their ordinary meanings to the words of the amendment.
The Supreme Court's reading, on the other hand, requires us to construe
the phrase, "such test is designed to determine or predict whether such
individual is suitable or trainable," as though the phrase meant that such
test in fact determines or predicts whether such individual is suitable or
trainable. Second, this reading is consistent with the view that motive
was an element of Congress's definition of discrimination. An employer
acts in good faith if she uses a test that has been designed by a profes-
sional to predict suitability for the job-regardless of whether the test is
in fact job related. Surely the employer may rely on a professional to
develop the best possible test. Third, when Senator Tower described his
amendment on the floor of the Senate, he never alluded to a requirement
that a test be job-related. Rather, he emphasized that, to enjoy protec-
tion under the amendment, employers would be required to administer
tests to all applicants without regard to race.391 For these reasons, it is
far from obvious that the language of Tower-I shows it was meant to
protect only job-related tests. Accordingly, any support for the Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 703(h) must lie in the debates on the
amendment.
The Tower amendment was in large measure a response to Motor-
ola.392 An understanding of the amendment, therefore, begins with anal-
ysis of Congress's reaction to that case. The most salient fact about the
debate is that no more than one senator expressed approval of the Motor-
ola decision, and every proponent who spoke on the matter said the same
result could not obtain under Title VII. As far as Congress was con-
cerned, Motorola was a bastard from its birth.
The Court itself quoted the passage in the Interpretative Memoran-
dum that clearly rejected the hearing examiner's opinion: "There is no
requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide qualification
tests where, because of differences in background and education, mem-
bers of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than mem-
390. Looking at Tower-l with the benefit of a decade of experience under Griggs, we can see a
strong objection could have been raised to this amendment. A test can be professionally designed to
predict suitability or trainability, yet fail to do so; nevertheless, such a test might have been lawful
under Tower-I, the language of which would have protected a test according to its design, not its
effect. If Congress intended to prohibit adverse impact, senators would have directed their attention
to the effects of employers' behavior, not merely the purposes, and would probably have argued
against the amendment because it would have protected tests that were actually not job-related.
That this argument was not advanced is a further indication that Congress did not intend to enact
adverse impact. See infra note 404 and accompanying text.
391. 110 CONGo REC. 13,492 (1964).
392. [d. (statement of Sen. Tower).
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bers of other groups.,,393 The authors of the Interpretative
Memorandum commented individually to the same effect, both on the
floor of the Senate and in writing. 394
Particularly revealing is a letter that Senator Clark sent to the Wall
Street Journal. It read in part:
The civil rights bill would not make unlawful the use of tests such as
those used in the Motorola case, unless it could be demonstrated that
such tests were used for the purpose of discriminating against an individ-
ual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In other
words, it is not enough that the effectof using a particular test is to favor
one group over another, to produce a violation of the act.395
This letter reveals not only that Congress approved of tests like the one
used by Motorola, but also that Congress intended to protect any ability
test that was not purposefully used to discriminate. The last sentence of
the letter also reveals that Congress was aware a test could have an ad-
verse impact, but considered the impact of a test to be irrelevant.
Senator Clark's letter is important because he was a co-captain for
Title VII. The letter is even more important because it expressed the
393. 401 u.s. at 434-35 n.lO, quoting 110 CONGoREc. 7213 (1964).
394. Senator Case stated:
To clear away misconceptions on this whole case, I have had prepared a memoran-
dum which makes clear, I believe, that it would not be possible for a decision such as the
finding of the examiner in the Motorola case to be entered by a Federal agency against an
employer under title VII.
This is so, first, because the Equal Employment Opportunities [sic] Commission estab-
lished by title VII would have no adjudicative functions and no authority to issue enforce-
ment orders.
Second, title VII clearly would not permit even a Federal court to rule out the use of
particular tests by employers because they do not "equate inequalities and environmental
factors among the disadvantaged and culturally deprived groups."
110 CONGoREc. 6415 (1964). Then Senator Case introduced into the Record the memorandum to
which he had referred. After setting forth the assertions the Senator had made orally, the memoran-
dum continued:
There is no doubt. . . that such a result would be unmistakably improper under the pro-
posed Federal law. The Illinois case is based on the apparent premise that the State law is
designed to provide equal opportunity to Negroes, whether or not as well qualified as white
job applicants.
Whatever its merit as a socially desirable objective, title VII would not require, and no
court could read title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or change the occupational
qualifications he sets for his employees simply because proportionately fewer Negroes than
whites are able to meet them. . . .
Title VII says merely that a covered employer cannot refuse to hire someone simply
because of his color, that is, because he is a Negro. But it expressly protects the employer's
right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job
qualifications. Indeed, the very purpose of title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job
qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color. Title VII would in no way interfere
with the right of an employer to fixjob qualifications and any citation of the Motorola case
to the contrary as precedent for title VII is wholly wrong and misleading.
Id. at 6416. Senator Case made similar statements on other occasions. See, e.g., id. at 7246,13,076.
Senator Clark shared the same views. See id. at 7217, 9107.
395. Id. at 9107. In this letter, Senator Clark expressed his personal approval of the Motorola
decision. S~e supra note 359.
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views of the leadership of the Senate and of the major advocates of Title
VII. We know the leadership agreed with Senator Clark because his let-
ter was reprinted in Bipartisan Civil Rights Newsletter No. 39.396 This
number was one of a series of newsletters that constitute an important
but neglected part of the legislative history of Title VII. The newsletters
were circulated to each proponent of the bill and to anyone else who
asked to receive them.397 They were prepared in the offices of Senators
Humphrey and Kuchel. 398 The former, a Democrat, and the latter, a
Republican, were not only the overall managers of the civil rights bill,399
but were also their respective party's whips in the Senate. Expressing the
views of the ranking members of the Senate and the principal advocates
of the bill, the newsletters are entitled to considerable weight as an index
of congressional intent. 400
Nevertheless, the opponents of the bill continued to harp on the
theme that Title VII would outlaw tests like the one used in Motorola.
For example, Senator Smathers read aloud an account of the decision
which claimed that "merit and ability and Motorola's standards of per-
formance were cast aside. . . ."401 Later, the Senator said Title VII
"would take away from the employer his right to require an examination,
give it to everyone, and say, 'I will take the man who makes the highest
and best grade, because that is the man who can do the best for my com-
pany.' "402 Senators Fulbright and Ellender also argued that Motorola
would outlaw aptitude tests.403
Eventually, Senator Tower introduced his amendment to protect
ability tests. Tower-I was rejected for two reasons. The Supreme Court
mentioned one in Griggs, namely, the fear that the amendment would
396. Id.
397. Id. at 7474 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). The top of each newsletter carried the follow-
ing statement:
(The bipartisan Senate leadership supporting the civil rights bill, H.R. 7152, headed
by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Senator Thomas Kuchel, will distribute this newslet-
ter to the offices of the Senators who support the legislation. This newsletter will help to
keep Senators and their staffs fully informed on the civil rights bill. It will be distributed
whenever circumstances warrant, daily if necessary.)
398. Id. at 7474 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
399. Id. at 6812 (statement of Sen. Mansfield); id. at 9244 (statement of Sen. Jordan).
400. Other numbers of the Newsletter also indicated the leadership's opinion of Motorola.
Newsletter No. 16 said, "under Title VII, even a Federal court could not order an employer to lower
or change job qualifications simply because proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to
meet them." Id. at 7479. Newsletter No. 28 expressed the same opinion: "The recommendation of
the hearing examiner in the Motorola case could not be possible under this title." Id. at 8370. Thus,
the leadership of both sides of the aisle knew a test can have an adverse impact, but consistently
agreed that the bill would not outlaw ability tests as selection criteria unless the tests were purpose-
fully used to discriminate.
401. Id. at 6000.
402. Senator Smathers was correct in one sense. Title VII did take away an employer's right to
take the man who makes the highest grade on a test.
403. Id. at 9599-9600 (statements of Sens. Fullbright and Ellender).
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protect an employer who deliberately used a professional test to exclude
blacks.404 (This reason, of course, is further evidence of the Senate's fo-
cus on employers' motives.) Senator Case stated:
If this amendment were enacted, it could be an absolute bar and
would give an absolute right to an employer to state as a fact that he had
given a test to all applicants, whether it was a good test or not, so long as
it was professionally developed. Discrimination could actually exist
under the guise of compliance with the statute.405
The Senator seemed to fear an employer might commission a profes-
sional to write a test that blacks would fail, or choose an existing test
known to favor whites. The Senator showed no sign of thinking about a
job-related test.406
The Court failed to mention the other reason Tower-I was defeated,
yet only by taking account of both reasons can we fathom the mind of
Congress. The other reason was the belief that the amendment was un-
necessary. The leadership in the Senate perceived that the amendment
was aimed at protecting tests like the one used by the Motorola Com-
pany.407 Believing that such tests were not endangered by the bill, the
Senate concluded that Tower-I was unnecessary. Senator Case said,
"The Motorola case could not happen under the bill the Senate is now
considering."408 Senator Humphrey agreed:
Every concern of which this amendment seeks to take cognizance has
already been taken care of in Title VII, as amended, and presented in the
[Mansfield-Dirksen] substitute. These tests are legal. They do not need
to be legalized a second time. They are legal unless used for the purpose
of discrimination. The amendment is unnecessary.409
404. That senators perceived this possibility is evidence that they read the amendment with
care. Had they intended to prohibit adverse impact, such careful reading would also have revealed
that Tower-I would have protected tests that were not job related. See supra note 390 and accompa-
nying text.
4050 110 CONGo REC. 13,504 (1964).
406. It is remotely possible that a job-related test could be used discriminatorily. For example,
suppose two tests predict success on the job with equal certainty, yet one test selects more whites
than the other. A prejudiced employer might deliberately choose the test that favors whites. But
this is a sophisticated example of discrimination. Nothing in the Congressional Record suggests that
the proponents of Title VII had any such example in mind.
407. Senator Tower himself created this perception:
Mr. President, I hope my colleagues in the Senate will give very careful attention to
the amendment. I believe that proponents of the bill realize that this is not an effort to
weaken the bill. It is an effort to protect the system whereby employers give general ability
and intelligence tests to determine the trainability of prospective employees. The amend-
ment arises from my concern about what happened in the Motorola FEPC case. I have
discussed the case in great detail in the Senate, and I shall not repeat my argument.
Let me say, only, in view of the finding in the Motorola case, that the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, which would be set up by the act, operating in pursuance
of Title VII, might attempt to regulate the use of tests by employers.
110 CONGo RECo 13,492 (1964).
408. Id. at 13,503.
409. Ido at 13,504.
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Senator Frank J. Lausche of Ohio asked Senator Humphrey to read the
language that made tests legal,410 and the Senator from Minnesota (with
some help from Senator Jack Miller of Iowa) pointed to section 703(h) of
the substitute.411 Speaking of this section, Senator Humphrey said,
"That amendment was one that was added after the original substitute
package had been tentatively agreed upon. We reviewed the entire Mo-
torola case, and then added that particular section.,,412 Senator Miller
held the same view of the purpose of section 703(h): "Let me say that I
feel very strongly, as all other Senators do, about the Motorola case.
When the amendment to which I have referred was drawn up, I was
satisfied that such a situation would be prevented by the new language.413
Note well the senators' disdain for the Motorola decision. Because
rejection of Tower-I could have been construed as approval of Motorola,
senators went out of their way to express their disapproval' of that deci-
sion. This disapproval is clear in the comments of Senator Case, who
opened his remarks by saying, "I feel certain that no Member of the
Senate disagrees with the views of the Senator from Texas [Tower] con-
cerning the Motorola case"414 and later added:
I want it to be clearly understood, so far as I am concerned-and I
believe I speak for all members of the committee, the captains, and the
leadership--that our position against this amendment and the vote we
shall cast against it do not mean approval of the Motorola case or that
the bill embodies anything like the action taken by the examiner in that
case.415
The Senate believed that the Motorola decision could not be repeated
under Title VII, even if no specific language were added to the bill. We
have seen that the Senate was unaware of job relatedness. We have also
seen that the Senate intended 'that the adverse impact of a test would not
make it illegal. Therefore, the Senate believed that ability tests were not
discriminatory, regardless of whether they had an adverse impact and
regardless of whether they were job related.
The Senate rejected Tower-I.416 Two days later, Senator Tower
called up an amendment originally addressed to the frequency with
which the EEOC should report to Congress and, in conformity with Sen-
ate rules, "modified" the amendment (but in fact completely changed it)
to address testing. The discussion of Tower-II was brief. Senator Tower
410. Id. at 13,504.
411. /d. The language that was thought to protect ability tests was "bona fide. . . merit sys-
tem." This point, which was implied by Senators Humphrey and Miller on June lIth, was expressly
stated by Senator Miller on June 12th. Id. at 13,651.
412. /d. at 13,504.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 13,503.
415. /d. at 13,504.
416. Id. at 13,505.
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reported that it was similar to Tower-I, "which was, I believe, agreed
upon in principle. But the language was not drawn as carefully as it
should have been. It is my understanding that the present language has
been cleared through the Attorney General, the leadership, and the pro-
ponents of the bill."417 Senator Humphrey confirmed this report by say-
ing that Tower-II had been examined by interested senators, who found
it in accord with the purpose of Title VII, and by asking that the amend-
ment be adopted.418 It was adopted, by a voice vote,419and it became the
final clause of the first sentence of section 703(h).
Why was Tower-II adopted after Tower-I had been rejected only
two days before? The answer is obvious: the objections were overcome.
One objection was that Tower-I would have protected a professionally
developed test even if it were purposefully used to discriminate. The pro-
viso in Tower-II ("provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate") satis-
fied this objection.
The other objection was that the amendment was unnecessary be-
cause ability tests did not fall within the definition of discrimination.
Nothing in Tower-II or in the colloquy between Senators Humphrey and
Tower before the amendment's adoption answers this objection. Theoret-
ically, the amendment remained unnecessary. Practically, however, the
amendment had become a necessity. Thirty-eight senators voted in favor
of Tower-I,42O and three senators who were absent when Tower-I was
voted upon favored it.421 Fifteen of these 41 senators were proponents of
the civil rights bill,422 and three of them were co-captains of other titles
of the bill.423 Thus, the quantity and quality of the support for Tower-I
were significant. Forty-one senators could not be ignored, especially be-
cause the opponents of Tower-I agreed with its purpose of protecting
ability tests.
Other than the proviso to Tower-II, the major difference between
417. Id. at 13,724.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 13,505.
421. Senators Ellender, Fullbright, and Robertson were absent but would have voted for Tower-
I; they were paired with Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and
Daniel B. Brewster of Maryland, each of whom withheld his vote against the amendment because his
absent pair would have voted for it. Id. at 13,505. A fourth absent senator, Herbert S. Walters of
Tennessee, also probably would have voted for Tower I. He voted in favor of Senator Ervin's motion
to delete Title VII, id. at 13,085, and against the entire civil rights bill, id. at 14,511. Senator Wal-
ters, however, was not counted in the numbers in the text.
422. They voted for the civil rights bill six days later. Compare the list of voters for Tower-I, id.
at 13,505, with the list for the bill. Id. at 14,511.
423. The co-captains were: Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky for Title IV, Senator
Cotton for Title VI, and Senator Roman L. Hruska of Nebraska for Title II. Id. at 6528 (statement
of Sen. Humphrey). Curiously, Senator Cotton eventually voted against the bill. Id. at 14,511.
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the two versions of the amendment was the omission from Tower-II of
the language limiting protection to tests that are "designed to determine
or predict whether such individual is suitable or trainable with respect to
his employment in the particular business or enterprise." The Supreme
Court claimed this language required tests to be job related. If so, why
was it omitted? The proponents of Title VII read the amendment so
carefully that they discovered a tiny loophole: prejudiced employers
might discover a way to use a professional test illegitimately. If these
vigilant senators believed that the omitted language contained the words
that limited protection to valid tests, and if these same sentators had in-
tended to outlaw adverse impact and to create an exception for valid
tests, would they have approved Tower-II without the operative words?
Not likely. More likely, the senators knew nothing of job relatedness,
and they intended to outlaw only disparate treatment. They voted in
favor of Tower-II, minus the quoted language from Tower-I, because (ex-
cept for the guarantee against perversion of a legitimate test) they saw no
difference between the two versions of the amendment. It protected pro-
fessionally developed ability tests, such as Motorola's Test No. 10, that
were selected and administered in good faith. Although Congress may
have realized that such tests can be imperfect, it never thought they were
discriminatory .
After the Senate passed the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute for H.R.
7152,424 the bill was sent to the House of Representatives. Representa-
tive Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and the leading
Democratic spokesperson for the civil rights bill in the lower chamber,
testified before the House Rules Committee on the changes made by the
Senate. Of the Tower amendment, he said it "validates nondiscrimina-
tory ability tests given by employers. . . . I take it that would be per-
mitted anyhow. . . ."425 He made much the same remark on the floor
of the House immediately before it voted to accept the Senate's amend-
ments.426 Thus, the House shared the Senate's understanding that the
Tower amendment was meant to protect professionally developed ability
tests that are selected and administered with no intent to discriminate.
The errors of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Motorola debates
and Tower amendment are now evident. All senators disapproved of
Motorola and wanted to ensure the use of fairly administered ability tests,
regardless of their adverse impact. Representatives and senators were
unaware of test validation; they intended to protect all ability tests, not
merely job-related tests. The text of Tower-I was not limited to job-re-
lated tests; rather, it would have protected tests designed to select suita-
424. Id.
425. Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, Hearings on H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1964).
426. 110 CONGo REC. 15,896 (1964).
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ble or trainable employees, irrespective of whether such tests achieved
their goals. Congress's unawareness of test validity and Senator Tower's
failure to discuss it as he argued for his amendment prove that the text of
the amendment meant what it said, not something else. Indeed, if
Tower-I were in fact limited to valid tests, the proponents of Title VII
would never have allowed the language effecting this limitation to be
omitted from Tower-II. On the assumption that any professionally de-
veloped test will be designed to select suitable or trainable employees,
Tower-II was seen as identical to its ancestor except in the former's pro-
viso against perversion of legitimate tests.
Accordingly, the argument that Congress intended to outlaw ad-
verse impact because section 703(h) protects only job-related tests is
without support.427 The section was meant to protect all professionally
developed ability tests that are administered in good faith, regardless of
their adverse impact. The debates on the Motorola case and the Tower
amendment, therefore, stand as powerful evidence that Congress did not
include adverse impact in Title VII's definition of discrimination. Con-
gress knew tests can have an adverse impact, yet specifically protected
them.428
Adverse impact was like pornography: few if any legislators could
define it, but they knew it when they saw it, and every time they saw it,
they rejected it. Seniority systems, ability tests, and nepotism in unions
are practices that have an adverse impact on blacks, yet Congress in-
tended that each of these practices be lawful under Title VII. In the face
of this intent, no argument can be sustained that Congress intended to
outlaw adverse impact.
8. Non-congressional sources
Proving a negative is difficult, and resort to unconventional argu-
ment becomes inevitable. We have scoured the Congressional Record for
evidence of whether Congress intended to enact, or was even aware of,
adverse impact. Although virtually all of the evidence points in the same
427. The contradictory argument is supported. Tower-I was considered unnecessary because
tests used in good faith were not outlawed by the bill. Also, Tower-! was dangerous because it
would have protected tests used in bad faith. Congress's focus was exclusively on the employer's
state of mind, and this fact indicates that Congress meant to prohibit only disparate treatment.
428. An additional instance of express protection of adverse impact in Title VII is § 712, which
reads, "Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State,
territorial, or local law creating special rights or preference for veterans." Because the overwhelm-
ing majority of veterans are men, veterans' preference laws have an adverse impact on women.
This instance may be less important than nepotism, seniority, and ability tests. The debates
paid little attention to sex discrimination, so the adverse impact of veterans' preference may have
gone unnoticed. Also, Congress's special regard for veterans may have outweighed a general desire
to outlaw adverse impact. Nevertheless, § 712 stands as an additional instance of congressional
protection of practices with an adverse impact.
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direction, doubts may persist. Congress's definition of discrimination in-
cluded motive; a comment about an aspect of adverse impact was not
made when, with the benefit of hindsight, the comment should have been
made; a widely shared understanding that certain conduct would be law-
ful under the bill is inconsistent with an intent to adopt adverse impact;
express language was adopted to protect forms of behavior that are obvi-
ous examples of adverse impact: each of these arguments, except the
first, is essentially counterfactual, and all rest on the premise that Con-
gress acted in an intellectually consistent way. But perhaps Congress
wrote an act that is internally inconsistent, and perhaps representatives
and senators made ill-informed or ill-considered statements during de-
bate; legislators are human beings, after all. Because of these possibili-
ties, we must buttress our discussion with an examination of non-
congressional sources. The argument will partake of the same form-
ability testing was approved, only intentional discrimination was disap-
proved; but the breadth, authority, and unanimity of these sources will
combine to demonstrate that Congress did not intend to enact the ad-
verse impact definition of discrimination.
a. Sources of Which Congress Might Have Known
Of significance rivaling the Interpretative Memorandum and House
committee reports for understanding Title VII are the reports of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. Many provisions of H.R.
7152 originated as recommendations of the Commission,429 and reports
of the Commission were frequently cited by the legislators.43o The Com-
mission's 1961 report ran to five volumes;431 the third volume, entitled
Employment, devoted 248 + xii pages to employment discrimination,
but said nothing about adverse impact or related issues. Tests were not
ignored, however; there was comment on civil service hiring procedures,
which involved testing. But rather than inquire whether civil service
tests excluded proportionately more blacks than whites or whether the
tests had been validated, the Commission focused only on the disparate
treatment fostered by the "rule of three," under which any of the top
three scorers on a test could be selected. "If the hiring agency discovers
that one is a Negro, it may hire one of the others. If all are Negroes, it
may. . . request more names or fill the job by transfer, reinstatement, or
promotion. "432 The Commission also discussed in detail a settlement
429. Tables showing the provisions of H.R. 7152 that originated as recommendations of the
Civil Rights Commission appear at 110 CONGo REC. 6970-71 (1964). Another table showing the
impact of the Commission appears at id. at 698-99.
430. See, e.g., id. at 6543 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). See a/so S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., 10 (1963).
431. 1961 REPORT, supra note 275.
432. Id. at 39-40.
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agreement over claims of discrimination involving the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation. The agreement, which President Kennedy called a mile-
stone, contained affirmative action obligations such as seeking out minor-
ity candidates and establishing vocational training programs, but said
nothing about adverse impact; nowhere in the agreement was the em-
ployer called upon to determine the effect of its selection criteria on
blacks and the job relatedness of those criteria.433 Likewise, the findings
of the Commission said nothing about adverse impact,434 and the recom-
mendations of the Commission were equally silent on this score.435
Civil Rights '63 was the title of the Civil Rights Commission's 1963
report. It devoted nineteen pages to employment discrimination, but did
not mention adverse impact or related issues. Instead, the report noted
the increasing displacement of human workers by machines and stressed
the need to train blacks in marketable skills.436 There is no evidence that
the Civil Rights Commission adopted, or was even aware of, the adverse
impact definition of discrimination. Indeed, the evidence shows the
Commission was altogether innocent of adverse impact.437 And if the
Civil Rights Commission knew nothing of this definition of discrimina-
tion, how probable can it be that Congress knew of the definition and
wrote it into law?
A few other sources of which Congress may have been aware-all
silent on adverse impact-may be cited. President Kennedy established
the President's Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and the
commission issued its report in November of 1963.438 The commission
instituted the "Plans for Progress" program, which was designed as a
model of how to achieve equal employment opportunity.439 The model
plan called on employers to engage in affirmative action like recruiting
minority applicants, informing supervisors of the goal of utilizing minor-
ity workers, and identifying employees with potential for advancement;
but the model plan did not call for developing job-related selection crite-
ria or avoiding criteria with an adverse impact on blacks.44O
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433. Id. at 77-80.
434. Id. at 157-61.
435. Id. at 161-64.
436. U.S. COMMISSIONON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1963 REPORT 73.
437. The report discussed two job retraining programs in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Id. at 86-
87. More blacks than whites failed the qualifications tests for some courses, and there were many
more times white than black participants in the programs. These programs, therefore, were similar
to Griggs: access to the opportunities in question was conditioned on passing tests that proportion-
ately more whites than blacks passed. If adverse impact had been known to the Commission, would
it not have inquired whether the qualifications were valid?
438. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT].
439. Id. at 108.
440. Id. at 102. Perhaps the President's Commission was not far from these notions. Its vice
chair, Hoban. Taylor, pointed out that minorities receive inferior education, which "leads to inability
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Congress may also have been aware of federal attempts to gain entry
for blacks into apprenticeship programs. In the Federal Register of Octo-
ber 23, 1963, the Secretary of Labor published proposed rules regarding
apprenticeship programs.441 The key rule required "selection of appren-
tices on the basis of qualifications alone, in accordance with objective
standards. "442 This rule was interpreted to allow selection on the basis of
such criteria as aptitude tests, high school diplomas, grades, and previous
experience. Although each criterion would probably have disqualified
proportionately more blacks than whites, the rules accepted these criteria
without requiring their validation against success in the specific appren-
ticeship program or the ultimate job.443 Clearly, the Department of La-
bor had no notion of adverse impact as these rules were written. Rather,
the Department was grappling for a way to get blacks into programs
from which they had been excluded wholesale. Objective criteria were
perceived as the way to overcome prejudicial admissions policies. Objec-
tive criteria can do this; they can defeat disparate treatment. That they
open the door to adverse impact was not appreciated at the time.
Two final sources of which Congress may have been aware as it de-
liberated the civil rights bill were Executive Order 10,925444and the reg-
ulations issued pursuant to the order by the President's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity.445 The order and regulations required
nearly all private firms that contracted with the federal government to
agree not to discriminate against applicants or employees because of race,
but were silent on adverse impact. As with all of the other sources we
have examined, the executive order and enforcing regulations indicate
that Congress neither knew of nor intended to enact the adverse impact
definition of discrimination.
b. Sources Published Shortly After the Enactment of Title VII
Nor did the contemporary commentators believe that Title VII in-
cluded adverse impact. Rather, the commentators believed the Act out-
lawed only intentional discrimination based on prejudice. Prejudice was
defined broadly enough to include good-faith generalizations about the
ability of blacks to work satisfactorily. Employers who refused to hire a
black because of the beliefs that whites are better employees or that fel-
low employees or customers would not accept a black were acting out of
to qualify at the college or job-training level. These facts, in turn, lead to inability to qualify for job
opportunity." Id. at 133-34. Perceiving the causal links on which Griggs relied, Mr. Taylor was
only one step short of challenging the validity of criteria for obtaining jobs.
441. 28 Fed. Reg. ll,313 (1963).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 11,315.
444. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
445. Id. at 6579, amended by 28 Fed. Reg. 9812.
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prejudice as surely as were employers who refused to hire a black because
of racial animosity. Although we cannot comment on every author who
wrote on Title VII in the middle and late 1960s, we can review several
important works in which adverse impact would logically have been dis-
cussed if it had been known.
The leading discussion of Title VII's legislative history was written
by Francis Vaas.446 He said nothing about adverse impact or related is-
sues. In fact, as he commented on the unsuccessful attempts to add the
word "solely" to the Act, Mr. Vaas implied the belief that motive was an
essential element of the definition of discrimination:
For an unfair [unlawful] employment practice to exist, what must be the
causal nexus or relationship between the improper motive and the overt
act? Must the improper motive be the dominant factor, a substantial
contributing factor or merely a factor leading to the overt act? The an-
swers to these questions await the clarification of the law by administra-
tive practice and judicial decision.447
That motive might be irrelevant never occurred to this author.448
Carl Rachlin, General Counsel of the Congress of Racial Equality,
wrote a provocative discussion of the Tower amendment.449 He believed
that general ability tests like Test No. 10 were unfair to blacks;45Ohe also
asserted that some employers administered very difficult entrance exami-
nations to applicants451 and that other employers imposed "artificially
high irrelevant standards designed to exclude Negroes,"452 for example,
requiring a high school diploma of employees who perform menial
tasks.453 Then Mr. Rachlin implied that the effect of a test that excluded
blacks, rather than the employer's intent, should be the legally relevant
factor.454 Further, Mr. Rachlin urged that, when an employer demands
the right to use tests, they should "be directed to specific, job-related
446. Vaas, supra note 210.
447. Id. at 456-57.
448. Nor did the possibility occur to Richard Berg, who wrote another discussion of the legisla-
tive history of Title VII. Commenting on the addition of the word "intentionally" to § 706(g), Mr.
Berg said:
Its effect, if any, is questionable. Discrimination is by nature intentional. It involves both
an action and a reason for the action. To discriminate "unintentionally" on grounds of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin appears a contradiction in terms. For this
reason Senator Humphrey described the insertion of "intentionally" as "a clarifying
change. . . . It means simply that the respondent must have intended to discriminate."
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,31 BROOKLYNL. REV. 62
(1966).
449. Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 RC. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 473
(1966).
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 487 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 488.
Id.
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abilities (as demanding as necessary) rather than general abilities."455
Certainly, Mr. Rachlin understood the elements of the adverse im-
pact definition of discrimination: effects instead of intentions are control-
ling and tests must be job related. But other passages in his article
demonstrate that Mr. Rachlin did not believe Title VII incorporated ad-
verse impact, that Mr. Rachlin was in fact arguing for an improvement
on the work of Congress. First, immediately after he implied that result
should be the defining feature of discrimination, Mr. Rachlin offered an
illustration that reveals more precisely what he had in mind. "For exam-
ple, where the [Ku Klux] Klan is strong among the employees of a plant
and the employer is forced to continue discrimination against his will,
the employer cannot be said to have a wrongful intent. Nevertheless, the
lack of employment opportunity is no less existent."456 Mr. Rachlin evi-
dently believed that Title VII required a specific desire to disadvantage
black workers. The employer dominated by the Klan means to deny jobs
to blacks, and his reason is their race; the only sense in which he can be
said to lack wrongful intent is that he has no desire to do what he is
forced by his employees to do. If Mr. Rachlin believed the Act required
a desire to disadvantage, he could not have believed it incorporated ad-
verse impact. Even if he believed Congress intended the Act to capture
the employer dominated by the Klan, Mr. Rachlin's view of Title VII
was still a far cry from adverse impact.
Second, the thrust of Mr. Rachlin's article was to overcome a prob-
lem created by the Tower amendment. The problem began with Test
No. 10. Mr. Rachlin believed it was not a good test; a "reputable indus-
trial psychologist" said that "very few psychologists competent in test
construction and use would defend it."457 Despite its deficiencies, Test
No. 10 was apparently protected by the Tower amendment.458 Here
arose the problem: general intelligence tests like Test No. 10 could easily
be designed to discriminate against blacks, yet superficially appear to be
fair. "What court, when faced by a barrage of expert testimony on both
sides of the question, will be able to decide the intent of the giver of the
test. . . ?,,459 The same sort of problem could arise with other selection
criteria, such as a high school diploma requirement. 460 Congress could
have avoided these problems by omitting the Tower amendment, argued
Mr. Rachlin, but since it is in the Act, the best solution is to accept that
all general intelligence tests are biased against blacks and to "interpret"
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 486.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 487-88.
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Title VII as permitting only job-related tests.461 Thus, it is evident that
Mr. Rachlin did not believe Congress required tests to be job-related;
indeed, it was Congress's failure to protect only job-related tests that cre-
ated the problem Mr. Rachlin attempted to resolve.
Finally, Mr. Rachlin claimed the Tower amendment was an obstacle
to the enforcement of Title VII; he characterized the amendment as "a
mass of ambiguities, due partly to poor drafting, partly to the refusal of
the Legislature to investigate sufficiently the complex problems created
by ability and aptitude testing, and partly (one hesitates to suggest) to
something less than legislative good will."462 However long he may have
hesitated, Mr. Rachlin did bring himself to suggest that the purpose of
the Tower amendment was less than benign, and the suggestion is signifi-
cant. A writer who believed that Title VII defined discrimination in
terms of effects and required tests to be job related would not have under-
mined his own cause by calling the relevant language in the Act ambigu-
ous and impugning the motives of its author. Thus, although Mr.
Rachlin unquestionably knew everything one has to know in order to
understand adverse impact, his article is evidence that Congress did not
intend to write this definition into law.
Michael Sovern of Columbia Law School, whose book on racial dis-
crimination in employment was mentioned above,463 was a leading
scholar of labor law. In addition to a chapter on state FEP legislation,
his book contained chapters on Title VII, the presidential executive or-
ders, the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts, and other
topics. Nowhere was adverse impact discussed. Moreover, Professor
Sovern made statements he could not have made if he believed Title VII
outlawed adverse impact. For example, in connection with the Tower
amendment, he said:
many ability tests require a high degree of literacy when the job being
tested for does not. A common example is the written examination for a
job requiring manual skills. The marginally literate applicant is likely to
lose the job to a better educated competitor who may not be as good at
the job itself. That Title VII permits employers to use such examina-
tions, provided that they are "not designed, intended or used to discrimi-
nate because of race," etc., should not prevent those administering the
Act from seeking to educate and persuade employers to use tests better
suited to their needs and less likely to heap an additional disadvantage on
the Negro product of a segregated school system.464
Later, Professor Sovern commented on discrimination in apprenticeship
programs:
e
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461. Id. at 488.
462. Id. at 490.
463. Sovern, supra note 328.
464. Id. at 73.
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To a large extent, then, equal opportunity in the construction industry
depends on abolition of nepotic apprenticeship selection. Some abolition
is possible under existing law. When. . . a union is shown to be imple-
menting an animus against Negroes along with its preference for rela-
tives, the remedial powers of the state commissions seem ample to strike
down both. . . .
Similarly, if a local can be shown to have excluded Negroes at some
earlier time because of their race, the use of nepotic standards that pre-
serve the effects of that earlier discrimination can fairly be held pro-
scribed by the standard antidiscrimination law. . . .
The standard law against discrimination does not, however, reach
the union that cannot be shown to have engaged in racial discrimination.
Without proof as to how it came to have few or no Negro members, a
local probably cannot be found guilty of racial discrimination for favor-
ing the friends and relations of its members. If Negroes are to gain entry
to the crafts controlled by such locals, legislation going beyond the typi-
cal antidiscrimination law is needed.465
Lest one speculate on whether Professor Sovem believed that Title
VII was "legislation going beyond the typical anti-discrimination law,"
we may note another sentence that appeared on the same page as the
preceding quotation: "And a law that merely prohibits racial discrimina-
tion may not correct this situation: as we suggested above, unless the
local's lack of Negroes is itself attributable to racial discrimination, it is
hard to see how a preference for friends and relatives can be converted
into discrimination because of 'race, creed, color or national origin.' "466
Of course, the adverse impact definition of discrimination easily reaches
the all-while local with a nepotic admissions policy, even if the union
never discriminated in the past and the admissions policy were adopted
and administered in good faith: the policy, though racially neutral on its
face, excludes proportionately more blacks than whites and is not job
related. Clearly, Professor Sovern did not believe that Title VII (or ex-
isting state laws) included adverse impact.
William Gould was a legal scholar who was personally concerned
with the development of a body of law against employment discrimina-
tion. Formerly a consultant to the EEOC (and later a member of the
faculty of the Stanford Law School), Professor Gould wrote several
thoughtful articles towards this end during the 1960's.467 None of these
465. /d. at 188.
466. Id.
467. In addition to the articles discussed in the text above, Professor Gould wrote The Negro
Revolution and the Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 207 (1965); Labor Arbitra-
tion of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969); Black Power in the
Unions: The Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); and Some
Limitations upon Union Discipline under the National Labor Relations Act, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067.
These articles appeared between the enactment of Title VII and the Supreme Court's decision in
Griggs.
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articles demonstrates a belief that Title VII outlawed adverse impact.
Two articles in particular address subjects on which the adverse impact
definition has a significant bearing.
Before examining these articles, let us review a third definition of
discrimination that exists under Title VII. In addition to disparate treat-
ment and adverse impact, there is present effects of past discrimination.
Under this definition, an act that is performed in good faith may be ille-
gal if it gives present force to or preserves the effects of discrimination
that occurred in the past.468 The Supreme Court has dealt a double blow
to the present effects definition, and its continued vitality is doubtful to-
day.469 Nevertheless, in the late 1960's, at the time Professor Gould pub-
lished the articles of interest herein, the present effects definition was
alive and well.
One. of these articles, entitled, Employment Security, Seniority, and
Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,470 was writ-
ten for the purpose of proposing to the EEOC how it should apply Title
VII to seniority systems.471 One might expect that an author who be-
lieved the Act included the adverse impact definition would have dis-
cussed how seniority systems, though neutral on their face, can have a
disproportionate adverse impact on blacks and, but for the express lan-
guage of section 703(h), would violate the Act. In the process, such an
author would have tried to explain away the legislative history which
suggests that Congress never intended to outlaw seniority systems472 and
that Congress considered section 703(h) as a clarification, not an
exception. 473
Professor Gould did part of this when he noted that "seniority is
468. The leading case adopting this definition is Quarles v. Philip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968), in which an employer used to maintain racially segregated departments. Later,
strictly limited numbers of blacks were allowed to transfer into the formerly all-white department.
The court held the employer in violation of Title VII because a black who transferred to a job in the
better-paying white department "would find himself junior to white employees holding less employ-
ment seniority who got their positions by reason of the company's former racially segregated em-
ployment policy." Id. at 514.
469. InUnited Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the Court rigidly applied Title VII's
short limitations period, holding that the present effects of a discriminatory act that was not the
subject of a timely charge of discrimination cannot support a claim. Id. at 558. By extension, the
present effect of an act that occurred before Title VII took effect also cannot support a claim. On the
same day, in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court held a
seniority system is not illegal merely because it preserves the effects of past discrimination. The
principal application of present effects had been to seniority systems. See cases cited in B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 29-45.
470. 13 How. L.J. 1967 [hereinafter cited as Gould, Employment Discrimination].
471. Id. at 4.
472. For example, the language in the Interpretative Memorandum, 110 CONGo REc. 7213
(1964).
473. E.g., 110 CONGo REc. 12,723 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 15,893 (statement of
Rep. McCulloch).
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literally discriminatory per se against minority employment because of its
well-known 'last to be hired, first to be fired' effect. The employed Negro
worker has yet to achieve tenure which is comparable to whites because
of the disproportionate share of unemployment which has been borne by
the former group.,,474 But then he continued:
An attempt to establish a statutory violation on the basis of deprivation
of seniority which is attributable to minority unemployment, however,
would be revolutionary as well as industrially chaotic. Moreover, it runs
counter to the entire thrust of the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act in which Congress demonstrated its hostility to preferential hiring
before even reaching the secondary issue of job priorities. . . . [S]uffice
it to say that neither the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[nor] the courts are likely to be persuaded that seniority accumulated by
white employees where discriminatory hiring policies have existed can be
affected by Title VII.475
This excerpt shows, first, that Professor Gould did not believe that sen-
iority systems were prima facie illegal merely because of their adverse
impact on blacks; and second, that his real objection to seniority systems
was their tendency to preserve the effects of past discrimination. Senior-
ity is an area in which the adverse impact and present effects definitions
overlap; Professor Gould evidently had only the latter in mind.
Later in the article, Professor Gould wrote, "Wherever the effect of
a practice impedes fair employment, the practice must be altered. "476
This sentence seemingly advocated adverse impact but, placed in context,
did not. The context was Professor Gould's concern that grandfather
clauses might be used to prefer whites over blacks; therefore, he argued
that Title VII had to be read to preclude an employer from using lengthy
recall lists compiled before the Act took effect.477 Thus, the sentence just
quoted was not a plea for the adverse impact definition of discrimination,
but an admonition that the EEOC must not condone the present effects
of intentional pre-Act discrimination. That this was Professor Gould's
purpose is clear from the following paragraph, which concluded the sec-
tion of the article in which all of the foregoing quotations from his article
appeared:
Thus, either one or more of a number of elements must be evidenced
in the record. First. . . the fact that one race predominates to the near
exclusion of another in a particular job or department is highly suspi-
cious. This would seem to be a "result" of an intention to discriminate
and, as indicated above, it may be often difficult to tell if the discrimina-
tion is in seniority rather than in hiring. The case would become easier if
it could be shown that a company had refused to considera Negro appli-
474. Gould, Employment Discrimination, supra note 470, at 8.
475. Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
476. Id. at to.
477. Id. at 9-10.
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cant for advancement or that a union had abritrarily refused to press
grievances about the same matter.478
This paragraph focused so completely on intent as to eliminate any doubt
that Professor Gould believed motive was an element of the definition of
discrimination, even if the motive infected only pre-Act conduct.
The other of Professor Gould's late 1960's articles that deserves our
attention is Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and
Its Implications.479 As its title suggested, this article dealt with the
courts' treatment of racial discrimination and seniority systems. Thus,
the article was a logical successor to the one we have just examined,
which dealt with how the EEOC should address the same problem. As
in the earlier article, Professor Gould's primary concern was the way in
which seniority systems can preserve the effects of past discrimination
against black workers:
Congress was anxious to make Title VII apply prospectively, and the
legislative history did not specifically discuss whether new seniority
agreements had to provide Negro employees with seniority credits that
they might have obtained in a white department but for past discrimina-
tory hiring and transfer practices. If Congress intended to bring into be-
ing an integrated work force, however, and not merely to create a paper
plan meaningless to Negro workers, the only acceptable legislative intent
on past discrimination is one that requires unions and employers to root
out the past discrimination embodied in presently nondiscriminatory sen-
iority arrangements so that black and white workers have equal job ad-
vancement rights. If this was not the congressional intent, questions
concerning the constitutionality of Title VII are raised.48O
As in the earlier article, Professor Gould did not maintain that a
seniority system is illegal simply because it works proportionately greater
hardship on blacks than on whites; he maintained only that a seniority
system is illegal if it preserves the effects of past discrimination. The
difference is important for our purposes, as a hypothetical case can illus-
. trate. Suppose in 1966 an employer opened a plant in a labor market
that was half black and half white. The plant needed highly skilled
workers. The employer hired without regard to race but, because few
blacks possessed the requisite skills, the initial work force was ninety-five
percent white. As time passed, more blacks acquired the requisite skills,
and by 1978 the work force reflected the racial composition of the com-
munity. Then the depression of 1981-1982 cost the plant half its busi-
ness, and the employer has decided she must layoff workers. If she lays
off according to seniority, more blacks than whites will lose their jobs
because the white employees (some of whom have been with the firm
478. Id. at 12.
479. 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gould, Seniority].
480. Id. at 1042 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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since it opened) have more years of service. In this case, the black em-
ployees cannot be said to suffer from the present effects of past discrimi-
nation, as this employer never discriminated, and the argument advanced
by Professor Gould would avail them naught. Yet the black employees
would certainly feel a disproportionate adverse impact, as more blacks
than whites would be out ofwork.481 The point is that the present effects
and adverse impact definitions of discrimination are different, and Pro-
fessor Gould advanced only the former.
Again as in the earlier article, Professor Gould continued to believe
that intent was an element of the definition of discrimination. Consider
these statements:
All that Quarles says is that department organization has thwarted the
advance of black workers on their own merits. Should this "effect" have
been enough to establish discriminatory intent under the statute?482
* * * *
The position of the defendant in H.K. Porter is not more meritorious
because Negroes could move up in their own departments without trans-
fers. If anything, these "gains" establish discriminatory intent more
clearly than in Quarles.483
Professor Gould would surely have advocated adverse impact if he
thought it was outlawed by Title VII, for adverse impact sweeps broadly
and can help many more minorities than present effects can (especially as
we move further from pre-Act events). Professor Gould did not advo-
cate adverse impact because, in all likelihood, he believed-along with
practically everyone else-that intent was an element of the definition of
discrimination. By identifying the requisite intent in pre-Act conduct
that had post-Act effects, this commentator could justify the present ef-
fects definition, but adverse impact cannot be extruded from this formu-
lation.484 Thus, Professor Gould stands as another example of a
knowledgeable and committed scholar who showed no signs of believing
that Title VII incorporated adverse impact.
A comment published in the University of Chicago Law Review in
1965485indicates the author believed that intent was an element of the
definition of discrimination under Title VII.
Proof of Intent. Title VII . . . explicitly requires proof of intent to
discriminate. This stipulation was incorporated into the bill late in the
Senate debate when amendments to the wording of sections 706(g) and
481. Cf American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) (holding that a bona fide sen-
iority system established after the effective date of Title VII is protected by § 703(h), even though the
system has an adverse impact on blacks).
482. Gould, Seniority, supra note 479, at 1052.
483. !d. at 1057.
484. Id. at 1063.
485. Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Amendment of 1964,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430 (1965).
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707 were offered from the floor. The additions were accepted only be-
cause the bill's sponsors understood them to be surplusage since section
703 defines an unlawful employment practice an as action taken "because
of' the forbidden considerations. . . .
The intent requirement may serve a valuable function as an affirma-
tive defense, for even if the plaintiff has been subjected to de facto dis-
crimination the defendant should prevail if he can prove that the
discrimination was not purposeful. 201
201. If the requirement of intent had not been added to the bill a strong
case could have been made that since the statute's general policy is reme-
dial and preventative, rather than punitive, relief for the plaintiff would
be appropriate even for unintended violations. . . . But because of the
amendment, if a defendant can prove affirmatively that the discrimina-
tion alleged was not purposeful, the decision should be in his favor even if
discrimination did in fact occur.486
We may disagree with the author in a minor regard: a defendant need
never prove affirmatively that his "de facto" discrimination was not pur-
poseful; the burden of proving intent is on the plaintiff at all times.487
Nevertheless, we must concur in the author's interpretation of the Sen-
ate's purpose in adding the word "intentionally" to the Act. Even if the
reader does not agree on this score, however, the present point is proved:
an author writing immediately after Title VII was enacted believed that
intent was an element of the definition of discrimination and that "de
facto" discrimination was not outlawed.
Irving Kovarsky published Testing and the Civil Rights Act in
1969.488 His explicit concern was employment tests that were uninten-
tionally discriminatory, that is, tests on which whites performed better
than blacks, although blacks were equally good performers on the job.489
Professor Kovarsky was well-informed on tests and searched for ways
their negative effect on black employment could be minimized. If he had
believed that Title VII incorporated adverse impact, surely he would
have discussed it, for its bearing on testing is unmistakable. Yet through-
out the article Professor Kovarsky demonstrated a belief that the Act
could only be violated by intentional conduct:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor had its origin in negligence cases as
an aid to a plaintiff injured by a defendant having exclusive control over
the instrumentality causing the accident. The use of a similar evidentiary
aid seems desirable where the motive of an employer, who holds tight
control over the testing process, is questioned. Fair employment does not
involve the proving of negligence but rather the establishing of intent.
486. Id. at 459-60.
487. Texas of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
488. Kovarsky, Testing the Civil Rights Act, 15 How. L.J. 227 (1969).
489. /d. at 228-33.
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But the technique used to shift the burden of proof seems apropos in a
fair employment controversy centered about a test. 490
* * * *
An employer using an unvalidated test is possibly negligent, but negli-
gence is not the same as engaging in an intentional malpractice. Gross
negligence can be treated as an intentional wrong in a tort or criminal
case, but facts to establish gross negligence must be presented. Relying
on an unverified test should be treated in the same manner as gross negli-
gence and considered as an intentional wrong.491
* * * *
If an employer intentionally uses a test which is unrelated to the job,
Title VII is presumably violated. On the other hand, if an irrelevant test
is used unintentionally, there is doubt as to whether an employer can be
held legally responsible. The Guidelines on Employment Testing Proce-
dures refer to tests that are based on "specific job-related criteria" and
concern tests "professionally developed in one situation" that may be
misused "in another situation." The "fatherly" advice coming from
EEOC does not fit the situation when an irrelevant test is innocently
given. If the same irrelevant test is given to white and Negro job candi-
dates, an intentional violation cannot be established. 492
* * * *
Because proof of an intent to discriminate is unnecessary to the adverse
impact definition, Professor Kovarsky stood with the numerous other
scholars who manifested no belief that this definition was part of Title
VII.
The last and most important article we will examine in this context
is Alfred Blumrosen's The Duty of Fair Recruitment under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.493 Professor Blumrosen was (and remains) a recog-
nized scholar of labor and employment discrimination law at the Rutgers
University School of Law; in addition, he served as Chief of Conciliations
for the EEOC from 1965 to 1967. Therefore, what he proposed, and did
not propose, may fairly be taken as representative of the thinking of the
concerned and informed activists who waged the battle against discrimi-
nation during the 1960's.
If Professor Blumrosen had believed that adverse impact was dis-
criminatory under Title VII, this article was an ideal forum to assert that
belief. The first sentence of the article indicated its focus: "Discrimina-
tion in recruitment and hiring is the chief measurable evil against which
the modern law of employment discrimination is directed."494 Recruit-
490. [d. at 236.
491. [d. at 241 (footnote omitted).
492. [d. at 244-45 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
493. Blumrosen, The Duty of Pair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 11 RUTGERS
L. REV. 465 (1968).
494. [d.
1985] GRIGGS' FOLL Y 563
ment and hiring are areas in which selection criteria can operate
powerfully to disadvantage blacks. Moreover, Professor Blumrosen was
well aware that facially neutral recruiting and hiring mechanisms could
favor whites over blacks. Indeed, long before many others did, he under-
stood how adverse impact operates. For example, he discussed word-of-
mouth recruiting. It tends to preserve the racial composition of a work
force because "circles of friendship and residence are segregated by race,
[and] the employees will refer whites because they know them or know of
them. But it is unlikely that the employees will know a Negro. . . ."495
Another apparently neutral practice is refusing to accept applications ex-
cept when jobs are available; but when word-of-mouth recruiting com-
bines with refusing to keep applications on file, blacks can be
disadvantaged because white employees will let their white acquaintances
know when to apply.496 Professor Blumrosen appreciated that blacks
have less education and experience than whites, so that "if the employer
establishes educational and prior experience standards as conditions for
employment, he will necessarily exclude from consideration proportion-
ately more Negroes than whites.497
In spite of his consciousness that facially neutral practices can have
adverse effects on blacks, Professor Blumrosen did not argue that such
practices were unlawful in and of themselves. He did not argue that Title
VII defined discrimination in terms of effects. Rather, he maintained
that we can reasonably expect employers to be aware of the effect of their
behavior, and we can hold them accountable for what they are aware of:
Where an employer has a segregated labor force and uses recruitment
methods which perpetuate it, it is fair to assume that he is aware of the
consequences of his recruitment system.498
* * * *
The awareness of the consequences of the recruitment system establishes
the intent necessary for judicial proceedings under Title VII.499
* * * *
[W]hile the basic work force is all white, the system [word-of-mouth
recruiting] is discriminatory. An employer who uses it is "failing to hire"
[within the meaning of § 703(a)(1)] from the available labor market be-
cause he is restricting his recruitment efforts to the white labor market.
The foreseeable, and hence intended, consequence of his action is the re-
striction of his labor force to whites only. 500
* * * *
Under the circumstances described here [blacks having less educa-
495. Id. at 477.
496. Id. at 482.
497. Id. at 496.
498. Id. at 474.
499. Id. at 475.
500. Id. at 478.
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tion and experience than whites], with employer awareness of the exclu-
sionary consequences of the use of educational and experience
requirements, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination arise
and shift the burden of explanation to the employer. . . . The employer
whose use of such criteria has produced or contributed to a segregated
labor force may be unable to demonstrate a rational relation between the
standard and the work to be done. In that case, his action constitutes
discrimination, and his standards must be suspended.501
Professor Blumrosen clearly believed that motive was an element of the
definition of discrimination. His emphasis on employers' awareness (or
presumable awareness) of the effect of their conduct demonstrates this
belief. He identified a serious problem and offered a solution: the prob-
lem was use of selection criteria with an adverse impact, and the solution
was inferring intent from reasonably foreseeable effects; but he never
abandoned the fundamental belief that Title VII requires proof of intent.
We may laud Professor Blumrosen for his fidelity to the intent of Con-
gress. We may also praise him and Professor Kovarsky for the quality of
their solution, which we advocate below.
All of the leading contemporary commentators on the Civil Rights
Act believed that Title VII prohibited only intentional discrimination. In
reference to issues to which adverse impact clearly applied, none of the
commentators considered adverse impact part of the definition of dis-
crimination. The same statements are true of the Civil Rights Commis-
sion and of the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity. Executive Order 10,925, which prohibited discrimination
by government contractors, did not prohibit adverse impact, nor did the
Secretary of Labor's rules on apprenticeship programs. This evidence
completes the proof that Congress did not intend Title VII to include the
adverse impact definition of discrimination.
9. Congress's Definition of Discrimination
The only definition of discrimination Congress intended to write
into Title VII was disparate treatment. As Justice Rehnquist wrote in
General Electric v. Gilbert:
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the
time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Four-
teenth Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long his-
tory of judicial construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate. . . because of [race or] sex. . . ," without
further explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it
meant something different from what the concept of discrimination has
traditionally meant. 502
501. [d. at 496-97.
502. 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976).
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This statement correctly reflects the intent of the Eighty-eighth Con-
gress. The Civil Rights Act contains no explicit definition of discrimina-
tion because everyone agreed that it meant what it had meant for many
years.
This agreement is significant because opponents of the civil rights
bill often criticized it for lacking a definition of discrimination.503 Sena-
tors favoring the bill offered their own definitions, which invariably re-
flected disparate treatment and never adverse impact. These offers are
unusually important because H.R. 7152 was placed on the floor of the
Senate without benefit of committee report; thus, as Francis Vaas has
observed, "Seldom has similar legislation been debated with greater con-
sciousness of the need for 'legislative history,' or with greater care in the
making thereof, to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the
law."504
Senator Muskie certainly understood discrimination to mean dispa-
rate treatment: "Discrimination in this bill means just what it means
anywhere: a distinction in treatment given to different individuals be-
cause of their race. . . . The term is used in a number of Federal stat-
utes without definition. . .. And as a practical matter, we all know
what constitutes racial discrimination."505 What we all knew in 1964
was that discrimination meant disparate treatment. Some forward-think-
ing persons may have thought that discrimination included adverse im-
pact, but Senator Muskie was plainly not one of them.
Nor were Senators Clark and Case. Answering an objection that the
language of the bill was vague and unclear, Senator Clark said: "Dis-
crimination is a word which has been used in State FEPC statutes for at
least 20 years, and has been used in Federal statutes, such as the National
Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, for even a longer
period. To discriminate is to make distinctions or differences in the treat-
ment of employees. . . ."506 The Interpretative Memorandum staked
out the same position: "It has been suggested that the concept of dis-
crimination is vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden
meanings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference
in treatment or favor. . . ."507 The definition of discrimination contem-
plated by this passage is unquestionably disparate treatment. The ad-
verse impact definition is neither clear nor simple, and it is full of hidden
503. 110 Congo Rec. 2560 (statement of Rep. Johansen) (1964); id. at 2613 (statement of Rep.
Alger); id. at 5863-64 (statement of Sen. Eastland); id. at 8428 (statement of Sen. Robertson); id. at
15,873 (1964) (statement of Rep. Wyman). See also the minority report of the House Judiciary
Comm. on H.R. 7152, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 68 (1963).
504. Vaas, supra note 210, at 444. See also 110 CONGo REC. 12,275-76 (1964) (statement of
Sens. Manfield and Dirksen).
505. 110 CONGo REC. 12,617 (1964).
506. Id. at 7218.
507. Id. at 7213.
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meanings for an employer who must measure adverse impact or hire ex-
perts to validate tests.
The word "discrimination" also appears in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. Senators Ervin and Javits disagreed on the desirability of
enacting this title, but both agreed on the meaning of discrimination
under the title. "What is discrimination?" asked the Southerner. "No-
where in the bill is it defined. It is defined in the court cases, and it is
defined in the dictionary. Discrimination of ~hat nature is simply treat-
ing a man of one race differently from a man of another race. That is
how it has been defined."508 The Northerner concurred: "I do not be-
lieve it is a vague standard. I am prepared to support it on the basis of
the many cases which define what discrimination means, in terms of ap-
plying the same state of circumstances to a man of one color as to a man
of another.,,509
Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut had the same defini-
tion in mind when he said:
The purpose of title VI is due to the fact that the Hill-Burton Act
[42 D.S.C. §§ 291 et seq., hospital construction] and the Morrill Act [7
D.S.C. §§ 321 et. seq., land grant colleges]specificallyprovided for sepa-
rate but equal facilities. They made provision for Federal funds to go to
separate but equal installations; furthermore, there are many programs in
the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Labor which led
to exactly the same situation. 510
Of course, racially separate hospitals and colleges are the epitome of dis-
parate treatment.
Other senators shared this understanding of discrimination. Senator
Ervin asked Senator James o. Eastland of Mississippi whether the latter
agreed that "the use of the word 'discrimination' in the context of 'on the
ground of race or color' means treating a man of one race differently
from a man of another race."51l The latter did agree,512 whereupon the
former asked whether the latter agreed "that that is a most vague gener-
alization,"513 indeed, so vague as to amount to an unconstitutional abdi-
cation oflegislative power to the executive agencies.514 Not surprisingly,
the latter agreed again.515 Then Senator Humphrey joined the confabu-
lation. In reply to the objection that the bill delegated power unconstitu-
508. Id. at 5606.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 7102.
511. Id. at 5863. Senator Ervin made this point so frequently that one may wonder whether the
shrewd Southerner knew other definitions were possible and wanted to create a solid record on
which to reject them.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. /d.
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tionally, the Democratic whip pointed to other federal acts which used
the word "discrimination" without further explication, namely, the In-
terstate Commerce Act, the Federal Aviation Act, and the Hill-Burton
Act.516 In reply to the objection that the concept of discrimination was
vague, he said:
[T]here is no foundation for saying that the word "discrimination" has
no precise, legal meaning. The eminent retired Supreme Court Justice,
Mr. Charles A. Whittaker, in the article that was printed in the Congres-
sional Record on March 17, page 5437, observes:
The meaning of the term "discrimination," in its legal sense, is
not different from its dictionary meaning.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines discrimination
as:
A distinction, as in treatment; esp., an unfair or injurious
distinction.
The Senator knows that the word discrimination has been used in
many a court case. What it really means in the bill is a distinction in
treatment. It means a distinction in treatment given to different individu-
als because of their different race, religion, or national origin.
. . .[T]he word "discrimination" has been used repeatedly without
any separate statutory definition because the word "discrimination" is
simply defined. It means "different treatment." That is all it means.517
Three points are evident. First, "discrimination" meant simply dif-
ferent (disparate) treatment. Second, the word was meant to carry the
same meaning in the Civil Rights Act as in other legislation. Third, the
word was used in its ordinary meaning, not in a radical new meaning.
Disparate treatment fits in this matrix perfectly; adverse impact has no
place at all.
It may be argued that it is erroneous to focus so intently on the
definition of the word "discrimination," for the Supreme Court grounded
the Griggs opinion on section 703(a)(2), and this section does not men-
tion discrimination. Rather, the section says an employer may not
"limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way that would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual or employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race. . . ." Did Congress intend section 703(a)(2) to outlaw
adverse impact?518
516. Id. at 5863-64.
517. Id. at 5864.
518. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), Justice Rehnquist implied that
§ 703(a)(I) prohibits disparate treatment, id. at 133, and § 703(a)(2) prohibits adverse impact, id. at
136-37. There is no basis in the legislative history for such a distinction. Indeed, only one legislator
expressed any interest in the meaning of § 703(a)(2), id. at 5614 (statement of Sen. Ervin), and this
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We have seen that the Congressional Record, committee reports, and
transcripts of hearings are barren of references to adverse impact. This
fact alone is sufficient to defeat any argument that section 703(a)(2) was
intended to incorporate adverse impact. Congress could not have written
into law what the legislators knew nothing of.
If section 703(a)(2) does not embody adverse impact, why is the sec-
tion in the Act? The answer lies in the history of employment discrimi-
nation bills presented to Congress. Although many such bills were
introduced before and during World War 11,519none came near success.
After the war, however, the enactment of the Ives-Quinn bill520 in New
York signaled that legislation of this sort was possible, and hundreds of
bills were sponsored in Congress before Title VII was eventually
passed.521 Typical of the clauses defining unlawful conduct in many pre-,
mid-, and early post-war bills were sections 3(a) and (b) of H.R. 229,
introduced by Representative Dawson of Illinois on January 3, 1947:
Sec. 3. (a) It shall be an unfair employment practice for any em-
ployer within the scope of this Act-
(1) to refuse to hire any person because of such person's race,
color, national origin, or ancestry;
(2) to discharge any person from employment because of such
person's race, color, national origin, or ancestry;
(3) to discriminate against any person in compensation or in
other terms or conditions of employment because of such person's
race, color, national origin, or ancestry;
(4) to confine or limit recruitment or hiring of persons for em-
ployment to any employment agency, placement service, training
school or center, labor union or organization, or any other source
that discriminates against persons because of their race, color, na-
tional origin, or ancestry.
(b) It shall be an unfair employment practice for any labor union
within the scope of this Act-
(1) to deny full membership rights and privileges to any per-
son because of such person's race, color, national origin, or ancestry;
(2) to expel from membership any person because of such per-
son's race, color, national origin, or ancestry; or
(3) to discriminate against any member, employer or em-
ployee because of such person's race, color, national origin, or
on only one occasion. Congress understood both sections to prohibit the same kind of conduct,
namely, discrimination-in today's terms, disparate treatment.
519. C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 98 (3d ed. 1974), mentions pre-
war bills. Examples of bills during the war are H.R. 7942 (1942) and S. 101 (1945).
520. 1945 N.Y. Sess. Laws 457.
521. Burnstein & MacLeod, Prohibiting Employment Discrimination: Ideas and Politics in the
Congressional Debate Over Equal Employment Opportunity Legislation. 86 AM. 1. OF SOc. 512. 516.
519 (1980). Prof. Burnstein kindly supplied the author with the list of enforceable bills he compiled.
There were 124 such bills introduced into the House and 200 into the Senate between 1945 and 1964.
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ancestry. 522
Section 3(a) of this bill reads much like section 703(a)(1) of Title VII;
over the years, the language of the earlier section was condensed but not
changed materially (except for section (a)(4), which was dropped when
employment agencies were made directly subject to the law). Section
3(b) also reads much like section 703(c)(1) of Title VII,523 which applies
to labor organizations; again, the later section is a condensation of the
earlier. The important point is that there was no hint of the words
"limit, segregate, or classify" that appear in sections 703(a)(2) and (c)(2)
of Title VII.
Shortly after he was elected to the Eightieth Congress, Irving Ives of
New York (the same of the Ives-Quinn bill) introduced S. 984 into the
Senate.524 Section 5(a) of this bill was conventional; unlawful employ-
ment practices by an employer were defined in terms plainly derived
from the same source as section 3(a) ofH.R. 229.525 But section 5(b) of
Senator Ives' bill was new:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any labor organiza-
tion to discriminate against any individual or to limit, segregate, or class-
ify its membership in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
such individual of employment opportunities, or would limit his employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee or as an applicant for employment, or would affect adversely his
wages, hours, or employment conditions, because of such individual's
race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry.526
This language is unquestionably the source of sections 703(a)(2) and
(c)(2). What was it meant to do? Plainly, it applied only to labor unions,
but, beyond this fact, the Senate hearings on S. 984 are not helpful.527
Senator Ives testified that his bill was patterned after the Ives-Quinn
law;528 but that law contained no language similar to section 5(b), and
Senator Ives did not comment on why the new section was added. Nor
did the first chairman of the New York State Commission Against Dis-
crimination, although he alluded briefly to the addition of section 5(b).529
522. H.R. 229, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONGoREC. 46 (1947).
523. Section 703(c)(1) reads: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organiza-
tion (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any indi-
vidual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 D.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1) (1982).
524. S. 984, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
525. Id. Section 5(a)(1) of S. 984 read: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, reli-
gion, color, national origin, or ancestry."
526. Id.
527. Antidiscrimination in Employment, Hearings on S. 984 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
528. Id. at 7.
529. Henry C. Turner said: "Senate bill 984 is rather largely molded after and expresses the
philosophy sct forth in the Ives-Quinn law, the New York State law against discrimination. So
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Nevertheless, we can identify the purpose of section 5(b), which was
aimed at the way unions disadvantaged blacks, if we keep in mind that S.
984 was introduced in 1947.
The closed shop was sti11legal at the time S. 984 was introduced. 530
A union's refusal to admit black members could prevent an employer
who had no desire to discriminate from hiring blacks. A union shop
clause in a collective bargaining agreement could have the same effect:
why should an employer hire a black if she would have to be discharged
in a few weeks because the union refused to admit her to membership?531
Even unions that accepted black members were free to classify them by
race-for example, by maintaining segregated locals-and this practice
could also have a profound effect on blacks' employment opportunities.
These were not merely possible injuries; exclusion from and segregation
within unions were widespread and injurious. In the 1940s, blacks were
often excluded from a union altogether, even though the union repre-
sented them in collective bargaining, with the result that they had no
voice in the formulation of the union's bargaining position or in the ratifi-
cation or administration of the labor contract. If blacks were admitted to
a union, they were commonly segregated into an auxiliary local and gen-
erally denied the right to participate in union elections. If blacks were
not segregated into an auxiliary local, they were commonly placed at the
bottom of the referral1ist in the hiring hall or restricted by their em-
ployer-without objection from their union-to low-paying, undesirable
jobs.532 Senator Ives was fully aware of the way labor unions treated
blacks. In his report on S. 984 to the Senate, he wrote:
Contrary to the general impression, discrimination in employment is
not confined to certain sections of the country, certain industries, or cer-
tain groups. . . .
Discrimination in employment is practiced by business, by govern-
ment, and by labor unions. It is manifested by a refusal to hire, by a
denial of in-service training or upgrading opportunity, by wage differen-
tials, by the formation of auxiliary unions lacking the usual benefits of
union membership, or by blanket exclusion from such membership.
Discrimination is not only widespread; it has been increasing rapidly
and continuously since the end of the war.
From a statement submitted by Mr. Mike Masaoka, of the Japanese-
closely does it parellel that with the exception, possibly, of one or two of the definitions with respect
to unlawful practices, it might also be said to duplicate it in principle. . . ." Id. at 328.
530. The closed shop was outlawed later that year by § 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
531. The second proviso to § 8(a)(3), added by Taft-Hartley, was meant to eliminate the need to
discharge persons a union unfairly refused to admit to membership. Id. § 158(a)(3).
532. See H. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1944).
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American Citizen's League [to the Senate subcommittee holding hearings
on S. 984]:
Before the war, through the courtesy of several unions, persons
of Japanese ancestry were permitted to organize auxiliary unions, to
pay dues and assessments, but not to enjoy the usual benefits of
union membership. Today in many west-coast localities we are not
even granted the privilege of forming these segregated unions.533
Knowledgeable in the ways of unions and desirous of a law that
would end all unequal treatment of blacks, Senator Ives added section
5(b) to his bill. The section was clearly aimed at a variety of forms of
disparate treatment by unions. In fact, in his report to the Senate, Sena-
tor Ives described unlawful practices by unions as follows: The bill "de-
clares as an unlawful employment practice: . . . (2) by a labor
organization the limitation, segregation, or classification of its member-
ship in any way which would deprive or limit any individual's employ-
ment opportunities. . . ."534 This description did not use the word
"discrimination," indicating quite plainly that the phrase "limit, segre-
gate, or classify" was written to reach the ways in which unions disad-
vantaged blacks. In all probability, therefore, the words on which the
Supreme Court grounded the adverse impact definition were originally
intended to prevent labor unions from engaging in blatant forms of dispa-
rate treatment. Certainly there is no evidence that those words were in-
corporated into S. 984 in order to outlaw "practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation."
S. 984 was not enacted. Thereafter, anti-discrimination bills some-
times used the formula in sections 3(a) and (b) of Representative Daw-
son's bill and sometimes the formula in sections 5(a) and (b) of Senator
Ives's bill. For fifteen years, the phrase "limit, segregate, or classify" was
used only in reference to labor unions. Because the anti-discrimination
bills introduced into succeeding Congresses tracked the language of pre-
ceding bills, we may fairly conclude that his phrase came to have a set-
tled meaning. It was that labor unions would be barred from disparate
treatment such as segregating blacks into auxiliary locals, using segre-
gated referral lists in hiring halls, and the like.535
533. S. REP. No. 951, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
534. Id. at 13.
535. Even after Representative Roosevelt applied the phrase "limit, segregate, or classify" to
employers, other legislators continued to introduce bills that applied the phrase only to labor unions.
For example, Senator Clark sponsored S. 773, introduced on February 11, 1963, which read in
pertinent part:
Sec. 5. (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, or national origin. . . .
(b) It ~hall be an unlawful employment practice for any labor organization to dis-
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Not until the Eighty-seventh Congress did any bill apply "limit, seg-
regate, or classify" to employers. This application occurred in H.R.
10144, introduced by Representative Roosevelt on February 7, 1962.
Section 5(a)(2) of this bill is identical to section 5(a)(2) of H.R. 405 in the
Eighty-eighth Congress, which was also Representative Roosevelt's bill
and which, as we have noted, became Title VII. Except for the classes
protected, sections 5(a)(2) of H.R. 10144 and H.R. 405 are identical to
section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. Similarly, section 5(c)(2) of H.R. 10144 is
identical to section 5(c)(2) of H.R. 405, and, except for the classes pro-
tected, these sections are identical to section 703(c)(2) of Title VII. In-
deed, Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York, chairman of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, stated that Title VII was
essentially Representative Roosevelt's FEP bill of 1962.536 We may read-
ily infer that, with regard to labor unions, the phrase "limit, segregate, or
classify" in H.R. 10144, H.R. 405, and Title VII, meant what the phrase
had always meant, that is, that disparate treatment as practiced by labor
unions was outlawed. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to apply
the adverse impact definition of discrimination to labor unions.
What conclusions may we draw about the application of "limit, seg-
regate, or classify" to employers? Unfortunately, Representative
Roosevelt did not reveal his reasons (or, more precisely, we have found
no record of his reasons) for applying the phrase to employers. Never-
theless, we can infer the Representative's purposes. In the Eighty-sixth
Congress, he had sponsored another equal employment opportunity bill,
H.R. 427. This bill, introduced on January 7, 1959, defined unlawful
practices by employers and unions in terms similar to sections 3(a) and
(b) of Representative Dawson's 1947 bill.53? What happened between
1959 and 1962 to prompt Representative Roosevelt to switch to the
formula of Senator Ives's bill and to apply the phrase "limit, segregate, or
criminate against any individual or to limit, segregate, or classify its membership in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of equal employment opportu-
nities, or would limit his employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee or as an applicant for employment, or would affect adversely his wages,
hours, or employment conditions, because of such individual's race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin.
Note particularly that § 5(b) provided that a union could not "discriminate. . . or. . . limit, segre-
gate, or classify." Thus, a leading proponent of the civil rights bill and a co-captain for Title VII
understood that "limit, segregate, or classify" applied to the way unions committed disparate treat-
ment against blacks. H.R. 427, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1959).
536. 110 CONGo REC. 2551 (1964).
537. Section 5 of H.R. 427 read in relevant part:
UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE DEFINED
Sec. 5 (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, rdigion, color, national origin, or ancestry.
(2) to utilize in the hiring or recruitment of individuals for employment any employ-
ment agency, placement service, training school or center, or labor organization, or any
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classify" to employers? By reconstructing the relevant aspect of the pub-
lic debate on civil rights, particularly during 1959-1962, we can make an
informed guess-a guess that is fully consistent with everything else we
know about the definition of discrimination Congress intended in Title
VII.
It was well known that labor unions as well as employers discrimi-
nated against blacks; we have seen that anti-discrimination bills included
unions from the 1940's onwards. At first, racial discrimination was no
cause for shame and could be freely acknowledged.538 Later, as public
opinion began to shift, unions and employers denied that discrimination
existed.539 Finally, when the civil rights movement was in full gear and
the existence of discrimination could not easily be denied, employers and
unions began to cooperate to preserve their old ways. The cooperation
occurred in the usual adversarial fashion of American labor relations:
employers blamed unions for discrimination,54O unions blamed employ-
ers,541 and the status quo was preserved.542 In industries organized by
craft unions, the employers claimed that they could hire only workers
approved by the unions and that the unions refused to admit blacks into
apprenticeship programs; the unions claimed there was no point in train-
ing black apprentices because they would never be hired by the employ-
ers. In businesses organized by industrial unions, the unions claimed
that they had no power to control hiring practices and that the employ-
other source which discriminates against such individuals because of their race, religion,
color, national origin, 0 [sic] ancestry.
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against,
any individual or any employer because of the race, color, religion, national origin, or
ancestry of any individual;
(2) to cause or attempt to force an employer to discriminate against an individual in
violation of this section. . . .
S. 773, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) (1963).
538. For example, for many years the constitution of the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers expressly excluded blacks. Proposed Federal Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination in
Employment in Certain Areas Because of Race, Color, Religion, National Origin, Ancestry, Age, or
Sex, 1961: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 350-51 (1961) (testimony of Louis Sean) [hereinafter cited as 1961
Hearings].
539. See, e.g., id. at 53-69 (testimony of James Crane); id. at 440-51 (testimony of Milton
Genet).
540. See, e.g., id. at 43-53 (testimony of Joseph Garcia); id. at 666-83 (testimony of Irving
Mendelson).
541. See, e.g., id. at 171 (testimony of Duane Greathouse); id. at 245-46 (testimony of Earl J.
McMahon); id. at 391 (testimony of William E. Pollard).
542. These three phenomena-shameless admission, bold-faced denial, and buck-passing coop-
eration-overlapped one another in time. In 1961 denial and buck passing coexisted in public. See
supra notes 539-41. An example of an admission (though not shameless) was the statement of
George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, that "in the District of Columbia. . . there are local
unions whose membership and whose apprentice rolls are closed to Negro applicants." 1961 RE-
PORT, supra note 275, at 131.
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ers hired only whites; the employers claimed they could not hire blacks
because whites would refuse to work next to blacks. These claims con-
tained enough particles of truth to form a smoke screen for the real truth,
which was that unions and employers wanted blacks to remain an under-
class and that labor and management condoned and abetted each other's
efforts to preserve this status.
But then the Civil Rights Commission and black leadership blew the
smoke away. Devoting seven pages to discrimination in apprenticeship
programs543and twenty-five pages to discrimination by labor unions, 544
the Commission's 1961 report interdicted the vicious circle of self-right-
eous buck passing. Both unions and employers were blamed for the ex-
clusion of blacks from jobs.
Consider apprenticeship training, which was a prime focus of the
report because blacks had long been denied access to skilled jobs. In the
St. Louis area, said the report, 14.5 percent of the residents were non-
white, but less than one-half of one percent of apprentices were non-
white.545 Black participation was similarly low in the cities of Atlanta,
Baltimore, and Detroit and the states of California, New Jersey, and
New York. 546 Who was responsible? In industries organized by craft
unions, craftsmen were trained in formal apprenticeship programs. The
bulk of these programs were operated by joint union and employer com-
mittees.547 It was evident, therefore, that the paucity of black craftsmen
was not the fault of unions alone, but was attributable to both unions and
employers. In industries organized by industrial unions, "management is
primarily responsible because, even in unionized plants, unions seldom
have a voice in the selection of apprentices."548 Of course, in non-union
settings, responsibility for the lack of black trainees belonged exclusively
to employers.
The Commission discussed discrimination in areas other than train-
ing and again made clear that unions and employers were often jointly
responsible. Distinguishing once more between industries organized by
craft unions and industries organized by industrial unions, the 1961 re-
port noted that in the former there were sometimes segregated locals;
blacks worked less than whites because employers hired through the
white locals.549 Where locals were integrated, blacks still encountered
difficulty in being referred by their unions and in being accepted by the
543. Id. at 104-11.
544. !d. at 127-57.
545. Id. at 107.
546. Id. at 107-08.
547. Id. at 105.
548. !d. at 109.
549. [d. at 131.
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employers.55o Unions and employers also discriminated in concert in the
industrial setting. Restrooms and eating facilities were segregated in
some unionized plants, yet there was no indication that the unions were
attempting to eliminate this racial insult.551 Even more important was
the frequently inferior job status of Negro employees in the industrial
plants. Most of the firms interviewed in Atlanta [a Southern city], Balti-
more [a border city], and Detroit [a Northern city] employed substantial
numbers of Negroes. Often, however, Negro employees were found only
in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs.
. . . [S]ome unions in Detroit and Baltimore seem to have adopted a
hands-off policy. . . .
. . . [In Atlanta] Negro employees are confined to unskilled classifi-
cations, principally janitorial and common labor jobs. Unions apparently
are unwilling to try to improve job opportunities for Negroes. For the
most part these unions were confronted with company restrictions on
Negro employment at the time collective bargaining was established.
The departmental or occupational seniority provisions subsequently writ-
ten into collective bargaining agreements have merely served to freeze
preexisting discriminatory patterns. 552
Plainly, in 1961 the Civil Rights Commission assigned responsibility for
the inferior status of blacks to both unions and employers.
Representative Roosevelt was a leading proponent of a law against
employment discrimination, and during the Eighty-seventh Congress he
chaired the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on
Education and Labor. The subcommittee held hearings on employment
discrimination in major cities across the country. Thus, in addition to
the report of the Civil Rights Commission, with which he was surely
familiar, Representative Roosevelt heard considerable testimony during
the latter months of 1961 concerning the joint responsibility of employers
and unions for racial discrimination. In Chicago, for example, he
learned about the Washburne Trade School, a facility for apprentices op-
erated by the city school system. Of more than 2,600 students, only
twenty-six were black, and in seven of the twelve trades there were no
black apprentices at all.553 Who was responsible for this under-
representation of blacks? One might be inclined to blame the unions un-
til the following facts were known: all students in the school were adults,
and they were employed; they were sent to the school at their employer's
expense.554 Students were selected to become apprentices in large part by
the joint apprenticeship committees of unions and employers, though
550. !d. at 132.
551. Id. at 135.
552. Id. at 135-36.
553. 1961 Hearings, supra note 539. at 228 (testimony of Willoughby Abner).
554. !d. ,at 262 (testimony of Louis Newkirk).
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some students were sent directly by employers.555 Accordingly, responsi-
bility for the small number of blacks in the school was attributable to
both employers and unions. Earl J. McMahon, president of the Chicago
& Cook County Building & Construction Trade Council, stated emphati-
cally that "trade unions do not have complete control of the apprentice-
ship programs and it is not a field for unilateral control by our affiliates.
We must work with the employer in the matter of apprentices and re-
sponsibility for the success or failure of the program is not ours
alone."556 In Los Angeles, Representative Roosevelt heard witnesses tes-
tify that employers and unions were jointly responsible for discrimination
against blacks in the shipping,557 film,558seafaring,559 and restaurant560
industries. And in New York City Representative Roosevelt received ev-
idence about joint responsibility for discrimination in the building
trades,561 electric utilities,562 and sundry other industries. 563 This evi-
dence (of which he seemed to have been apprised by committee investiga-
tors before the hearings began) was evidently convincing to
Representative Roosevelt, for at the opening of the hearings in each city
he made the same statement: "We seek no whipping boy. We do not
believe, for example, either organized labor or management is wholly re-
sponsible for employment discrimination. "564
In addition, Representative Roosevelt heard at length about buck
passing. For example, in Chicago, the Rev. S. S. Morris, president of the
local branch of the NAACP, was speaking of apprenticeship programs
when he referred to "[a] vicious cycle of excuses and buckpassing from
board of education to union contractor, [that] has led to this miserable
condition of racial exclusion. . . ."565 Three members of the subcom-
mittee-Representatives Roman C. Pucinski of Illinois,566 Edward W.
555. Id. at 228 (testimony of Willoughby Abner).
556. Id. at 245-46.
557. Id. at 392-93 (testimony of William E. Pollard).
558. Id. at 393.
559. Id. at 401.
560. Id. at 472 (testimony of Joseph W. Walker).
561. Id. at 503-04 (testimony of Elmer Carter).
562. Id. at 513.
563. Id. at 712-13 (statement of Otis E. Finley).
564. Id. at 2, 280, 483.
565. !d. at 150.
566.
[T]here is a tendency to not be able to effectively fix the blame for this. The labor
groups maintain that the employer may be a very important role in this. The employer, on
the other hand, turns around and says it is the labor groups. The board of education
people blame both groups. . . .
. . . You cannot pin the responsibility on anyone source. . . .
Id. at 248. This statement also shows Representative Pucinski's belief that both employers and
unions were responsible for discrimination.
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Hiestand, of California,567 and Roosevelt himself568-made comments
which revealed a conviction that buck-passing was a serious problem.
Representative Roosevelt also believed that unions or employers
were capable of eliminating discrimination if either party set its mind to
the task. At the opening of the hearings in Chicago, he said, "I might
observe, though, that when either labor or management strongly desires
to effect change, change usually occurs."569 He made identical statements
at the openings of the hearings in Los Angeles570 and New York. 571
Representative Roosevelt believed that unions and employers were
jointly responsible for discrimination, that each of the parties often de-
nied its own responsibility by pointing a finger at the other, and that
either party was capable of effecting change. He expressed these beliefs
during the closing months of 1961, the period immediately preceding his
introduction of H.R. 10144. These beliefs must have led him to adopt
the formula in the Ives bill, which was more comprehensive than the
formula in the Dawson bill; comprehensiveness would certainly be a vir-
tue of a statute aimed at widespread, often subtle practices. These beliefs
also led him to apply the phrase "limit, segregate, or classify" to employ-
ers. If both unions and employers were jointly responsible for discrimi-
nation, both parties needed to be governed by the same statutory
provisions. If the parties tended to pass the buck, the answer was to
make both liable so buck passing would accomplish nothing. If either
party could effect change if so motivated, the risk of a law suit-with no
chance to shift the blame to the other party-was likely to provide ade-
quate motivation.
We may consider two additional explanations of section 703(a)(2).
First, the perception that unions and employers cooperated to disadvan-
tage blacks (or at least condoned each other's practices) probably led to a
realization that the parties could easily take advantage of a statute that
defined unlawful conduct by unions and employers in different terms.
Very likely, Representative Roosevelt came to appreciate that the parties
567.
I notice that in these particular groups that is a pretty tightly closed group. I do not
know whether management passes the buck to the union and the union passes the buck to
the management, but it would seem that in these tightly closed groups there might be
something to investigate. . . .
ld. at 4Ol.
568.
I am not blaming you as an individual. I am blaming you as part of an organization
that has responsibility and does not seem to have moved in any direction on it at all, at the
present time, except to pass the buck to management and then to say, "Our contract says
that management has this right and, therefore, we withdraw from the field. If management
wants to discriminate, there is nothing we can do about it.'
ld. at 430. See a/so id. at 247.
569. ld. at 2.
570. ld. at 280.
571. ld. at 483.
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could manipulate their practices so as to shift apparent responsibility to
the party whom the law did not reach. For example, section 5(b) of the
Ives bill prohibited unions from discriminating or segregating, but sec-
tion 5(a) prohibited employers only from discriminating. Therefore, all
the parties had to do was to place responsibility for segregation solely on
the employer. Of course, this problem did not have to arise. The solu-
tion was to define unlawful conduct by unions and employers in the same
terms. Adding section 703(a)(2) had just this effect.
Second, a further possible purpose for applying "limit, segregate, or
classify" to employers was that an employer without a labor union would
have been permitted to segregate freely, so long as she did not discrimi-
nate. To the extent that discrimination and segregation were different
concepts, the purpose behind Representative Roosevelt's bill required
that employers be barred from both forms of behavior.
Section 703(a)(2) was incorporated into Title VII in response to the
evidence that unions and employers were jointly responsible for discrimi-
nation and often cooperated purposefully to disadvantage blacks. Cer-
tainly there is no reason to believe that the section was written to
legislate a new definition of discrimination. It follows that Congress in-
tended Title VII to enact only one definition of discrimination, disparate
treatment.
III
THE POLICIES OF THE ACT AND A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Courts are constantly presented with claims that were not foreseen
by legislatures, that cry for relief, and that statutes can be extended to
cover. A general theory of when courts do or should extend a statute is
beyond the ambition of this article. Nevertheless, one tenet of such a
theory can be advanced with confidence: a court should not extend a
statute if it was hotly contested and, in final form, represented a compro-
mise, and if the proposed extension would undermine the purposes of the
statute or lead to a result the legislature desired to avoid. The adoption
of adverse impact violated this tenet.
We have seen that Congress did not intend to outlaw adverse im-
pact, which must be considered an extension of an act that divided Con-
gress deeply and was passed only after a compromise (the Mansfield-
Dirksen substitute) was fashioned. We have also seen that adverse im-
pact has led to quotas, which Congress abhorred. Below it will be shown
that this result is contrary to the purposes of the Act and, indeed, con-
trary to the purposes underlying adverse impact itself. For these reasons,
adverse impact should be abandoned.
The effort to achieve the purposes of Title VII should not be aban-
r1~ o.rl
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sistent with congressional intent, serves the policies Congress sought to
advance, and avoids or mitigates the problems of adverse impact, then
that construction would deserve serious attention. Such a construction
does exist. It results from applying the doctrine of foreseeable conse-
quences to disparate treatment.
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e A. The Reasons for Adverse Impact and the Policies of the Civil
Rights Act
r
I Griggs was no accident. The Supreme Court normally documents
with care its references to congressional intent. When the Court wrote,
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation"572-and omitted a footnote-
the Justices must have been fully aware that nothing in the legislative
history of Title VII supported this assertion. Furthermore, all of the Jus-
tices had lived through the civil rights era. Five of them573 were mem-
bers of the high court during the Eighty-eighth Congress, when the
principal issue in the capital was the civil rights bill; they must have
known that the idea of adverse impact had not been born or, at least, had
not entered the public consciousness. Another Justice574 was a key
leader in the civil rights movement; he, too, must have known from his
own experience what Congress intended and did not intend. Yet the de-
cision in Griggs was unanimous (Justice Brennan not participating).
Why did the Court ignore the will of Congress?
Two related explanations are possible. The first, psychological in
character, springs from the opinion itself:
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem em-
ployment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in
headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability. 575
* * * *
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and gen-
eral testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees
as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with examples of men
and women who rendered highly effective performance without the con-
ventional badges of accomplishment in terms of certificates, diplomas, or
degrees. 576
* * * *
What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the
572. 401 u.s. at 432.
573. Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, and White. Justice Brennan would have been
included in this group, but he took no part in the consideration or decision of Griggs.
574. Justice Marshall.
575. 401 U.S. at 432.
576. Id..at 433.
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person for the job and not the person in the abstract.577
Excluding Justice Brennan, the mean age of the Justices in 1970 was 65,
the median age was 62, and the youngest Justice was born in 1917.578
Therefore, all of the Justices had grown up in a period when education
beyond elementary school was often a privilege of wealth; and all of them
had lived through the Great Depression, when many promising young
persons were forced to leave school and fend for themselves. Surely,
each Justice personally knew individuals who, though lacking creden-
tials, had achieved great success in life. The Justices had lived through
the Second WorId War as well. During this time, there was a strong
emphasis on know-how and an equally strong disdain for pedigree. Also,
during and after the war, Americans came to realize that anti-Semitism
was an important element in Hitler's rise to power. The opportunity to
strike down a high school diploma requirement-a requirement that was
not necessary to perform the job; a requirement that blacks could not
satisfy because of the same kind of prejudice that corrupted Germany
before the war; a requirement than prevented blacks from drawing on
their ability and energy, as immigrants had done in the past, to improve
their lives-the opportunity to strike down this sort of requirement must
have beckoned to the Justices like the Sirens.
But Griggs is more than another example of a hard case that makes
bad law. The Court was correct to write, "The objective of Congress in
the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities. . . ."579 Injustice to blacks was one of the reasons for
Title VII, but economics was another. Congress sought to improve the
economic position of blacks and thereby improve the economic welfare of
the nation as a whole. Senator Clark said, "The Council of Economic
Advisors. . . states that we could add $13 billion to our gross national
product if Negroes could fully utilize the skills they already have in the
job markets. "580 Senator Case asked rhetorically:
How long can the United States continue to undertrain a sizable segment
of its young people, limit their opportunities for entry into the labor mar-
ket, hamper and restrict their employment advance, underutilize their
professional skills, deprive them of job security, without serious conse-
quences to the Nation's own economic and social advance?581
And Senator Humphrey declared:
In title VII we seek. . . to release the tremendous talents of the
American people, rather than to keep their talents buried under prejudice
or discrimination.
577. [d. at 436.
578. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, App. 6-8 (9th ed.
1975).
579.
580.
581.
401 U.S. at 429-430.
110 CONGo REC- 7205 (1964).
110 CONGo REC. 7242.
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Racial prejudice in employment is one of the most wasteful practices
for the economy. . . .
Every bit of evidence we have in connection with fair employment
practice laws indicates that such a statute not only is good law, good
morals, and good labor-management practice, but it also is good
economics. 582
Similar views were held in the House of Representatives. Represen-
tative Lindsay said, "title VII concerns economic waste; the economic
waste that is caused by denial of job opportunities to citizens in this
country.,,583 Representative McCulloch, the ranking Republican on the
House Judiciary Committee, joined by six other Republicans on the com-
mittee, expressed the same idea in additional views on the need for H.R.
7152:
The failure of our society to extend job opportunities to the Negro is
an economic waste. The purchasing power of the country is not being
fully developed. This, in turn, acts as a brake upon potential increases in
gross national product. In addition, the country is burdened with added
costs for the payment of unemployment compensation, relief, disease,
and crime.
National prosperity will be increased through the proper training of
Negroes for more skilled employment together with the removal of barri-
ers for obtaining such employment. Through toleration of discrimina-
tory practices, American industry is not obtaining the quantity of skilled
workers it needs. With 10 percent of the work force under the bonds of
racial inequality, this stands to reason. Similarly, an examination of job
openings that are regularly advertised discloses that the country is not
making satisfactory use of its manpower. Consider how our shortage of
engineers, scientists, doctors, plumbers, carpenters, technicians, and the
myriad of other skilled occupations could be overcome in due time if we
eliminate job discrimination.
A nation need not and should not be converted into a welfare state
to reduce poverty, lessen crime, cut down unemployment, or overcome
shortages in skilled occupational categories. All that is needed is the in-
stitution of proper training programs and the elimination of discrimina-
tion in employment practices. 584
582. Id. at 6549. Later, the Senator stated:
America has enjoyed many great scientific advances because we opened our doors to
immigrants from other countries, immigrants who could not find freedom to live and work
until they came to this country.
I am of the opinion that some of the great discoveries yet to come will be because
America kept its door open, because America kept its heart open. I am of the opinion also
that when industries deny jobs to people because of race, they really deny opportunities to
themselves. We cannot afford this artificial restriction on the productive capacity of free
men.
!d. at 13,083.
583. Id. at 1639.
584. H.R. REP. No. 914, Part 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVEHIS-
TORY,supra note 332, at 2149.
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These ideas were not new in the Eighty-eighth Congress. The argument
that discrimination should be outlawed because it is costly can be traced
back at least as far as Senator I ves' s bill in 1948.585
But new ideas did develop after Title VII was enacted. Psycholo-
gists learned that difference in intellectual ability is not the correct expla-
nation of why blacks do not perform as well as whites on standardized
ability tests.586 Social scientists learned that racially neutral standards
can exclude blacks from job opportunities. 587 The dominant economic
theory of discrimination, based on the notion that employers and others
have a taste for discrimination,588 was challenged by a new theory, called
statistical discrimination, in which taste and prejudice were irrelevant. 589
Even Congress learned. By the opening of the 1970's, our legislators
knew what they had not known several years earlier:
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series
of isolated and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on
the part of some identifiable individual or organization. It was thought
that a scheme that stressed conciliation rather than compulsory processes
would be most appropriate for the resolution of this essentially human
problem, and that litigation would be necessary only on an occasional
basis. Experience has shown this view to be false.
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex
and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now gener-
ally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than
simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject is replete
with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority and lines of
progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory
practices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation
requirements. 590
585. S. REP. No. 951, supra note 534, at 3-5.
586. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 156, at 1638-41.
587. /d. at 1599.
588. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICSOF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
589. A good explanation and summary of theories of statistical discrimination is Aigner & Cain,
Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977).
590. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (footnote omitted). Had the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, P.L. 92-261, modified or reenacted §§ 703(a)(1) or (2) in any way relevant herein, an
argument could be made that Congress ratified the Griggs decision; but these sections were not
touched by the 1972 amendments except for the addition of the words "or applicants for employ-
ment."
If anything, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments proves that Congress did not ap-
prove of Griggs. Section 8 of H.R. 1746 proposed to modify § 703(h) of Title VII by striking the
Tower amendment and substituting the following:
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test which is
directly related to the determination of bona fide occupational qualifications reasonably
necessary to perform the normal duties of the particular position concerned: Provided,
That such test, its administration, or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The House Committee on Education and Labor reported favorably on H.R. 1746. H. REP. No. 238,
92 Cong., 1st Sess. Speaking of the quoted language, the report said that general intelligence tests,
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The Supreme Court was learning at the same time Congress was.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Griggs was George Cooper. 591
Along with Richard Sobel, Professor Cooper was a co-author of an influ-
ential article that appeared in the Harvard Law Review in 1969.592 The
authors argued:
Performance on tests is to some extent dependent on innate ability, but in
addition, tests measure how well a person has assimilated the knowledge
and skills that the particular test is measuring. . . .
The general patterns of racial discrimination, lesser educational and
cultural opportunities for black people, and cultural separatism that have
marked our society for generations have impeded blacks in attaining the
background necessary for success on existing standardized tests. A con-
sequence of this discrimination and segregation is the lower average black
score on most standardized tests, nonverbal as well as verbal. This scor-
ing discrepancy is particularly evident in the South, where the disparity
in educational opportunity is the greatest. 593
Although Cooper and Sobel conceded a central point of the argument of
this article-in 1964 few people understood either that tests might be
unfair to blacks or that merely forcing employers to allow blacks to take
tests would not significantly improve blacks' employment opportuni-
ties594-nevertheless, the authors argued that "testing vio1ate[s] fair em-
ployment laws in situations where an adverse racial impact is not
adequately justified, without regard to the motive of the employer in
adopting the practices.,,595
The EEOC took the same position as Cooper and Sobel. In Guide-
lines issued in 1970,596the Commission defined discrimination to include
~nt
ed
lo-
la-
ed
ds
lIC
:rs
~d
;89
0,
on which middle class groups outperform culturally disadvantaged groups, "are often irrelevant to
the job to be performed by the individual being treated." Id. at 21. Then the report discussed Griggs
and the EEOC's Guidelines on testing, concluding: "Section 8 perfects Title VII's provisions with
respect to testing and apprenticeship training." Id. at 22. IfH.R. 1746 as reported by the Commit-
tee on Education and Labor had been enacted, there would be little doubt that, as of 1972, Congress
intended to outlaw adverse impact.
H.R. 1746 was not enacted, however. Despite the favorable committee report, a substitute that
left the Tower amendment intact was agreed to. 117 CONGo REC. 32,142 (1971). The most likely
conclusion to be drawn from this legislative history is that Congress rejected an attempt to ratify
Griggs.
Accordingly, the quotation in the text above demonstrates what Congress had learned about
racial discrimination. Similarly, the attempt to repeal the Tower amendment in favor of language
that would have protected only job-related tests reveals what Congress had learned about testing.
Neither piece of learning, however, found its way into law.
591. Mr. Cooper's name does not appear among the attorneys listed in the official report. 401
U.S. at 425. Nevertheless, Mr. Cooper is identified as being of counsel on the petition for certiorari,
and he is identified as one of the petitioners' attorneys on the first page of the petitioners' brief in the
Supreme Court.
592. Cooper & Sobel, supra note 156.
593. Id. at 1639-40.
594. Id. at 1600, 1645.
595. Id. at 1670 (footnote omitted).
S96. 35, Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
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"[t]he use of any test which adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer
or any other employment or membership opportunity of classes pro-
tected by title VII . . . unless: (a) the test has been validated and evi-
dences a high degree of utility as hereinafter described. . . ."597 The
Guidelines specified validation standards. 598
Although the Supreme Court did not cite Cooper and Sobel's arti-
cle, the Justices were surely aware of it: the article was mentioned three
times in the petition for certiorari and three more times in the plaintiffs'
brief; the article was also cited in the briefs of the United States and of
the Chamber of Commerce as amici curiae. The Court did rely on the
EEOC Guidelines,599 going so far as to grant them great deference.600
Although the Guidelines mentioned by the Court pertained only to the
exception for tests in section 703(h), and not to the definition of discrimi-
nation, the two concepts are inextricably related. The issue of validation
does not arise unless a test with an adverse impact is considered discrimi-
natory. In short, the plaintiffs and the government presented the Court
with a Brandeis brief which contained research and reflection that had
occurred after Title VII was enacted.
With this knowledge in mind, we have the makings of another ex-
planation of Griggs. The Supreme Court believed that Congress had
made an error in 1964. Title VII was enacted without a full understand-
ing of the ways and means by which blacks were disadvantaged in the
economic system. Focusing on the South, our legislators thought the
cause of the problem was ill will; accordingly, they outlawed purposeful
discrimination. Then scholars and advocates learned that seemingly
color-blind institutions like standardized ability tests can exclude quali-
fied blacks from jobs just as surely as the color bar did. Accordingly, the
Justices allowed themselves to be persuaded that, unless they expanded
Title VII to reach such institutions, a major purpose of the Act would
not be fulfilled. (They were predisposed to persuasion by their feeling
about hiring by use of pedigree instead of ability.) It must have appeared
to the Justices that, without adverse impact, the shortage of skilled work-
ers would not be alleviated, the gross national product would not reach
its potential, and the burden of crime and welfare would not be miti-
gated. Further, of course, black unemployment would not be reduced,
and poverty among blacks would remain an open sore. Believing (albeit
mistakenly) that the disparate treatment definition of discrimination was
not sufficient to do the job, the Supreme Court completed the work of
Congress by adopting the adverse impact definition. 60 1
597. [d. at 12,334.
598. Id. at 12,334-35.
599. 401 U.S. at 433.
600. Id. at 434.
601. Griggs was one aspect of a broader change that occurred in the late 1960's: race became a
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It is now apparent that the policies the Court wanted adverse impact
&finition of interest. Blacks made demands, not merely as individual victims of discrimination, but
as a group entitled to a share of benefits; and such demands were increasingly considered legitimate.
As a result, there developed the consciousness of blacks' group interest-which in Griggs became a
group right-that underlies adverse impact. This development occured in many areas, and proof of
it is beyond the scope of this article; but a sketch of the growth of group consciousness in relation to
employment may be attempted.
An important manifestation (and later a cause) of the change in attitude towards group rights
was the growth of the affirmative action required of federal contractors. Persons doing business with
the federal government had been required since the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt
to sign promises not to discriminate on the ground of race. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109
(1941). The administration of President John Kennedy added affirmative action to the requirement
of non-discrimination, Exec. Order. No. 10,925,26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961), but in those days affirma-
tive action was a comparatively mild obligation and required little more than active steps to elimi-
nate discrimination. For example, the Lockheed Corp. agreed to "re-analyze its openings for
salaried jobs to be certain that all eligible minority group employees have been considered for place-
ment and upgrading." M. SOVERN,supra note 328, at 110.
Affirmative action in today's sense dates from the late 1960's, that is, the period immediately
precedings Griggs. In 1965, President Lydon Johnson issued Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg.
12,319 (1965); § 201 made the Secretary of Labor responsible for administering the parts of the order
dealing with federal contractors and empowered the Secretary to issue regulations. The Secretary,
Willard Wirtz, had previously expressed strong feelings against quotas. It is true that he believed
that employers and unions should take measures to counteract the effects of discrimination in the
past-for example, training blacks who would have been qualified but for previous discrimination.
W. WIRTZ,LABORANDTHE PUBLICINTEREST102-03 (1964) (speech of May 22, 1964). Neverthe-
less, he firmly opposed reverse discrimination. He wrote, "There is argument about whether prefer-
ential hiring of Negroes, to counteract the effect of previous discrimination against them, is now in
order. I think it is not. . . ." Id. at 112 (speech of November 7, 1963);see also id. at 115-16 (speech
of November 18, 1963). But the Secretary changed his mind shortly after the executive order was
issued. The first step occurred when he reversed a policy in place since 1962 by ordering that em-
ployers who operated programs under the jurisdiction of the Labor Department-including federal
contractors-must keep records identifying employees by race. FACTSONFILE 223 (1966) (Week of
June 19-26, 1966). The next step was to compare the percentage of blacks in a labor market to the
percentage of blacks in a firm, and the final step was to require federal contractors to hire enough
blacks to make these percentages equal.
An early focus of the Secretary was the construction industry. In 1966, St. Louis construction
contractors were required, before they were awarded federal contracts, to submit to an examination
by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) in which the contractors had to identify the
racial characteristics of their employees and specify recruitment sources and hiring procedures.
Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 341, 344. In 1967 construction
contractors in the San Francisco Bay Area submitted detailed affirmative action programs. Id. at
346. In the same year, Cleveland construction contractors who submitted low bids were required to
submit affimative action plans "with specifications intended to 'have the result of assuring that there
was minority group representation in all trades on the job in all phases of the work.''' Id. When one
contractor's plan detailed the total number of employees he would use in each trade and stated how
many of that number would be his goal for minority employment, the government required similar
goals of all construction contractors in the area. Id.
The OFCC's major thrust in the construction industry was the Philadelphia Plan. Beginning in
1967, affirmative action plans were to be reviewed before award of a contract, and each plan had to
result in producing more minority group representation in all trades and phases of the construction
project. Representation meant "representative numbers," not mere tokenism, and manning tables
were developed. Id. at 348. In an opinion issued in 1968, the Comptroller General ruled the pre-
award reviews of the Philadelphia Plan violated the statutory requirement of competitive bidding
because minimum standards for affirmative action plans had not been promulgated. Id. at 359-60.
In 1969 the Secretary announced a revised plan that satisfied the Comptroller's objection. The re-
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to serve were the same policies Congress intended Title VII to serve:
justice for individuals and improvement for the economy.602 The unspo-
vised Philadelphia Plan found there were substantial numbers of trained and trainable minorities in
six crafts in the area and decreed that at least 4-6% of contractors' craft workers must be minorities
by the end of 1970, rising annually to a minimum of 19-20% in 1973. Id. at 369-72. The Comptrol-
ler General decided the revised plan was invalid because its specific goals would lead to reverse
discrimination, Comment, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas on Federal Contracts, 17
UCLA L. REV. 817, 822 (1970), but the Attorney General later declared the plan to be lawful.
Before Griggs was decided, a court had agreed with the Attorney General. Contractors Association
of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (B.D. Pa. 1970).
Although the construction industry may have led the way into modern affirmative action, the
regulations applicable to all federal contractors were more important because of the greater numbers
of employers and employees affected-as much as one-third of the labor force. Note, Executive
Order 11246: Anti-discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N.YD. L. REV. 590, 591
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Executive Order 11246}. On July 1, 1968, the Secretary issued regula-
tions that applied to all federal contractors. 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1969). Subpart C required each con-
tractor and subcontractor who had 50 or more employees and a contract of $50,000 or more to
develop a written affirmative action program. Each program had to contain "identification and
analysis of problem areas inherent in minority employment and an evaluation of opportunities for
utilization of minority group personne!." Id. at § 60-1.40. If minorities were underutilized-in
other words, disproportionately represented-the program had to state specific goals and timetables.
Id. James Jones, the Assistant Solicitor for Labor Relations, declared that the affirmative action
required by these regulations included any action necessary to achieve social equality in an em-
ployer's job structure. Executive Order 11246, supra, at 592.
An example of an affirmative action program that met the requirements of the regulations was
Burlington Industries' plan of 1969. The employer promised to keep records of minorities' status in
the firm; to develop specific goals and timetables for hiring minorities with reference to their availa-
bility in the hiring area; to attempt to fill vacancies in skilled jobs from present employees; and to
establish goals and timetables for upgrading minorities with reference to their proportion among all
employees. Id. at 607-10, in which the entire plan is quoted.
In a nutshell, the executive branch of the federal government recognized the interest of the class
of blacks in obtaining more employment opportunities and required federal contractors to provide
those opportunities, regardless of whether the individuals who benefitted had been victims of dis-
crimination by the contractors. The Philadelphia Plan and the regulations of the Secretary of Labor
were widely and intensely publicized. The Justices of the Supreme Court were surely aware of the
new definition of affirmative action and, as they decided Griggs, may have been influenced by the
emerging legitimacy of blacks' group interest.
602. Some writers have argued that the law against employment discrimination was predicated
on a desire to protect individuals from disadvantage based on immutable characteristics. See, e.g.,
Smith, The Law and Equal Employment Opportunity: What's Past Should Not Become Prologue, 33
INDUS.AND LAB. REL. REV. 493, 498-500 (1980). Mr. Smith claimed that the law originally fo-
cused on characteristics such as race and sex, over which individuals have no control. Then, Mr.
Smith argued, the law turned to age, a factor over which we have no control but which is exper-
ienced by everyone. And recently the law has begun to protect characteristics over which individu-
als presumably have control, for example, marital status. Mr. Smith disapproved of this step because
it
has further confused the role of the law in providing equal employment opportunity. The
protection afforded to veterans of the Vietnam era, for example, is not logically related to
the other forms of prohibited discrimination. In addition, prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy. . . or sexual preference, or political affiliation. . . draws the law
even farther away from its original purpose: prohibiting employment discrimination
against individuals on the basis of personal characteristics over which they possess no con-
trol.
. . . The absence of a coherent or consistent precept encompassing the new categories
of prohibited discrimination raises a fundamental question: what is the law being asked to
express by condemning categories of employment discrimination based on personal charac-
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ken but palpable theory of Griggs was that justice for individuals would
result if workers were evaluated by their abilities, not their pedigrees, and
the economy would improve if selection were based only on criteria that
predict success on the job.
Unfortunately, the theory underlying adverse impact did not work.
It assumed that employers could economically adopt job-related criteria.
This assumption has proved false. Employers have not adopted valid
criteria because such criteria do not presently exist, and the cost of devel-
oping them may often exceed the gain of using them. Consequently, em-
ployers have been motivated to find a way around the law. They have
looked for the loophole in the rule, and they have found it. They hire by
quotas. If a selection criterion does not have an adverse impact, the rule
does not require the employer to validate the criterion. So employers
merely ensure that proportionate numbers of blacks are hired.
This behavior is inefficient because workers are chosen based upon
their skins, not their skills. This behavior is unjust because workers are
denied employment opportunities solely because of their race. At first, it
is whites who suffer from quotas; the whites are denied jobs in favor of
less qualified blacks. Later, the tables will be turned, and it will be blacks
who suffer from quotas. For a quota that begins as a lower limit for
blacks will one day become an upper limit. The mechanism of this trans-
position is simple. An employer wants to avoid litigation. He identifies a
proxy for the available work force (for example, the total labor force or
the community) and ensures that the percentage of blacks who pass his
teristics that can be changed by the individuals involved? Such condemnation dilutes the
moral underpinning of a body of law that is intended to implement the ethical precept that
individuals should be judged in employment decisions solely on the basis of personal char-
acteristics within their personal control.
Id. at 499-500.
The author disagrees with Mr. Smith in two regards. First, injustice is not inextricably tied to
immutability. As a youth, the author dreamed of becoming a professional athlete; immutable char-
acteristics, however-size, speed, and coordination, to name a few-stood in his way. Yet he does
not feel he has been the victim of unjust discrimination. On the other hand, were he to lose his
present job because of the way he voted in the next election-a matter of which he has complete
control-he would take his case to the Supreme Court.
Second, the protected classes added to statutory law after 1964 do not represent a shift in direc-
tion. Congress has consistently been concerned with individual justice and productivity. The basic
idea is that justice in employment requires a worker to be judged on his own characteristics that are
related to productivity; judgments based on characteristics that are unrelated to productivity or that
may be true of a class to which the worker belongs, but are not true of him, are unfair.
Thus, Mr. Smith was wrong to say there is no logical relationship between the older and newer
protected classes. All are related because they promote productivity-related judgments based on
individual ability. Further, Mr. Smith was wrong to say that the new protected classes dilute the
moral underpinning of the law. American workers know, as Congress knew, that a woman can be as
productive as a man, and a handicapped worker who can do the job can be as productive as an able-
bodied worker. Contrary to Mr. Smith's assertion, Congress has uniformly acted on the precept that
employment decisions should be predicated on individual productivity, and that precept is widely
held in the nation.
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test is the same as the percentage of blacks in the proxy. At first, this
move may help blacks gain entry into jobs they might not otherwise have
obtained. Knowing that few of their race held the job in question, blacks
may have lost interest in it and prepared themselves for other jobs. Con-
sequently, in the begining blacks may amount to a greater share of the
proxy than they do of the available work force for the job in question.
Thus, the employer who hires as many blacks as the proxy indicates may
wind up with an overrepresentation of blacks. Soon, however, the word
will spread that this employer does not discriminate, and blacks will be
attracted to his firm. Witness the Post Office. Because whites have far
more job opportunities than blacks, before long blacks will comprise a
greater fraction of the available work force for a non-discriminatory em-
ployer than they comprise of the employer's proxy. In other words,
whereas blacks may at first have been over-represented in the employer's
proxy, eventually they will become under-represented. Yet the employer
will not likely adjust his quota. The same fear of litigation that moti-
vated him to hire a representative number of blacks will motivate him to
hire a representative number of whites. In short, blacks will rush to jobs
with a non-discriminatory employer, only to find themselves excluded-
as they may have been excluded twenty years ago-by a quota. For these
reasons, adverse impact is ultimately counterproductive.
B. A Proposalfor Reform
For all its theoretical and practical problems, adverse impact has the
virtue of attacking institutional discrimination. Injustice occurs when a
black's application for a job is rejected, not because of her lack of ability,
but because of characteristics white society has imposed on her race; and
national productivity will never reach its potential so long as blacks are
excluded from jobs for reasons unrelated to job performance. The plain-
tiffs in Griggs suffered a classic example of institutional discrimination:
they were qualified for the work they sought, but they were rejected be-
cause they lacked high school diplomas that white society, through a
myriad of discouragements, had hindered their obtaining. Congress may
have been unaware of this phenomenon in 1964, but it is clearly an evil
that should be eradicated, and it is close enough in kind to the problem
Congress was attempting to solve that courts may properly prohibit insti-
tutional discrimination under the aegis of Title VII. But ends are differ-
ent from means. Identifying an evil and agreeing that it may be dealt
with under a statute are separate from choosing the appropriate way to
eradicate the evil. Institutional discrimination is unjust. and should be
prohibited under Title VII, but adverse impact is the wrong tool for the
job.
Judicial law making is not only inevitable but also desirable. A leg-
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islature can address only so many problems when it enacts a statute; a
vehicle must exist for handling the public demand that closely related
problems be resolved. Such problems cannot practically be returned to
the legislature because they are too many and it acts too slowly. Also,
courts can experiment with rules, modifying or abandoning them as ex-
perience dictates, and courts can tailor rules to specific cases. But the
courts should not playa free hand as they make law under a statute.
They should keep in mind the purposes the statute was designed to serve;
they should honor the accommodations of interest fashioned in the legis-
lature and avoid the pitfalls the legislators feared.
The purposes of Title VII were to promote racial justice and to im-
prove national productivity. Quotas were considered unjust. Any as-
sault on institutional discrimination must respect the purposes of justice
and productivity and avoid the pitfall of quotas. Measured against these
criteria, adverse impact fails. It does not promote productivity because
the EEOC Guidelines make test validation too difficult. Also, both the
prima facie case and the "defense" under adverse impact are riddled with
difficulties, with the result that it does not clearly promote justice. And
because adverse impact is synonymous with quotas, it leads to the pitfall
that Congress meant to avoid at any cost.
Although adverse impact must be abandoned, the effort to combat
institutional discrimination need not be. If the doctrine of foreseeable
consequences were read into disparate treatment, much of the good of
adverse impact could be preserved, and much of the bad could be
eliminated.
Discrimination outlawed by Title VII occurs when an employer
judges a worker by his race rather than his productivity. We can read
the doctrine of foreseeable consequences into disparate treatment because
the doctrine serves the purposes of the Act. Under disparate treatment
with foreseeable consequences, a rebuttable presumption would arise that
the cause of a significant disproportionality was racial discrimination.
The reasoning supporting the presumption is that a person intends the
foreseeable consequences of her behavior. Thus, an employer would nor-
mally be held to have intended to discriminate if she used a test that was
not job-related and that had a disproportionate effect of which she knew
or reasonably should have known. The presumption could be rebutted
by proof that the employer intended (made reasonable efforts) to select
by productivity and not by race.603 Thus, an employer could use a valid
603. For example, suppose an employer filled 100 vacancies in entry-level jobs in a given month
with 70 whites and 30 blacks. If the plaintiff proved that half of the people living in the area
surrounding the plant were black and half of the applicants for the jobs were also black, we would
have reason to suspect the employer of discrimination. Why would we be suspicious? Because such
an outcome is unlikely to occur by chance (the possibility that random hiring would yield a 70:30
ratio is approximately one in 3,333), but such an outcome is quite consistent with the hypothesis of
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test, regardless of its disproportionate effect, because the test selects pro-
ductive workers. Other considerations would become relevant for cases
that fall between these poles, but the issue at all times would be whether
the employer selected by race or productivity. A few hypothetical cases
will demonstrate how foreseeable consequences applied to disparate
treatment (hereafter, "disparate treatment") would serve the purposes of
Title VII, mitigate the problems of adverse impact, and perhaps lead to
new benefits through increased communication between blacks and
employers.
Let us begin with a simple case. An employer required that all new
employees hold a high school diploma; 80 percent of whites in the avail-
able work force, but only 70 percent of blacks, could satisfy this require-
ment. The employer had never tried to determine systematically whether
the requirement predicted success on the job. Therefore, he cannot be
heard now to say that he required a diploma because it distinguished
productive from unproductive workers. He may have believed in good
faith that high school graduates make better employees; his common
sense may have suggested that graduation is proof of a certain level of
intelligence, knowledge, and discipline, and workers at this level will be
more productive than workers below it. But common sense can be
wrong. Indeed, a high school diploma can be unrelated or inversely re-
lated to successful performance of some jobs. The goal of enhancing pro-
ductivity is served by rational efforts to utilize the best available selection
criteria, not by intuitive and often mistaken impressions. Accordingly,
we may infer that Congress intended to protect reasonable, not merely
good-faith, beliefs about productivity. This inference is supported by the
Tower amendment, which was intended to protect professionally devel-
oped tests. An employer may reasonably believe that such a test, when
used for the kind of jobs for which it was designed, is valid. In our hypo-
thetical case, the belief of the employer was not reasonable because it was
not verified in any way.
The employer cannot claim ignorance of the disproportionate effect;
high school graduation rates are common knowledge and readily avail-
able in any almanac. Because he knew (or should have known) that a
greater proportion of whites than blacks holds diplomas, we may infer
that he intended the effects the diploma requirement produced. Thus, his
conduct amounted to disparate treatment because he intentionally pre-
ferred whites over blacks for reasons other than productivity. He may
discrimination. Still, the employer could win the case, for example, by proving that most of the
white applicants were well-recommended, experienced workers whose former employer had recently
gone out of business, while most of the black applicants were inexperienced youths without refer-
ences.
Note that the role of statistics in a disparate treatment case is to help reveal the employer's state
of mind.
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have lacked any desire to injure blacks and may have been free of racial
prejudice, yet he would remain liable. His position is the same as the
employer who intentionally refuses to employ blacks because of fear that
customers or co-workers will be dissatisfied.
Suppose the employer argues the disparity was not large enough to
matter. Certainly a minuscule difference in the performances of the races
ought to be disregarded. But any substantial disparity would be legally
significant if the employer (foresaw and therefore) intended it and the
test was not valid. The number of blacks to whom the test was unjust
might be small, but each individual was entitled to protection under Title
VII. In the face of the evidence that the employer lacked a reasonable
belief that his test fairly measured productivity, he should lose this case.
Suppose another employer used a test that 80% of whites passed,
but only 70% of blacks passed.604 He had never used the test before, or
had used it only a short while, and did not know whether the dispropor-
tionate effect was attributable to the test or to simple bad luck for the
blacks who took the test. Here we would be interested in the likelihood
that the disparity occurred by chance, the care with which the test was
chosen, and the employer's behavior towards black employees. If statis-
tical analysis revealed that the disparity in rates of success could easily
have occurred by chance, we would be unsure whether the disparity was
real or merely a random result. If the employer had carefully looked for
a fair test, and if he generally treated black employees as well as white
employees, we would believe the employer had taken reasonable steps to
select by productivity, not race. On the other hand, if the disparity was
unlikely to have occurred by chance, if the employer had chosen the test
without due regard for its applicability to the job in question, and if he
often treated individual blacks less favorably than whites, we would be
inclined to find for the plaintiffs. We would believe the disparity was
genuine and that the employer had not taken reasonable steps to select by
productivity; thus, he should have foreseen and, accordingly, he intended
the disproportionate effect the test produced.
Now let us consider another simple case. Suppose a test consistently
had a disproportionate effect, and a validation study revealed the test was
significantly better than chance at predicting success on the major as-
pects of the job. Plainly, the employer should win this case. Although
604. In the following analysis, test takers are used as a proxy for the available work force.
Comparing relative rates of success on an identified selection criterion is one common way of estab-
lishing adverse impact. Two other common proxies for the available work force are the population
of the community (or the labor force) and applicant flow; adverse impact is determined by compar-
ing the percentage of blacks on the job with the percentage of blacks in the community (or in the
area labor force) or by comparing the percentages of successful black and white applicants. See
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975). The analysis that follows
above in the text ,is equally applicable to these other proxies and methods of proof,
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she knew of, and therefore intended, the disproportionate effect, she also
knew the test selected qualified employees. Even if she were prejudiced
against blacks and actively desired the disproportionate effect, she would
win because the blacks whom the test disqualified were unable to do the
work and consequently have no legal ground of complaint.
The difficult (and most common) cases fall between the easy ones.
Suppose an employer hired according to score on a published ability test
and was aware that it had a disproportionate effect on blacks. The test
was professionally designed for the type of job for which the employer
used the test, and its authors asserted it was significantly better than
chance at predicting productivity on the job. The fundamental question
would be: did the employer intend to hire by productivity or race?
Knowing that the test was valid for this type of job, yet also knowing
that the test has not been validated for the specific job in the employer's
firm, we cannot be sure that only unqualified blacks were excluded;
therefore, other evidence becomes important. A partial list of such evi-
dence includes the likelihood and size of the disparity, the availability of
better tests, the economics of testing for this employer, and the em-
ployer's treatment of black employees and potential employees. Ceteris
paribus, a disparity that probably did not occur by chance-particularly
a large one605-runs counter to the assumption that blacks and whites
are equally qualified for most jobs. An employer genuinely interested in
productivity-based decisions would normally be suspicious of a signifi-
cant disparity and would investigate alternative selection criteria; an em-
ployer content with a disproportionate effect would be more likely to
turn a blind eye to alternatives. Also, the amount of money an employer
can economically spend on testing varies with individual circumstances.
For example, a large firm with high turnover in a necessary job may
profit from developing the best possible test for that job; a small firm with
low turnover in a minor job may be wiser to minimize selection costs.
An employer who uses the best test that the economics of the situation
dictate is judging according to productivity; an employer who spends an
unreasonably small amount on selection may be judging according to
race. And an employer who behaves fairly towards blacks already on the
job and who actively seeks black applicants is more likely to have used a
test for its predictive power (as opposed to its disproportionate effect)
than an employer who treats black employees unfairly and is hostile to
affirmative action. 606
605. A disparity can be large in two ways. One is the percentage difference between rates of
success, for example 80% vs. 15%. Another way is the absolute number of persons affected. The
difference between 80% success for whites and 75% for blacks might be considered small if the
difference in absolute numbers of successful applicants were 50, but large if the difference were 5,000.
606. In Fumeo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the employer hired for a job by
contacting persons whom a supervisor knew to be qualified. The Supreme Court found the employer
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Disparate treatment, applied with regard for the purposes of Title
VII, would avoid some of the major problems of adverse impact, and
those which remained would become less troublesome. The focus of liti-
gation would be the employer's reason for adopting the challenged selec-
tion criterion. Was it used in a reasonable belief that the criterion
measured productivity, or was it used because of its disproportionate ef-
fect on blacks? Clearly, the burden of persuasion would be on the plain-
tiffs to establish that the employer acted for improper reasons. The
notion of causality involved would be precisely what Congress intended,
namely, motivated behavior.
The costs and benefits of validated tests would be relevant evidence
under disparate treatment. The law would no longer expect an employer
to spend more money validating and administering a test than use of the
test would save. The law would also expect an employer to consider
seriously suggestions by employees of alternative recruitment and selec-
tion procedures that might reduce the disproportionate effect of a test.
Most important, the quotas that result from adverse impact would
disappear. Employers resort to quota hiring because the cost of con-
structing a valid test far exceeds the benefit of using it. Because disparate
treatment recognizes that Congress sought to enhance rather than dimin-
ish productivity, an employer acts within the law by making reasonable
efforts to choose the selection criterion that best contributes to productiv-
ity. If such a criterion has a disproportionate effect on blacks and is only
marginally better than random hiring in predicting success on the job (so
that the employer has cause for concern that her good faith could be
questioned), one solution would be elimination of the disproportionality
via a quota; but this step would be unattractive because the employer
would know she was hiring blacks who were less qualified than whites
she could hire. Other solutions would be much more attractive: the em-
ployer could increase her efforts to find a better yet economical selection
criterion; she could ensure that black employees were treated fairly on
the job; she could encourage blacks to apply for work in her firm and
help them improve their skills through on-the-job training. Steps like
these-affirmative action as it was understood when Congress passed Ti-
tle VII-would be neither unfair to whites nor costly to the employer,
and they would protect her effectively against disparate treatment claims.
had not discriminated, even though the employer might have hired more minority workers by ac-
cepting applications at the job site. The Court held that Title VII "does not impose a duty to adopt a
hiring procedure that maximizes the hiring of minority employees." Id. at 57-78. The proposal
suggested in the text is not inconsistent with this holding. The proposal would not require employ-
ers to maximize the hiring of blacks. Rather, the proposal holds that, if an employer uses a selection
criterion that disproportionately excludes blacks when the employer is aware of a more (or at least
equally) economical selection criterion that excludes fewer blacks, the employer's use of the former
criterion is evidence of an intent to discriminate. Like other evidence of intent, of course, this sort of
evidence would not necessarily be conclusive.
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Of course, some of the problems associated with adverse impact
would remain; yet these problems are attributable directly to Congress.
Back pay can be troublesome under disparate treatment; for example,
suppose an employer flatly refused to hire any blacks, and a court had to
determine which blacks were interested and qualified and would have
been hired in the absence of discrimination. Yet Congress knew there
were such employers and specifically wrote back pay into the Act.
Because the disproportionate effect of a test would remain relevant
evidence, courts would still need to decide whether the plaintiffs identi-
fied a fair proxy for the available work force, and courts would still need
to compare the effect of the criterion on blacks and whites. Courts would
also have to draw a line between legally significant and insignificant dis-
parities (though we have argued that any disparity more than minimal is
legally significant under disparate treatment). Thus, characteristics of a
group would still bear on whether an individual suffered discrimination.
But Congress is responsible for these problems, too, for it contemplated
that statistical evidence would be relevant to the employer's state of
mind. 607 Statistics must refer to properly defined classes, methods of
607. The Supreme Court has properly utilized statistical analysis to illuminate intent in Title
VII cases in which intentional discrimination was at issue. The seminal case was Casteneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), in which a prisoner in a Texas jail attacked his conviction on the ground of
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the selection of grand jurors. The prisoner proved
that 79% of the county's population was Mexican-American, while the average percentage of Mexi-
can-American grand jurors over an 11 year period was 39%; and during the two and one-half year
period when the grand jury which indicted him sat, the percentage of Mexican-Americans on the list
from which grand jurors were selected was 50%. (The average percentage of Mexican-Americans
actually on grand juries during this period was 46%.) [d. at 495. The prisoner also proved that
potential grand jurors were selected by "key men" who applied subjective standards that were sus-
ceptible to abuse as applied. [d. at 497. The state offered no evidence attacking the reliability of
those statistics or the prisoner's allegations of discrimination. Rather, the state directed its fire at the
probative value of the statistics, arguing the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun writing, disagreed:
If the jurors were drawn randomly from the general population, then the number of
Mexican-Americans in the sample could be modeled by a binomial distribution. . . .
Given that 79.1 % of the population is Mexican-American, the expected number of Mexi-
can-Americans among the 870 persons summoned to serve as grand jurors over the II-year
period is approximately [870 x .791 =] 688. The observed number [of Mexican-American
grand jurors] is 339. Of course, in any given drawing some fluctuation from the expected
number is predicted. The important point, however, is that the statistical model shows that
the results of a random drawing are likely to fall in the vicinity of the expected value. . . .
The measure of the predicted fluctuations from the expected value is the standard devia-
tion, defined for the binomial distribution as the square root of the product of the total
number in the sample (here 870) times the probability of selecting a Mexican-American
(0.791) times the probability of selecting a non-Mexican-American (0.209). . . . Thus, in
this case the standard deviation is approximately 12. As a general rule for such large
samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater
than two or three standards deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was
random would be suspect to a social scientist. The II-year data here reflect a difference
between the expected and observed number of Mexican-Americans of approximately 29
standard deviations. A detailed calculation reveals that the likelihood that such a substan-
tial departure from the expected value would occur by chance is less than 1 in 10140.
Id. at 496-97 n.17. In other words, given the data at hand, the observed low percentage of Mexican-
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comparing statistics must be approved, and lines must be drawn between
American grand jurors was extremely unlikely to have occurred by chance. Therefore, a cause of
some sort was working to limit the number of Mexican-American grand jurors. What was the
cause? Only one cause was relevant in this, an equal protection case: namely, an intent to exclude
Mexican-Americans. Given the history of human relations in Texas and the subjective method of
selecting potential grand jurors, the Court rightly believed that purposeful discrimination was the
most likely cause of the observed outcomes. The state having failed to convince the Court that
another, legitimate cause explained the outcomes, the prisoner prevailed.
Three months later, the Supreme Court applied this mathematical model to a Title VII case. In
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the Attorney General sued a school
district near St. Louis, claiming the district was engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
against black applicants for teaching positions. The government proved that school principals had
unlimited discretion in hiring. The only guideline was to hire the most competent person, compe-
tence including intangibles like personality, disposition, appearance, poise, voice, articulation, and
ability to deal with people. Id. at 302. The government also proved that, of 1,231 teachers employed
by the district during the 1972-1973 school year, only 22 (less than 2%) were black; while more than
15% of the teachers in the greater St. Louis area were black and nearly 6% of the teachers in the
area surrounding but excluding the City of St. Louis were black. Id. at 303. The school district
argued that these statistics lacked probative force on the issue of whether the district was engaged in
a pattern or practice of discrimination, but the Court answered by quoting its recent decision in
Teamsters v. United States:
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices
will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired. Evi-
dence of long-lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that
of the general population thus may be significant even though § 7030) makes clear that
Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population.
433 U.S. at 307, quoting 431 U.S. at 340 n.20. Was the disparity between the percentage of black
teachers in the area and the percentage employed by the school district large enough to be significant
on the issue of discrimination? The Court could not answer the question because of uncertainty over
the appropriate proxy for the available work force. The proxy could have been all teachers in the
greater St. Louis area, or only teachers in the area surrounding but excluding the city. Applying the
methodology of Castaneda, Justice Stewart calculated that, in the former case, the number of black
teachers employed by the school district in 1972-1973 would be more than five standard deviations
from the expected number, whereas, in the latter case, the number hired would be less than two
standard deviations from expectation. The case was therefore remanded for litigation of the issue of
the appropriate proxy.
The Supreme Court was correct in applying the methodology of Castaneda to the facts of Ha-
zelwood, for the issue in both cases was whether the defendant had intentionally disadvantaged a
protected class of people. We have noted that Castaneda was an equal protection case, and the
Court had previously held that motive is controlling in constitutional cases of this sort. Hazelwood,
too, turned on motive. There was no showing that a facially neutral selection criterion had an
adverse impact on black applicants; rather, the government proved that hiring was an unregulated,
subjective process that could easily have been infected by a discriminatory motive. Thus, statistics
were used in Hazelwood in exactly the manner foreseen by Congress: they helped to reveal the
employer's state of mind.
One may be uncomfortable with the Castaneda methodology, for there are elements of irration-
ality about it. For example, what was the basis for believing that Mexican-Americans and Anglo-
Americans in Texas were equally willing and qualified to serve as grand jurors, or that black and
white teachers in the St. Louis area were equally willing and qualified to fill the positions available in
Hazelwood schools? A presumption of equality is necessary to this form of reasoning-otherwise,
disproportionate representation would be the expected result; yet evidence on which to support the
presumption is rarely if every presented.
More important, Castaneda methodology all but forgets that rare events do occur by chance,
even in random procedures. If a coin is flipped 10 times, the result is unlikely to be 10 tails. If the
exercise is repeated often enough, however, a string of 10 tails will appear. If this result occurred on
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significant and insignificant results. But whereas statistics are controlling
under adverse impact, they are only informative under disparate treat-
ment. Group characteristics would help explain how an employer in-
tended to treat individuals, and liability would never hinge on statistics
alone. As the Interpretative Memorandum stated, "While the presence
or absence of other members of the same minority group in the work
force may be a relevant factor in determining whether in a given case a
decision to hire or to refuse to hire was based on race, color, etc., it is
, only one factor. . . ."608
Foreseeable consequences may be read into Title VII without doing
violence to the separation of powers. Because the doctrine is old and
settled, and the Act and its legislative history are silent on the point, we
may fairly assume that Congress was not averse to the courts' invocation
of the doctrine. It would lead to the same outcome in some ca~es as
adverse impact does now, but to different results in other cases. In
Griggs, for example, the testing issue would have been resolved against
the employer. Passing the tests became a condition precedent to all jobs
outside the labor department on July 2, 1965-the very date on which
Title VII became operative. Given Duke Power's history of discrimina-
tion, this coincidence hardly seems accidental. Passing scores on the
tests were set at the national median for high school graduates, so that a
large fraction of all graduates could not qualify. Duke Power must have
known that such high passing scores would exclude virtually all blacks
from the very jobs from which blacks had been excluded in the past-
another dubious coincidence. Duke Power could not have believed that
passing the tests was necessary evidence of ability to succeed on the job:
although the company could have afforded the cost of a validation study
and probably hired sufficient employees to benefit from a job-related test,
no attempt had been made prior to the litigation to determine whether
success on the tests predicted success on the job; and common sense indi-
cates that coal handlers and clerks do not need such impressive creden-
tials. It follows that the testing requirement would have been struck
down under disparate treatment.
The diploma requirement in Griggs presents a closer question. On
the one hand, the requirement had been established in 1955, when dis-
crimination against blacks did not have to be hidden behind facially neu-
the first try and one was accused of cheating, the Castaneda methodology would support the accusa-
tion. It would be wrong, but a convincing rebuttal would be difficult to construct. Thus, a certain
number of innocent employers and school districts, whose numbers simply fall in the tails of a bino-
mial distribution, will be in serious trouble. However, these (and perhaps other) difficulties are not
reasons to reject the use of statistics to prove motive. Congress intended such use. Congress also
wisely limited such use: statistics are one factor, but not the only factor, that is relevant in proving
state of mind.
608. 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964).
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tral standards; and the diploma requirement was never applied to the
black labor department. Thus, the genesis of the requirement was not
discriminatory. After the Act took effect, Duke Power applied the di-
ploma requirement to blacks and whites alike, and the company financed
two-thirds of the tuition of employees who pursued diplomas. Further-
more, a modicum of education does not seem unreasonable for a job in a
power plant, which is mechanized with expensive equipment that could
be dangerous to employees or damaged by them. On the other hand,
Duke Power surely knew the diploma requirement excluded dispropor-
tionate numbers of blacks. The company had reason to suspect the re-
quirement was unnecessary, for several employees without diplomas
performed satisfactorily on jobs for which diplomas were later required.
Indeed, shortly after Title VII took effect, Duke Power began to allow
employees who lacked a diploma to transfer to other departments by
achieving satisfactory scores on the written tests. (We have noted that
this policy was probably implemented because whites who lacked diplo-
mas were not allowed to transfer into departments for which blacks with
diplomas had become eligible. This fact suggests the diploma require-
ment may not have been applied in complete good faith.) Finally, as was
true of the testing requirement, Duke Power had made no effort to vali-
date the diploma requirement, but could probably have paid the cost and
gained the benefit of more productive workers. Taking into account this
employer's history of discrimination and our conclusion about the testing
requirement, disparate treatment would probably have nullified the di-
ploma requirement as well, though reasonable persons might differ on
this issue.
, In other cases, disparate treatment would yield a different-and bet-
ter--outcome than adverse impact. Suppose a small employer used a
standardized ability test to select among applicants. 609 The test had a
moderate adverse impact on blacks and, though the publisher of the test
claimed it was valid for the class of jobs to which the employer applied
the test, it had not been validated for the specific job for which the test
was used in this employer's firm. The cost of constructing a valid test,
compared to the benefit of using such a test, would have been unreasona-
ble in light of the employer's revenue and turnover. The employer dealt
with her employees on an individual basis and did not tolerate racial
harassment or epithets on the job. This employer would be liable under
609. There is a growing body of opinion that professionally developed cognitive ability tests
(that is, "intelligence tests") are useful predictors of job performance. See, e.g., Ghiselli, The Valid-
ity of Aptitude Tests in Personnel Selection, in G. DREHER& P. SACKETT,PERSPECTIVESON EM-
PLOYEESTAFFINGAND SELECTION337 (1983); Schmidt & Hunter, Employment Testing: Old
Theories and New Research Findings, in id. at 368. Some caution before accepting such opinions
may be in order. See id. at 338-91. Nevertheless, this research indicates the wisdom of Congress's
intent to protect professionally developed ability tests when used for the jobs for which the tests are
designed.
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adverse impact, as the test had a disproportionate effect on blacks and
was not validated; yet liability on these facts would be unjust. Under
disparate treatment, the employer would rightfully win this case.
Of course, the facts could change and, if they did, perhaps the great-
est benefit of disparate treatment would be realized. Suppose black em-
ployees (perhaps aided by an organization in the community) approach
the employer we have just described and complain of the adverse impact
of her test. She answers that she will not hire by quotas (which are ille-
gal), cannot hire at random, and has been satisfied with applicants who
passed the test. The blacks respond that an unvalidated test might be
unfair to black applicants-indeed, to qualified white applicants as well;
a better selection criterion would produce better employees of both races.
The employer replies that constructing a valid test for the job in question
would be economically infeasible.
At this point, the sweetest fruits of disparate treatment would begin
to appear. Perhaps the blacks or their friends in the organization helping
them know of a valid test (possibly used by another firm) of which the
employer was unaware. Perhaps the blacks know of experts in test devel-
opment who would offer their services at moderate fees for a good cause.
If these possibilities do not develop, others may. The employer may
agree to recruit more heavily in black neighborhoods and media in order
to offset the disproportionate effect of her test, or she may agree to give
blacks advance notice of a job vacancy in order to provide them with a
reasonable chance to identify qualified members of their race who could
apply. This list of possibilities is limited by our imagination, but there is
no limit to the possibilities an open line of communication could
produce.
The motive to communicate would be strong. The blacks would be
helping their fellow workers while probing for evidence that might sup-
port a law suit should the employer prove recalcitrant. The employer
would be demonstrating her good faith while entertaining ways to im-
prove her work force.
Congress hoped that claims of discrimination would be settled infor-
mally. The conciliation mechanism of section 706(a) was designed for
this purpose. This purpose has not been fulfilled under adverse impact,
but disparate treatment might well stimulate conciliation. Certainly, this
approach would be closer to the will of the people in Congress assembled.
